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Michoud v. Girod

Citations: 45 U.S. 503; 11 L. Ed. 1076; 4 How. 503; 1846 U.S. LEXIS 412

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 18, 1846; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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A legal dispute arose from an appeal in the case involving appellants Antoine Michoud and others against defendants Peronne Bernardine Girod and several heirs of Claude François Girod. The appeal originated from the Eastern District of Louisiana's Circuit Court, where the defendants had won a decree. They claimed they were victims of fraudulent transactions beginning in 1813, orchestrated by Nicholas Girod, a brother of the deceased Claude François Girod, which deprived them of their rightful inheritance from his estate. Claude François Girod died in November 1813, leaving a will and codicil that were probated shortly after his death. He had no spouse and left behind eight siblings and the children of a deceased sister as his legal heirs. Notably, Jacques Antoine Girod was specifically excluded from inheritance by the terms of the will. The case involved multiple legal filings and amendments, complicating the proceedings, but the core issue centered on the alleged fraud and mismanagement of the estate. Claude François Girod’s will expressed his wishes and background, reflecting his intent to adhere to his Catholic faith.

Living beings should settle their affairs while in good health and sound mind to prevent complications during illness that may impair judgment. A request is made for divine grace and a burial among Christians with traditional rites. The testator's estate includes three houses, a plantation with buildings and improvements, various lands, and over two hundred seventy bales of cotton. Acknowledgment is given to debts totaling approximately thirty thousand dollars. Specific bequests include $2,000 for annual masses and church repairs in Thone, $1,000 for the poor of the parish, $500 to cousins Dodos Gollie, $2,000 to the Suard brothers, $500 to distant relations, $1,000 to the Charity Hospital, $2,000 to the children of the deceased sister Fran oise, $1,000 to sister Teresa, $1,000 to god-daughter Rosalie, $4,000 to brother James, and $2,000 to brother Claude, all stated without prejudice to their rights in the succession.

The document outlines the last will of C. F. Girod, detailing specific bequests and the appointment of executors. Girod bequeaths $500 to the parish of Assumption for church construction, $6,000 to Fran oise Vils for her long service, $1,500 to his god-daughter Fran oise, and $200 each to mulatresses Belanie and Polline. He grants freedom to his mulatto slave Dominic, effective six months posthumously. Girod appoints his brother Nicolas and Jean Fran ois as executors, with Mr. Phillipon as an alternate. He annuls any prior wills, emphasizing that this document represents his final intentions. 

Following Girod's death, a judge confirmed the will and its executors. Four inventories of Girod's estate were conducted between November 12, 1813, and February 26, 1814, totaling $124,594.45, which included a disputed half-interest in property in New Orleans. Allegations arose that the executors acted unlawfully to benefit themselves at the expense of other heirs, claiming the entirety of the estate.

On January 19, 1814, Nicholas and Jean François Girod, testamentary executors for their deceased brother Claude François Girod, petitioned Judge François Corvaisier of the Court of Probates in Lafourche Parish. They sought court approval to sell the estate's movable property, plantation, slaves, and adjoining lands at public auction to settle succession debts, as authorized by Claude's will dated November 30, 1812. 

On February 16, 1814, the executors executed a bond to protect the judge from liabilities associated with selling properties outside his jurisdiction. Subsequently, on February 18, 1814, Judge Corvaisier conducted the sale of the estate's assets at the deceased’s sugar plantation, which included various tracts of land and personal property. An error was noted regarding a lot at Donaldsonville that mistakenly appeared in the inventory but belonged to another party. The sale totaled $84,755.40, excluding any calculation errors, and was signed by witnesses and the judge.

On February 18, 1814, a judicial sale of the estate of the deceased C. F. Girod was conducted in Assumption Parish, Louisiana. J. F. Corvaisier, the judge of the Parish and Court of Probates, oversaw the auction, which involved various properties including thirteen tracts of land, a sugar plantation, three islands at the mouth of Bayou Lafourche, and one hundred seventeen slaves, alongside livestock, farming implements, and distillery equipment. The sale, announced publicly, was conducted without warranties against latent defects. All items were sold individually, except for the sugar plantation, which was sold with its furnishings. The total amount received was $84,755.40, paid in cash by Charles Saint Felix, who acknowledged his receipt and took possession of the property. The executors, Nas. Girod and Jn. F. Girod, confirmed receipt of the funds and released Saint Felix from any further claims. The document was signed by the involved parties and witnesses, and noted by the presiding judge, J. Corvaisier.

On February 23, 1814, Saint Felix transferred ownership of property to Nicholas Girod and Jean F. Girod for $84,755.40, acknowledging receipt of payment and stating that no further titles would be provided beyond those from a prior judicial sale. The deed stipulates that the purchasers accept the provided titles and release Saint Felix from any future claims. The transaction was witnessed and signed by the parties involved. 

Subsequently, on March 4, 1814, Nicolas and Jean François Girod, as testamentary executors of the late Claude François Girod, petitioned the Court of Probates, presided by Judge James Pitot, to sell eight lots and a piece of ground in New Orleans, valued at $20,700, to satisfy debts of approximately $60,000 owed by the deceased's estate. They requested the sale be conducted for cash, given the indivisibility of the property. The petition was served to the attorney for absent heirs, who expressed no objections. Following court orders, the sale proceeded as requested, with the final sale occurring on April 9, 1814.

On April 9, 1814, at 10 A.M., Jean Baptiste Marc Brierre, deputy register of wills for New Orleans, conducted a public sale of properties belonging to the succession of the late Claude Francois Girod. Present were Nicolas Girod, a testamentary executor, and Charles Robert Caune, an attorney representing absent heirs, along with witnesses Prosper Prieur and Sebastian Blondeau. The auction concluded with a total sale amount of $27,700, which Nicolas Girod acknowledged and took possession of.

