Delaine Stacy v. Willard Kenneth Ross

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1999-CA-00579-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; February 17, 1999; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed a case involving grandparent visitation rights between the natural parents, Delaine and Sandy Stacy, and the maternal grandparents, Willard Kenneth and Sue Ross. The trial court's decision was affirmed in part, reversed and rendered regarding visitation, and remanded for a determination of attorney's fees. The case arose after the Rosses sought visitation with their grandson, Kevin Stacy, following a deterioration of their relationship with the Stacys. The chancery court had granted the grandparents visitation rights, citing the strained relationship. 

Kenneth Ross, who had significant health issues, and his wife Sue had maintained a close relationship with Kevin until tensions escalated, resulting in a physical altercation and subsequent denial of access to Kevin by his parents. The court found that the grandparents had established a viable relationship with Kevin, but the severe conflict warranted remedial actions before visitation could be restored. The court acknowledged the complexities of the family dynamics, including Sandy's troubled relationship with her parents, which influenced the case. The ruling emphasized the need for a more appropriate standard in assessing grandparent visitation rights amidst ongoing disputes between custodial parents.

The court mandated all parties to participate in a counseling program with a court-appointed counselor to address visitation issues, ordering the Stacys to ensure Kevin is available for supervised visits with the Rosses. It held prior conflicts in abeyance and scheduled further reviews before March 5, 1999, without determining visitation was in Kevin's best interest or that the Stacys unreasonably withheld it.

On February 23, 1999, the court granted the Rosses unsupervised visitation, which the Stacys appealed on March 24, 1999. The Stacys failed to comply with this judgment, leading the Rosses to seek enforcement, citing the Stacys' presence during visits. The Stacys argued for relief due to Sandy Stacy’s high-risk pregnancy and claimed the judgment was void for lack of a best interest finding.

On June 23, 1999, the chancellor denied the Stacys' motion, held them in contempt for unreasonably denying visitation, and noted no finding was made regarding the best interest of visitation. Following another denial of visitation scheduled for June 19-21, 1999, the Stacys claimed they did not receive the executed judgment until July 7, 1999, and filed a motion to stay, challenging the constitutionality of the Grandparents Visitation Rights Act. The court found the Stacys in contempt on September 17, 1999, leading them to file a second consolidated appeal.

The reviewing court applies a limited standard, rejecting the Rosses' argument that the Stacys are procedurally barred from contesting the grandparents' visitation law. The court also refutes the Rosses' claim that the merits of visitation decisions were not appropriately before it, clarifying that prior orders were interim and the January 11, 1999, order was also interim.

The Stacys assert the Grandparents' Visitation Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by permitting courts to override a fit parent's visitation decisions based solely on the child's best interests. The court disagrees with this assertion.

In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed Washington Rev. Code 26.10.160 (3) unconstitutional due to its allowance for "any person" to petition for visitation rights without demonstrating a change in circumstances, leading to potential overreach in parental rights. This statute lacked the limitations present in Mississippi's Grandparents' Visitation Act, which requires courts to find that (1) a viable relationship exists between the grandparent and grandchild, (2) custodial parents have unreasonably denied visitation, and (3) such visitation serves the child's best interest. The Supreme Court emphasized that parents have a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to make decisions regarding their children's care, with the presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests. The Court highlighted the importance of not questioning fit parents’ decisions without evidence of unfitness. In the current case, the Stacys have not claimed unfitness, and despite a chancellor's comment suggesting they unreasonably denied visitation, the Stacys acknowledged the Rosses' viable relationship with their child, Kevin. They argue that the chancellor's decision undermines their parental authority regarding visitation decisions, reflecting the concerns raised in Troxel.

The Supreme Court in Troxel emphasized that visitation rights for grandparents must demonstrate that such arrangements serve the best interests of the children, noting that generally, spending quality time with grandparents is beneficial unless adverse influences from the grandparents are present. The Stacys argue that the chancellor’s interim order favored the grandparents’ visitation rights, infringing upon their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights and their fundamental authority as fit parents in making decisions regarding their child's care. The statute requires adherence to these rights, asserting that parents' control over their child's environment is paramount, and interference is only permissible under compelling circumstances indicating parental unfitness.

The trial court appeared to disregard the Stacys' wishes and, in its interim judgment, identified an existing viable relationship with the grandparents, prioritizing the re-establishment of visitation. Subsequent judgments mandated a visitation schedule involving supervised visits with a court-appointed psychologist, which the Stacys complied with. However, a later judgment altered this schedule to unsupervised visits without compliance from the Stacys, leading to their partial disobedience and eventual contempt ruling for failing to adhere to the visitation schedule. The chancellor noted that the Stacys' involvement at visitations obstructed the Rosses' meaningful visitation rights.