Subsequently, on April 28, 1814, Simon Laignel sold six lots of ground to Nicolas Girod for $35,800. The sale was executed before notary Michel de Armas and included a warranty limited to Laignel's acts and deeds. Laignel confirmed he acquired the property through the earlier public sale by Nicolas Girod as testamentary executor. The transaction was free of any mortgages, and Laignel acknowledged receiving the full payment in cash prior to the signing, waiving certain legal exceptions. The document was signed by the parties involved and the requisite witnesses.

The document details a legal case in which Nicholas Girod accuses the executors of Claude Francis Girod's estate, specifically Jean François Girod and R. C. Caune, of fraudulently claiming nearly $49,000 as creditors of the estate. Nicholas Girod asserts that he is owed $40,577.20 by the estate, based on debts incurred prior to Claude's death, and that the executors have refused to pay despite repeated requests. He petitions the court for the executors to be summoned and compelled to pay the owed amount, including interest and costs. 

The case was filed in the Parish Court of New Orleans on November 26, 1814, with Nicholas presenting a detailed account of the debt. The executors, in their responses filed on November 29, 1814, deny the claims, asserting that Nicholas must prove his allegations before the court, and request dismissal of the case with costs. The document includes formal citations and procedural details, including the service of the petition and the responses from the defendants.

An order was issued by the Parish Court of New Orleans on November 27, 1814, appointing F. Percy and F. M. Rouzan as arbitrators in the case of Nicolas Girod versus J. F. Girod, executor of C. F. Girod, with C. R. Caune representing absent heirs. Alfred Hennen, counsel for the plaintiff, moved for this appointment, and the court ordered that if the arbitrators could not reach an agreement, a third umpire would be appointed. 

On December 10, 1814, Percy and Rouzan, sworn in by Justice of the Peace John L. Laparge, examined the accounts between Nicolas Girod and the succession of the late Claude François Girod. They verified documents and testimonies, focusing on a sworn account from Nicolas Girod detailing thirteen items. The first verified item was for 801 hides, valued at $1,602, confirmed by Jean François Girod, who stated these hides were left in Claude François Girod's stores and sold for personal gain. The second item, amounting to $1,500, was derived from an account collected by Pierre Bousignes, a clerk for Claude F. Girod, who recalled that the funds belonged to Nicolas Girod and had been partially paid out before a fire in 1794.

The third item totals 6,222.18, arising from various remittances and transactions involving Jean Francois Girod and Claude Francois Girod concerning Nicolas Girod's interests. Key amounts include:

- 3,593.37 from a March 1795 fur shipment on the brig Jane, for which Claude Francois Girod never provided an account to Nicolas Girod.
- 2,395.63 for a second fur shipment in April 1795 on the brig L'Archedimoi, documented in the same copy-book.
- 432.75 for a barrel of wine charged to Claude Francois Girod's private account on October 17, 1795, with no subsequent credit.
- 2,000.00 for a bill of exchange drawn on April 7, 1796, by Claude Francois Girod, which was never accepted or paid.
- 1,193.75 for half the proceeds of twenty-six barrels of gunpowder shipped in April 1796, which Claude Francois Girod has not accounted for.
- 210.06 for miscellaneous merchandise belonging to Nicolas Girod that Claude Francois Girod failed to account for.
- 476.87 for debts that Claude Francois Girod was to collect on behalf of Nicolas Girod.
- 60.00 for a barrel of wine sold to Mr. de Vangine and paid to Claude Francois Girod.

The fourth item, amounting to 186.00, is based on Jean Francois Girod's claim that these articles were shipped to Havana by Claude Francois Girod for his private account. The fifth item, totaling 651.50, represents net proceeds from a sale made by Claude Francois Girod.

Girod's documentation details various financial transactions involving merchandise consigned to Claude François Girod by Nicolas Girod and Jean François Girod. Key entries include:

1. Two bales of blue drilling shipped to New York in 1801, with proceeds documented by Guilhempan, the clerk for C. F. Girod.
2. Net proceeds of a cask of manna shipped in 1797 by Nicolas Girod, as recorded in the same copy-book.
3. Merchandise consigned by Jean François Girod in 1797, originally belonging to Nicolas Girod, with sales documented in a separate waste-book.
4. Proceeds from merchandise left with Jean François Girod, also sold by Claude François, supported by documentation in another copy-book.
5. Net proceeds from twelve barrels of wine shipped in 1797, confirmed by a sales record.
6. Sales of 498 sextains of cards shipped in 1797, with proceeds accounted in the sales-book.
7. Further sales of 762 sextains of cards shipped in 1795, also documented in the sales-book.
8. A substantial sum from various lots of merchandise and jewelry sent to the provinces by Claude François Girod, with unsettled accounts between him and Nicolas Girod, as attested by Jean François Girod and other witnesses, indicating avoidance of accounting by Claude François Girod. 

The total of these transactions reflects a detailed financial history that includes both shipments and subsequent sales, with evidence presented through various records and witness statements.

The document details an arbitration involving Nicolas and Claude F. Girod concerning a financial account. The account balance, totaling $6,574.30, was adjusted on August 1, 1813, by Mr. Phillippon, Jr. The arbitrators confirmed that the items in the account do not pertain to the business dealings between the parties. They reviewed interest calculations on various components of the claim, including amounts from 1794 and 1797, applying a 6% annual interest rate over specified periods. The arbitrators verified the accuracy of most calculations, corrected one claim regarding a $651.50 item, and confirmed the final interest on the last account item. After thorough review, the total capital and interests due amounted to $62,769.98. The sums credited to Girod's account were also verified and totaled $22,351.89, leading to a balance in favor of Nicolas Girod.

Nicolas Girod's claim against Jean François Girod, executor of Claude François Girod's estate, has been adjusted to a balance of $40,418.09, down from $40,579.20, due to interest reductions on one item of the account. Arbitrators, after reviewing testimonies from witnesses and the relevant documents, determined that this adjusted sum is legally owed to Nicolas. Witness Joseph Guillot recounted a prior conversation with Claude François Girod, wherein Claude expressed a desire to settle accounts with Nicolas and proposed selling his house to him. However, Nicolas rejected this proposal and indicated he had made his own proposals to Claude, which were never resolved. The findings were formally documented and signed on December 12 and 14, 1814. Subsequently, the court ordered the defendants to provide reasons, by December 17, against homologating the arbitrators' report as a judgment.

A court order was issued on December 15, 1814, directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff $40,418.09, along with taxable costs, in accordance with an arbitrators' award. This judgment was finalized by Judge J. Pitot on May 6, 1815. A Deputy Clerk, Alfred Bodin, certified the case records on January 10, 1844. 

In a related matter, Jean François Girod submitted an account against a succession, which led to a judgment of $8,253.20 in his favor. The complainants alleged that most coheirs entrusted Nicholas and Jean François Girod with powers of attorney for the succession settlement. They claimed the executors concealed important facts, resulting in some coheirs releasing their claims against the succession.

Nicholas Girod, who died possessing most of Claude François Girod's real estate, was claimed by the original coheirs along with accounts of rents and profits. Evidence included a letter from Nicholas Girod dated May 27, 1817, discussing the distribution of the succession's assets and warning against the actions of a relative, Jacques, who had lost family regard. This letter and a subsequent deed executed on January 19, 1830, by Jean François Girod to Nicholas were included in the court proceedings. The letter was recorded on January 22, 1844, in Paris and admitted as evidence on April 29, 1844.

On January 19, 1830, before notary Louis T. Caire in New Orleans, Jean François Girod, junior, and his brother Nicolas Girod formally dissolved their partnership regarding several properties, including a sugar plantation on Bayou Lafourche. Jean François Girod sold his half-interest in the plantation and other associated properties to Nicolas Girod, transferring ownership without additional warranties beyond those provided by previous vendors. 

The transaction includes:

1. An undivided half of the sugar plantation, improvements, slaves, animals, agricultural tools, and all related items.
2. An undivided half of all jointly owned lands on Bayou Lafourche.
3. An undivided half of three islands at the mouth of Bayou Lafourche, named Timballier, Bross, and Caillon islands.

These properties were originally acquired together from Joseph St. Felix in 1814, who had purchased them from the estate of Claude François Girod. Both parties acknowledged satisfaction with the titles and knowledge of the properties involved. It was agreed that the sugar and molasses currently on the plantation were excluded from the sale, with their future net produce to be shared equally. Additionally, Jean François Girod transferred all debts owed to the plantation and the partnership to Nicolas Girod, granting him the authority to pursue payment without recourse against Jean François.

A sale and transfer of debts is executed between Nicolas Girod and Jean François Girod for a total consideration of $17,000. Nicolas Girod has subscribed to three promissory notes, each valued at $23,333.33, with staggered payment dates from 1831 to 1833, allowing for postponement of payments by paying annual interest of 8% until settled. Upon payment of these notes, Jean François Girod transfers all rights of ownership in their shared property—including plantation, lands, slaves, and implements—to Nicolas Girod, granting him full ownership and rights to use the property indefinitely.

Further, it is noted that Nicolas Girod previously sold a tract of land for $15,000, with $5,000 paid in cash for the plantation, and the remaining $10,000 to be paid over three years, which belongs equally to both brothers. Jean François assigns his share of the $5,000 debt to Nicolas on the condition that Nicolas credits him $2,500 in his running account, while transferring all rights and privileges associated with this debt.

The notary involved has informed the parties of Louisiana’s Civil Code Article 3328, which mandates that notaries must obtain a mortgage certificate for any sale of immovables or slaves, ensuring that all parties acknowledge the current status of the property and relieve the notary of any liability regarding the matter.

The document is a legal record concerning the estate of Nicholas Girod, who died in New Orleans on September 1, 1840. It details the will filed on January 30, 1841, which includes various monetary bequests totaling $710,000, primarily intended for charitable purposes, including support for French orphans and specific individuals. The will is signed by Girod and includes a specimen due bill for $50,000 payable to Mr. A. Michoud.

In the context of a legal suit, an injunction was issued against Antoine Michoud, the executor, to halt any payments or distributions from the estate. The legatees, who were made defendants in the case, contested that the will did not list all debts owed by Girod and argued that the executor's authority to sell property was legal. They maintained that a judge acting as auctioneer could sell property regardless of jurisdiction, asserting the sale price was fair and that no fraud occurred. The legatees also claimed the executors justifiably positioned themselves as creditors based on a long-standing judgment from 1816, which they argued should not be contested due to its established legal precedent (res adjudicata). The executors’ account was approved by the Court of Probates, further solidifying their legal standing.

Respondents reject claims that the executors misused their position as creditors of the succession and violated trust for personal gain. They assert that Nicholas Girod did not use deceit to obtain acquittances from the complainants, who signed them voluntarily and with full awareness of the circumstances. Respondents included family letters to support their view of Nicholas Girod as a benefactor to relatives, and they raised the defense of prescription. 

The plaintiffs made several admissions, including the following key points: Jean François Girod, senior, left a will favoring his son, Jean François Girod, junior, while the complainants retained one-eighth of Claude François Girod's estate. They do not contest the executors' account from 1817, except for specific claims against the executors. Most heirs of Claude François Girod lived in Europe, with only a few residing in Louisiana. Nicolas Girod's donation to the Poydras Asylum was valued at approximately $35,000. He remained in Louisiana after settling there under Spanish rule. The authenticity of letters referenced in the respondents' answer is acknowledged, but the complainants require full translations and reserve rights to contest their admissibility. Hyppolite Pargoud was brought to Louisiana by his uncle and lived with him until 1821. Information about the residences of certain family members, the age and marital status of Jean François Girod, junior, and the competence of Hyppolite Pargoud was also confirmed, along with the legitimacy of the acquittances signed by M'mes Pargoud and Adam, who acted with their husbands' assistance.