The chancellor failed to explicitly determine that visitation was in Kevin's best interest, as mandated by Miss. Code Ann. 93-16-3(2), and did not find that overnight and unsupervised visitation was appropriate. Prior to the June 15 judgment, the only finding related to visitation was the establishment of a "viable relationship" between the Rosses and Kevin, which the Stacys had initially agreed upon. Later, when denying the Stacys' motion for relief, the chancellor implied that the Stacys were "unreasonably denying visitation," but such an implication lacked evidentiary support. The geographical distance between the families (200 miles) and existing tensions were mentioned, with the Stacys having allowed some visitation. Mental health professionals had advised against visitation being in the child's best interest and did not deem the Stacys' stance unreasonable. There were no substantiated facts to support a finding of unreasonableness against the Stacys, which invalidated the order requiring them to facilitate visitation.

Consequently, the court reversed the chancellor’s judgment on visitation. In a separate June 15, 1999 ruling, the Stacys were held in contempt for not following a visitation schedule, which included two supervised visits against the Rosses’ wishes. They faced financial penalties for missed visitations and were permitted to purge contempt through future compliance. The Stacys contended that they were unaware of the visitation schedule due to delays in receiving the judgment, which was not entered until June 21, the last day of the visitation period. They argued that, if the underlying judgment was overturned, the contempt citation should also be dismissed, referencing Gadson v. Gadson as precedent. The conclusion drawn from Gadson emphasized that unless a judgment is void from the outset, compliance is mandatory unless relief is sought from a court.

A judgment of contempt may be reversed if compliance with the court order was impossible without fault from the charged party, as established in Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc. The hotel manager was not found in contempt because he lacked authority to restrict sewage flow as mandated by an injunction. In a separate case, a contempt citation against a child's mother and stepfather was reversed due to denial of statutory due process concerning their rights to counsel and silence. The fundamental requirement for contempt is that the charged party must have been able to comply with the order.

In the current case, the Stacys did not argue an inability to comply with the visitation order originally set by the chancellor on February 23. The judgment issued on June 21 merely extended this visitation, meaning the Stacys were still obligated to adhere to the initial order. Consequently, the court affirmed the contempt ruling for prior visitation failures. The Stacys were also granted a right to attorney's fees under Miss. Code Ann. 93-16-3(4), and the matter was remanded to the chancery court for fee determination.

However, the chancellor's decision to award unsupervised and overnight visitation to the Rosses was reversed due to manifest error. The court affirmed the contempt ruling but reversed the visitation order and remanded for attorney's fee assessment. A dissenting opinion suggested that rather than rendering a decision on visitation, the matter should be remanded for a new hearing to consider the current best interests of the child, Kevin Stacy, given the significant time elapsed since the last testimony. The dissent emphasized the need for an updated evaluation of visitation rights based on the family's current circumstances.

The judgment in question was originally dated June 15, 1999, but was modified and finalized on June 21, 1999, coinciding with the last scheduled visitation. The Stacys counterclaimed against the contempt motion, asserting they did not receive the executed judgment until July 7, 1999, which had not been entered until June 21, 1999. They argued that the judgment was ineffective until entered in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 79 and had not been properly served as required by Rule 5. Additionally, the contempt motion was filed within the ten-day stay period under Rule 62(a). 

The court ruled that Kenneth Ross was prohibited from attending the visits, although Dr. Masur advised and the parties agreed to gradually introduce Mr. Ross into the visitation schedule. Dr. Fleming, the initial court-appointed psychiatrist, reported that Kevin expressed fear of his grandfather and did not wish to see him, particularly due to past traumatic events involving Mr. Ross. This situation warranted the need to prevent any potential recurrence of trauma during visitations. Consequently, the chancellor appointed Dr. Masur to supervise visitations between the Rosses and Kevin, ensuring the Stacys were present. 

Dr. Masur's report from December 17, 1998, indicated ongoing conflict and animosity between the families. He concluded that visitation with Mr. and Mrs. Ross would not be in Kevin's best interest as long as the Rosses harbored negative feelings towards the Stacys, which could undermine parental authority. He recommended that the Rosses comply with the Stacys' latest requests, excluding any monetary demands.

Visitation with Kevin should initially be closely supervised due to concerns from the Stacys about potential traumatic reactions. The expectations surrounding these visitations are crucial in managing any adverse responses. Although the author has not directly assessed the child, they have reviewed relevant medical records and testimonies, suggesting that it may be in Kevin's best interest for visits with the grandparents to occur only with the Stacys' approval. Additionally, Sandra Stacy submitted a letter to the court in March outlining their reasons for non-compliance and requesting reconsideration. Rule 5 of the applicable legal framework mandates service of various documents and motions to all parties, with exceptions for those in default. Furthermore, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 58 requires that every judgment be documented separately and titled as a Judgment to be effective, conforming to the procedures specified in Rule 79a.