Antoine Michoud was to attest a document as the Sardinian consul, but it was unused. Hyppolite Pargoud requested and received a second power of attorney executed on May 18, 1840. He was transparent about his intention to sue his uncle Nicolas, and during an inventory at Lafourche, he indicated he would pursue a claim if a will existed. The letters previously deposited by the defendants are genuine but the complainants reserve objections to their admissibility, requiring translation if admitted as evidence. The will of Nicolas Girod was unknown during the Lafourche inventory but was discovered later. Under the laws of the Duchy of Savoy, Hyppolite Pargoud is a forced heir of his mother, Peronne Bernardine Pargoud. Nicolas Girod, the eldest family member, was of an unspecified age at his death. He made significant gifts to his niece Philippine Poidebard in late 1833 and early 1834. 

The defendants admitted several facts: Denise Philippine Poidebard died in August 1841, leaving three children, all of whom had never been in the U.S. Jean Firman Pepin confirmed the accuracy of claims regarding the estate of Pierre Nicolas Girod, who died in New Orleans on September 1, 1841, leaving his property to Jean François Girod, Jr. The property in Nicolas Girod’s estate inventory originated from Claude François Girod's estate and was leased, not improved, by Nicolas. The ages of Jean Baptiste Dejan and Claude Gurlie were noted, along with their familiarity with Nicolas Girod. It was clarified that Nicolas Girod did not cultivate the lands on Bayou Lafourche, except for a plantation where he constructed levees.

The Bouvard family has lived near Bordeaux, France, since 1813. Etienne Rivolet, a legatee of N. Girod, is 40 years old and not directly related to the Girod family, though he is connected through his brother's marriage to a niece of Claude François Girod, the testator. In a case titled "Widow Pargoud and Others v. Antoine Michoud and Others," the court noted that witnesses Joseph Gaubuan and Corrino would testify that Simon Laignel purchased property belonging to Claude François Girod with the knowledge and consent of Jean François Girod, Jr., one of the executors. It was also acknowledged that Laignel later sold this property to Nicolas Girod, another executor. All objections to the defendants' sworn answers were waived, affirming their validity regardless of the officer before whom they were sworn. 

On July 29, 1844, the court ruled that the plaintiffs are the residuary legatees of Claude François Girod in specified proportions. The decree also set aside prior adjudications and conveyances of property involving Charles St. Felix and Nicolas and Jean François Girod while maintaining the rights of third parties to certain lands and slaves previously conveyed by Nicolas Girod.

The dative testamentary executors of Nicolas Girod are required to provide the plaintiffs and their legal representatives with valid notarial conveyances and assignments of undivided property portions corresponding to their status as residuary legatees of Claude François Girod. In case of disputes over these conveyances, Duncan N. Hennen will act as the master in chancery to resolve the issues. The property to be conveyed includes all property and slaves inventoried in Ascension, Assumption, and Lafourche Interior parishes after Nicolas Girod's death, as well as property in Municipality No. 2 of New Orleans and a specific house located at the corner of St. Louis and Chartres Streets in Municipality No. 1. 

Additionally, the account filed by Nicolas and Jean François Girod in the Orleans Parish Court in May 1817 will be annulled, and their claims of $40,418.09 and $8,253.20 will be rejected. Judgments from 1815 for these amounts will be considered satisfied, and no allowances will be granted to the defendants based on these judgments. Furthermore, releases given by plaintiffs Madame Adam and Madame Pargoud to Jean François Girod in 1817 will be nullified, recognized only as receipts for amounts received by each plaintiff.

A reference is ordered to a master in chancery to account for financial transactions between the estates of Nicolas Girod and Claude François Girod. The master will determine amounts owed to the plaintiffs by Nicolas's estate for property alienated from Claude’s estate, including rents, profits, and interest. The master will also assess any debts owed by the plaintiffs to Nicolas’s estate, which may include payments made by Nicolas toward Claude’s debts, legacies, and permanent improvements.

Key points to be accounted for include:

1. The value of a crop claimed to be on hand when property in Lafourche was adjudicated, with interest.
2. Amounts acknowledged by executors in their 1817 account as received or responsible for.
3. Sale prices of two tracts of land and two slaves, with interest from the sale date.
4. The value of ground donated by Nicolas to the Female Orphan Asylum, with interest from the donation date.
5. Rents and profits from various properties from 1814 onwards, calculated at reasonable rates, including specific rates during the lease to John F. Miller for properties in Faubourg St. Mary.

Credits to Nicolas’s estate will include:

1. Amounts credited to executors in their 1817 account, with interest, excluding two personal claims.
2. Payments made for Claude’s legacies, with interest.
3. Half of rents and profits from Bayou Lafourche plantation until Jean François Girod sold his interest to Nicolas.
4. Actual costs of permanent improvements made by Nicolas, without interest, minus the value of slave labor and materials used, accounting for depreciation.

Interest charged will be at a rate of five percent.

The master is tasked with determining the amount owed to each plaintiff from the estate of Nicolas Girod, based on their proportional interest in Claude François Girod's estate, including interest from the date of the master's report unless directed otherwise by the court. Payments will be made by Nicolas Girod's dative testamentary executors from the estate's funds, prioritized over legacies. All parties must provide relevant documents under oath as directed by the master, who may also conduct examinations through written interrogatories. The executors are ordered to cover the lawsuit's accrued costs. Either party may seek a court order for partitioning the real estate of Nicolas Girod. Further instructions will be pending until the master submits his report. 

The decree was signed on July 30, 1844, by Judge Theo. H. McCaleb. The defendants have appealed, with Mr. Eustis representing the appellants and Mr. Janin for the appellees. The case involves a dispute over the alleged purchase of Claude Girod's estate by his executors after his death in 1813, with pertinent sales occurring in 1814. The defense argues that the complainants lack equity due to their prolonged silence and acquiescence since 1814, referencing established legal precedents on this principle. The defense also claims that the plaintiffs' allegations lack specificity regarding the alleged concealment and misrepresentation, and the plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated ignorance of the adverse possession status, which the defendants deny.

Testimony from J. F. Girod, J. M. Girod, Michoud, and Rivolet establishes clear knowledge regarding the case. The complainants’ amended bill indicates that their requested relief is speculative rather than equitable, stemming from the will of Nicholas Girod and substantial legacies, rather than injustices from 1814. The release and treatment of co-executor J. F. Girod suggest that the complainants prefer the prospect of inheritance over litigation, as he is wealthy and alive, leading them to await his generosity rather than pursue claims against him posthumously.

The defendants assert a defense based on prescription, a legal concept distinct from statutes of limitation. Prescription pertains to the acquisition of rights or discharging debts over time, equating in significance to inheritance or sales. Under civil law, prescription extinguishes obligations similarly to payment or novation, affecting both legal and moral obligations. Possession is crucial in property matters, forming the basis of prescription titles. Nicholas Girod acquired complete title to the estates since 1814 through public and recorded acts of conveyance.

Relevant legal provisions from the Louisiana Code indicate that actions for nullity or rescission not limited by a shorter period may be initiated within ten years. In this case, there was no concealment of property ownership; rather, it was publicly recorded under N. Girod's name. The complainants were on notice due to adverse possession, which provides sufficient grounds for knowledge of the property’s status, as they had access to all necessary information. This legal framework emphasizes that the complainants cannot claim ignorance of the facts concerning the sales to N. Girod.

Fraud in the sales is primarily attributed to the executors purchasing at public sales, an issue evident since the titles were assigned to them. If fraud stems from a party's incapacity to purchase, the five-year prescription under Article 3507 applies for actions of nullity or rescission, with ten years for absentees. The agreement between J. F. Girod and Me. Pargoud from November 10, 1817, is classified as a contract or act, functioning as a partition as defined by court precedents. A previous case established that an action to invalidate a settlement due to fraud or lesion was barred by this five-year prescription, indicating that even claims of fraud are subject to this limitation without regard to when the fraud was discovered. Additionally, a four-year prescription applies to actions for lesion in general contracts, while a twenty-year prescription exists for defendants under a just title, which permits property transfer. Following the receipt of funds on November 10, 1817, no legal claims could undermine the just title of the sold property, as any misappropriation of funds would only lead to a personal claim not affecting property title. Heirs in Europe are seen as satisfied with the sale price, and allegations of unfair treatment do not imply bad faith in the original transaction. In possession matters, good faith is presumed, while bad faith must be proven. Recent legislation emphasizes a policy against stale claims, limiting actions against executors to two years from enactment and affirming their right to purchase if they have an interest in the property. This law is crucial for the case's considerations.

The Laws of Louisiana from March 28, 1840, outline relevant details of a succession case involving defendants who are dative executors, appointed by the Court of Probates rather than by the testator's will. The complainants question the defendants about the affairs of a succession opened in 1813, noting that the key deposition from co-executor J. F. Girod, taken in Paris, is crucial to the case. J. F. Girod's testimony asserts that the sales were not fraudulent and that the payments to heirs were based on legitimate accounts provided by N. Girod. The document details the amounts owed to N. and J. F. Girod, which were settled in 1817, and references various legal provisions that empowered the executors to sell the estate's property without judicial intervention and within a specified timeframe. It emphasizes that the judge, rather than the executors, conducted the public auction sale, which was deemed proper and complete under the law, negating the need for a court decree for the sale. The presumption of legality after a significant time lapse is applied, alongside a statute from 1834 that allows for the prescription of informalities after five years. Overall, the evidence suggests a lack of fraudulent activity by N. Girod, reinforcing the legitimacy of the transactions carried out by the executors.

Supreme Court decisions have significantly shaped the incapacities related to purchases at judicial sales under prior laws, as evidenced by the legislative interpretation of 1840. The interpretation of Spanish laws by the Louisiana Supreme Court is unreliable, and it is incorrect to assert that purchases by an executor at a public sale are entirely void; such prohibitions primarily serve to prevent abuse for the benefit of heirs. Heirs have the option to renounce or enforce purchases after a reasonable period. A trustee’s purchase can be set aside at the discretion of the cestui que trust, who may seek to have the estate resold within a reasonable timeframe if they dissent. Purchases by curators or trustees are considered malum prohibitum rather than malum in se. If there is continued public adverse possession, the dissenting party must act within a reasonable time for relief and cannot speculate on outcomes. The court must not allow parties to gamble on uncertain future events. The appraisement basis of the mortuary proceedings is upheld, and the complainants, who were satisfied with the price in 1817, cannot now seek to benefit from increased property values. Accepting part of the purchase price constitutes ratification of the sale, implying knowledge of any defects, unless ignorance can be proven due to misrepresentation or deceit. Remedies for any abuse by the executor or trustee lie in personal action, and the case of Rivas does not introduce any new legal principles.

The court examined whether a party knowingly received part of the sale price for a disputed plantation, ultimately concluding that there was no ratification of the sale due to insufficient evidence. The court referenced Louisiana’s legal principle that a person cannot mislead another by remaining silent when obligated to speak. The executors, acting as agents for the complainants, were aware of the sale price and could have ratified the sale by receiving their portions.

The court also addressed the authority of parish judges to manage inventories, appraisements, and sales of property under the Code of 1809, confirming their competence in these matters. It noted that no allegations were made regarding the authority of the judges involved, except for one specific sale, and emphasized that jurisdiction issues, particularly regarding probate courts, have historically been complex. The court favored the validity of actions taken by the courts after a significant time lapse.

Additionally, the amended bill questioned the competency of the Parish Court of New Orleans, but did not specify the grounds for this claim. The court highlighted the established jurisdiction of the New Orleans probate court regarding claims against successions, affirming that its decrees would remain undisturbed since the jurisdiction was not contested in the original bill, and the succession was solvent. The reference to the Code of Practice enacted in 1825 reinforced that the probate courts held exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.

The document outlines the legal framework surrounding judgments and settlements involving curators and executors in Louisiana, particularly in relation to absent heirs and vacant successions. It states that homologations, like all judgments, can only be annulled by the same court that issued them, and any action of nullity must be pursued in that court. If relief is not granted there, it can then be sought in federal courts. 

The account filed by executors in the Court of Probates of New Orleans included payments made to Nicolas Girod and J. F. Girod, which were approved by the judge. The complainants have discharged J. F. Girod and are attempting to hold N. Girod's succession accountable for both debts, despite these accounts undergoing litigation and judicial settlement. Judgments were issued on these claims in New Orleans courts on specified dates, and the complainants' reliance on conjecture rather than evidence undermines their case, especially given that J. F. Girod received a full discharge. 

The court's jurisdiction over the cases is established, and an objection regarding the presence of proper parties is addressed through references to the Code of 1809, which allows one executor to represent the succession if multiple executors are involved. The participation of a defensor for absent heirs is noted to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of the proceedings.

Judgments are deemed valid until annulled by an appropriate tribunal and cannot be challenged as fraudulent without sufficient evidence. The complainants failed to provide any evidence capable of undermining the judgments. Specifically, N. Girod's case is examined, focusing on his status as a trader who left behind various financial records upon his death. His transactions with his brother Nicholas, a New Orleans merchant, were supported by testimony from several witnesses and the examination of relevant documents. The case was appropriately referred to arbitrators due to its complexity, and they adhered to legal standards in their decision-making. Claims regarding interest owed and the interruption of prescription through acknowledgment were supported by witness testimony. The historical context of prescription under Spanish law was noted, establishing that such claims could last up to thirty years. The will of Claude Girod, which ambiguously mentioned debts of around $30,000, does not definitively negate the existence of debts, particularly between brothers. The mention of legacies and debts in N. Girod's petition was not limited, further indicating potential liabilities. The court emphasizes that it will not re-examine established judgments, presuming that all actions were conducted properly. Even without these judgments, past payments made to the complainants indicate a personal action for recovery, which is subject to a ten-year prescription period, as asserted by the complainants. The defense's position is clear and requires minimal judicial scrutiny based on the facts presented.

The appellants contest a lower court's decree, raising several assignments of error: 

1. They argue that the complainants' bill lacks equity and supporting evidence.
2. They assert that the complainants are barred from equity claims due to their prolonged silence and acquiescence since 1814.
3. They claim the cause of action is time-barred under Louisiana law.
4. They challenge the disallowance of claims totaling $48,671 as contradictory and unlawful.
5. They maintain that agreements made by two complainants in 1817 are binding, and that a declaration by co-executor J. F. Girod holds similar weight.
6. They contend that J. F. Girod's discharge nullifies any equity claims against the defendants.

Mr. Janin, representing the appellees, cites several legal points: 

1. The will permitted executors to sell property without judicial intervention, yet Spanish law required public sales authorized by the court.
2. Sales not preceded by a court order are void.
3. Judicial sales can be invalidated if legal formalities are not met.
4. A 1834 Louisiana statute addressing irregularities in judicial sales only pertains to advertisement issues and does not apply here as it wasn't pleaded.
5. Both civil and chancery law prohibit an executor from purchasing estate property.
6. The judgments obtained by Nicholas and J. F. Girod for significant amounts were allegedly the result of fraudulent actions, warranting judicial relief against such frauds.

Judgments obtained without the participation of heirs are not binding on them, as they were not parties to those proceedings and the executors did not adequately represent the estate or the heirs. Co-executors are jointly and severally liable, and one can act on behalf of all, but cannot sue one another if they have accepted the trust. Even when an attorney for absent heirs was involved, the judgments remain non-binding because that attorney's role was merely conservatory and did not equate to representation of the estate. Courts often disregard judgments against parties that were not properly cited or represented. The homologation of the 1817 account is not res judicata, as the heirs were not represented; an attorney appointed for some heirs failed to act appropriately, allowing them to be relieved of the homologation's effects due to the executors' fraud and the attorney's neglect. The burden of proof regarding fairness in trustee dealings lies with the trustee. Under civil law, an executor purchasing estate property is null and cannot be validated by prescription, as such possession is deemed 'precarious.' Any applicable prescription would only protect purchasers in bad faith after thirty years.

The defendants' reliance on ten- and twenty-year prescription periods is contingent upon having acquired possession honestly, through a just title, and with a title not defective in form, as per the relevant codes. However, the defendants did not plead this type of prescription but instead referenced a ten-year prescription for actions of nullity, established by Article 204 of the Code of 1808. This prescription applies solely to actions of nullity or rescission regarding agreements, while the current action is one of revendication, subject to a longer prescription period depending on the good or bad faith of the purchaser.

The receipts from 1817, provided by two heirs, do not constitute agreements but merely acknowledge the receipt of money. Even if treated as agreements, the right to rescind would only be barred ten years from the discovery of fraud, which the complainants were unaware of until 1837. The defendants also assert that these receipts imply ratification of the executors' actions. Nevertheless, such ratification is impossible for acts of absolute nullity, which cannot be validated without a new sale. Furthermore, if treated as an express ratification, the receipts lack the necessary legal language regarding the motive for rescission, and for tacit ratification, full knowledge of the circumstances is required, which is not present here.

Lastly, the defendants mention a five-year prescription from Article 3507 of the Code of 1825, but they failed to plead it. Even if they had, it would not apply to fraud cases, which are specifically addressed under the earlier cited article.

In cases involving trusts, the resale of property by a trustee can be validated over time. The statute of limitations on trust disputes begins only after a clear disavowal of the trust, which in this instance occurred when heirs learned that certain sales were simulated. Until that point, the heirs were misled into believing the executors were legitimate purchasers. U.S. courts of equity follow state statutes of limitations, but the timeframes differ between legal and equitable claims. Specifically, to bar an equitable estate, the same duration that would limit a legal estate must apply. In Louisiana, only a thirty-year prescription can bar revendication actions. Importantly, in cases involving fraud, the statute of limitations does not commence until the fraud is fully discovered, and mere rumors do not trigger this limitation. The supposed ratification by two complainants is challenged, as they were unaware of the executors' frauds when they signed receipts, indicating they acted without knowledge. In equity, if a party is unaware of their rights or the fraudulent nature of a transaction, subsequent actions do not constitute ratification. The fiduciary relationship requires careful scrutiny of alleged ratifications, and insufficient information does not equate to laches. The court's opinion does not require further commentary on the facts presented.

The court agrees with the Circuit Court's decision to invalidate the purchases made by Nicholas and Jean Francois Girod of their testator's estate, citing these transactions as fraudulent and void. The court emphasizes that the sales were conducted through nominal buyers, Laignel and St. Felix, who acted as intermediaries for the executors, thereby creating an apparent fraud. It asserts that the nature of such transactions inherently carries fraud, regardless of any judicial sanction or procedural correctness involved. 

Nicholas Girod acquired the entire estate, excluding other heirs, and later purchased Jean Francois's share for $70,000. Current heirs are suing Nicholas Girod's representatives to annul these purchases, claiming fraud and seeking their rightful portions along with an accounting of rents, minus Jean Francois's share. The defendants counter that the sales were legitimate, conducted publicly, and assert that the heirs' claims are barred by laches and the statute of limitations in Louisiana law. 

The court also notes that executors and administrators hold a fiduciary duty to the heirs, and examines the legality of their purchasing property from the estates they manage. It references established legal principles regarding the incapacity of trustees and agents to purchase property they are responsible for selling, supported by case law from various jurisdictions.

Trustees, agents, commissioners of bankrupts, assignees, solicitors, auctioneers, and certain creditors are generally prohibited from purchasing property they have knowledge of through their confidential roles. This prohibition exists to prevent potential conflicts of interest where individuals might misuse their insider knowledge to benefit themselves at the expense of those relying on their integrity. The legal principle extends to situations where an attorney buys from a client while the attorney-client relationship is active. It also applies to arbitrators purchasing unascertained claims from parties involved in a reference. If a person is barred from purchasing property directly, they cannot do so as an agent for another. This rule is rooted in the moral obligation to avoid conflicts between self-interest and integrity, particularly in private relations where a duty to protect another's interests exists. The law intervenes not merely based on the potential for ethical conduct but to mitigate the likelihood of self-interest overshadowing duty. Consequently, individuals cannot occupy the roles of both buyer and seller in these contexts, as their opposing interests would conflict. This principle is upheld in various jurisdictions, including Louisiana and Pennsylvania, with some exceptions noted in Pennsylvania regarding executors purchasing at auctions.

In Maryland, courts of chancery uphold the principle that a trustee cannot purchase the trust estate, as established in Wormley v. Wormley. This principle is supported by previous rulings, including Prevost v. Gratz and Ringo et al. v. Binns et al., which emphasize that an agent who discovers a defect in the title of property held in trust cannot exploit that information for personal gain; instead, they must act as a trustee for the principal. Furthermore, Church v. Marine Insurance Company reiterates that a trustee or agent cannot become a purchaser of the trust property. 

While a purchase by a trustee from a competent cestui que trust may be valid if agreed upon under clear terms without fraud or concealment, such cases are challenging to prove, particularly if there is any price inadequacy or inequality. Even if a trustee acts honestly in purchasing the estate from the cestui que trust, they remain bound as a trustee and cannot sell the property for personal profit. 

The principle has not been relaxed in New York, as demonstrated in Davoue v. Fanning, which reviewed the doctrine's application consistent with English chancery law. This case involved an executor purchasing part of the estate at auction and concluded that if a trustee or representative sells the trust estate for personal interest, the cestuis que trust are entitled to have the transaction annulled, and the property resold under court supervision.

The sale of property by an executor at public auction, even if conducted in good faith and for a fair price, is deemed void if the executor arranged for a third party to purchase it on behalf of the executor's wife, who has an interest in the property under the testator's will. The crucial consideration is not the presence of fraud but the inherent risk of abuse and potential for imposition, which could escape judicial scrutiny. While some U.S. chancery courts have ruled that an executor can purchase the testator's property at public sale without fraud, treating such purchases as voidable rather than void, the prevailing view holds that executors are trustees for the beneficiaries and should not be allowed to purchase estate property. The text argues for strict adherence to this rule, asserting that it is better to prevent such conflicts of interest than to rely on courts to remedy specific cases of fraud. It questions why the rule should be relaxed for executors regarding beneficiaries, especially when no similar leniency is granted to other trustees. In situations where a trustee must sell property for a non-sui juris beneficiary, they should seek court permission to purchase to ensure protection against conflicts of interest. The excerpt also references a Louisiana case where a mother purchased property belonging to her minor children, which was initially contested but ultimately ratified by the court due to the procedural approval involving a family meeting and judicial consent, illustrating the importance of judicial oversight in these transactions.

The excerpt emphasizes the strict adherence to the prohibition against executors purchasing property they administer, as rooted in civil law and Spanish law as applied in Louisiana. It addresses the arguments for exemption from this rule in cases where executors, who are also heirs or legatees, purchase at open sale without fraud. The text critiques the reliance on Louisiana Supreme Court decisions for interpreting Spanish laws on this matter, asserting that relaxations of the civil law rule have never included purchases by executors. It delineates the historical context of such prohibitions across various jurisdictions, highlighting that while certain relaxations exist for guardians purchasing from wards under specific conditions, no such allowances apply to executors. The civil law maintains that executors cannot act in personal interest when handling estate transactions, ensuring a clear separation between duty and personal gain to prevent conflicts of interest. The excerpt cites specific legal texts to support these assertions and reinforces the idea that any transactions made in bad faith are deemed invalid.

A contract is valid if a person of legal age confirms the purchase. A guardian is permitted to buy at a creditor’s sale, and similarly, if a minor's creditor sells, the guardian can purchase the property. However, the qualifications of these rules in civil law are often misunderstood and improperly applied to analogous roles, such as executors, where no authority exists to do so. These qualifications were primarily relevant in regions where civil law was unchanged. Despite the civil law's significant influence in Europe, its qualifications were widely rejected as imperfections by nations that compiled their codes from it, reflecting a deep understanding of human nature in practical affairs.

Pothier states that a tutor cannot buy property belonging to the minor under their administration, a principle echoed in the codes of Holland and enforced strictly in Spain. In Louisiana, similar rules meant that purchases made by executors of the estate were invalid, regardless of the circumstances of the purchase. Therefore, the purchases made by Nicholas and Jean François Girod of their testator's estate are deemed fraudulent and void, either as a result of acting through an intermediary or by the established equitable principle in both English and U.S. courts. The laws of Louisiana at the time of the purchases confirm their invalidity and the inherent conflict between self-interest and fiduciary duty. Consequently, the court orders that these purchases be annulled, and the complainants are not deemed to have forfeited their rights through negligence or the passage of time.

The conduct of the dependent relatives reflects their fears and reluctance to believe that they were wronged by their brothers, despite suspecting that owed payments were withheld. In cases of actual fraud, courts of equity provide relief even after significant time has passed, as long as a trust can be clearly established. Generally, while laches may bar a party from relief in equity if they have delayed unreasonably in asserting their rights, courts still consider the specifics of each case. There is no strict time limit for claiming relief in cases of actual fraud, which must be addressed within the lifetime of the parties involved or within thirty years of discovery. In this instance, the executors' purchases had not surpassed that timeframe, and the complainants only became aware of them in 1817, following an account presented by the executors that lacked full transparency. 

The receipts given by two complainants do not negate their rights, as they were issued without complete knowledge of the estate’s management. The executors withheld critical information, presenting an account without proper verification. Consequently, the court will annul previous official proceedings related to Nicholas Girod's account against the estate of Claude, allowing representatives of Nicholas to receive $6,574.20 with 5% interest, a figure supported by prior account settlements shortly before the testator's death, while disallowing other claims.

An error in the decree led to the omission of a sum that should have been allowed, as indicated by the judge's opinion noting a prior settlement. The court will allow Nicholas Girod's representatives to claim the actual costs of permanent improvements to the estate, along with interest at five percent, as well as allowances for taxes and expenses related to property recovery due to alluvion. A master will be appointed for the case, and parties interested in Claude F. Girod's estate may join the proceedings without delaying the distributions for those already represented. 

Jean François Girod is not currently a party but may join to claim his share under the will, subject to existing equities between him and Nicholas, particularly regarding a purchase money allowance. The court confirmed the plaintiffs as residuary legatees of Claude François Girod, specifying their respective shares. Additionally, the court annulled certain property adjudications and conveyances related to the estate while preserving the rights of third parties who received property from Nicholas Girod during his lifetime.

To facilitate the distribution of the estate of the late Claude François Girod to the residuary legatees, the Circuit Court is to determine whether to sell the estate's real and personal property or to partition it in kind, directing appropriate conveyances accordingly. The properties involved include those inventoried after the death of Nicholas Girod in the parishes of Ascension, Assumption, and Lafourche Interior, as well as properties located in Municipality No. 2 of New Orleans, which include alluvion and assets from the estates of Claude François Girod and those abandoned by the heirs of Bertrand Gravier in 1823. Additionally, a prior adjudication from the Parish Court in 1815 favoring Nicholas Girod for $40,418.09 will be overturned, allowing his representatives to claim $6,576.20 plus interest from August 1, 1813, instead. Furthermore, two acquittances from 1817 given by plaintiffs Madame Adam and Madame Pargoud to Jean François Girod will be invalidated, recognized only as acknowledgments of received amounts of 5,242.75 francs and 10,242.75 francs, equating to $975.15 and $1,905.15 in U.S. currency, respectively; these amounts are to be deducted from their shares in the estate distribution.

A master in chancery is to be appointed to account for the financial transactions between the estate of Nicholas Girod and the plaintiffs regarding the estate of Claude François Girod. The master will assess amounts owed to the plaintiffs for property alienated by Nicholas Girod, including rents, profits, and interest. Conversely, the master will evaluate what the plaintiffs owe Nicholas Girod’s estate for debts paid on behalf of Claude François Girod, legacies, and permanent improvements.

Key responsibilities include charging Nicholas Girod’s estate for the value of a crop allegedly on hand during a property adjudication, amounts acknowledged by executors in their 1817 account, the sale prices of land and slaves, and the value of a donation made to the Female Orphan Asylum, along with corresponding interest. The master will also account for the rents and profits from various properties since 1814, applying specific rates for leased properties.

Credits to Nicholas Girod’s estate will include amounts previously acknowledged by executors in 1817, excluding a personal claim of $40,418.09, which will be replaced with a court-allowed amount of $6,576.30. The estate will also be credited for payments made towards Claude’s legacies, half of the rents from the plantation, and the actual costs of permanent improvements to Claude’s estate. This includes costs related to alluvion improvements from a 1823 compromise act and improvements on specific properties, deducting the value of slave labor used in these enhancements.

Nicholas Girod is entitled to reimbursement for the actual costs of improvements made to property, with five percent interest accruing from the time these expenses are verified. Additionally, he will be compensated for any taxes he paid on the property belonging to Claude François Girod. The master has the authority to collect relevant documents and examine witnesses under oath to ascertain the costs associated with improvements. The master will determine the amount owed to each plaintiff based on their proportional interest in Claude François Girod's estate, with payments made from Nicholas Girod's estate before any legacies under his will.

Furthermore, individuals not currently involved in the proceedings but claiming rights to the estate can present their claims in the Circuit Court, which must allow them to become parties to the case. The costs incurred in this suit will be paid by Nicholas Girod's testamentary executors from the estate's funds.

The court affirms parts of the Circuit Court's decree and remands the case for further proceedings, ensuring that new claimants can join the suit and present their evidence as necessary, in alignment with the court's directions for justice.