J. S. Purdon v. Larry Locke

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1999-CA-01952-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; June 30, 1999; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Larry and Rita Locke filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against J. S. Purdon, M.D., his practice, Baptist Memorial Hospital-North Mississippi, and C. R. Bard, Inc., on August 17, 1993, alleging that a guide wire manufactured by Bard broke during a procedure, leading to Larry Locke's injuries, and that the athrocath used was negligently manufactured by Devices for Vascular Intervention (DVI). The complaint was amended to include DVI as a defendant on March 17, 1994. The case was initially removed to federal court on April 29, 1994, but the Lockes' motion to remand was denied. They later settled with Bard and DVI, resulting in an order dismissing those claims on August 24, 1995. After remanding the case back to state court on December 28, 1998, a trial commenced on June 14, 1999. The jury ruled in favor of the Lockes, awarding $650,000 in damages, which prompted Purdon to file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, citing excessive damages and various trial errors. The trial court denied these motions. The Lockes initially consulted Dr. Timothy Wright for chest pain, leading to tests that indicated significant coronary artery blockage, culminating in an emergency visit on June 8, 1992, where further complications were revealed.

Dr. Wright, along with his partner Purdon and cardiac surgeon Dr. Robert Derveloy, recommended coronary artery bypass graft surgery for Mr. Locke. However, Mr. Locke chose to undergo percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) and directional coronary atherectomy (DCA) instead. He provided informed consent for these procedures, which included the potential for emergency bypass surgery. During the surgery on June 11, 1992, a piece of guide wire broke off inside Mr. Locke's artery. Purdon's accounts of how the wire broke changed multiple times; initially stating the wire broke, then claiming he cut it, and finally attributing the break to a malfunction. Evidence from surgical staff indicated that Purdon entered the operating room post-surgery to retrieve the fractured wire, which was never recovered. Mr. Locke experienced significant discomfort and emotional instability following the surgery, impacting his relationship with his wife. He incurred about $47,000 in medical bills, which were later adjusted. The jury awarded the Lockes $650,000, leading Purdon to appeal on grounds that the damages were excessive and indicative of jury bias, passion, and prejudice. The legal standard for assessing whether a jury award is excessive requires that it be so unreasonable as to shock the conscience, and any claims of bias must be inferred from the verdict's amount compared to the proven damages. The evidence is evaluated favorably toward the verdict, and such awards will not be disturbed unless clearly outrageous.

In *James v. Jackson*, 514 So. 2d 1224 (Miss. 1987), four elements of damages related to bias were identified: (1) past and future pain and suffering, (2) past and future medical expenses, (3) lost wages, and (4) future disability. Purdon contends that Locke only presented evidence of one year of present physical pain and no future pain, arguing that Locke's emotional distress is limited due to a second bypass surgery in December 1998. However, Locke asserts that sufficient evidence for physical pain and emotional distress exists, and he provided medical bills totaling $45,721.29, which Purdon objected to but plans to address separately. There were no claims for lost wages or future disability, rendering those points moot.

Purdon challenges the $500,000 damage award, claiming bias and prejudice based on juror comments and statements made during closing arguments. He cites a juror's remark and inflammatory comments from Locke's counsel, arguing these demonstrate bias. However, Locke notes that Purdon did not object to these comments or attempt to address them during the trial, which weakens his argument. The trial judge's discretion over closing arguments limits the grounds for appeal unless there is evident abuse of discretion.

Purdon also compares his case to *Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Turner*, 543 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1989), arguing that the damages awarded in that case were significantly higher and warranted remittitur. However, the court emphasizes that jury awards are assessed on a case-by-case basis. In *Wells Fargo*, a substantial portion of the award was specifically for pain and suffering, and the current award of approximately $450,000 for pain and suffering in Locke's case does not seem excessively high.

Purdon referenced Rawson v. Mid-South Rail Corp. to support his position, noting a remittitur reduction from $187,500 to $112,500. The court applies an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating a trial judge's decisions, affirming that the trial judge is well-positioned to assess whether evidence justifies a jury award. The court found no abuse of discretion regarding the jury's award in Purdon's case.

Purdon claimed the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude Larry Locke's medical bills, arguing that since Locke had not paid these bills, they were not valid damages. He also stated that a portion of the bills had been written off, making them unsuitable for damages, and believed he should have been allowed to call a representative from Baptist to testify about this. Purdon argued that costs for a necessary DCA procedure should be excluded because they were not causally connected to the injury and would have been incurred regardless of the injury. He maintained that allowing recovery for unpaid bills undermines the concept of compensatory damages.

In response, Locke cited Mississippi law stating that the bills incurred due to injury are prima facie evidence of their reasonableness. Since payment demands were made to Locke, these bills were considered incurred and thus admissible for jury consideration. The burden shifted to Purdon to prove the bills' unreasonableness, which he failed to do, as he presented no evidence to counter the reasonableness of the bills. The testimony Purdon sought to introduce regarding the bills being "written off" was deemed inadmissible hearsay. Consequently, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion in limine, and Purdon's assignment of error was rejected.

Purdon argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict regarding Mrs. Locke's claim for loss of consortium and by granting jury instruction P-7. He asserts that no evidence was presented to prove that Mrs. Locke suffered a loss of consortium due to her husband’s injuries, referencing *Tribble v. Gregory*. Alternatively, he contends that the evidence did not support the loss of consortium instruction as per *DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp.* The court found that testimony from both Larry and Rita Locke demonstrated a significant decline in their relationship post-injury, with Larry experiencing emotional instability and physical limitations, which Rita testified led to frustration and diminished interactions between them. This evidence allowed the jury to reasonably infer an adverse impact on their relationship, justifying the loss of consortium instruction and the trial judge's discretion in denying the directed verdict.

Regarding the granting of jury instruction P-5, Purdon reasserts that there was insufficient evidence for the inclusion of present and future pain, suffering, and emotional distress in the damages calculation. The court found adequate evidence to support the damages awarded and noted Purdon’s failure to object to the instruction, which constituted a waiver of this argument. Consequently, the court deemed the assignment of error without merit.

Dr. Purdon challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict regarding Mr. Locke's medical negligence claim, arguing that the jury's decision lacked sufficient evidence and that the trial judge abused discretion. However, the court found no merit in Purdon’s claims, stating that both the jury and trial judge had a superior perspective on the evidence, which justified the verdict. Purdon’s assertion that the jury award was excessive was also rejected, as he did not meet the burden of proof on any issues. Consequently, the judgment of the Quitman County Circuit Court was affirmed.

In a separate opinion, Justice Smith concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Mr. Locke could recover past medical expenses despite not having paid them, but disagreed with the majority's stance that he could also recover costs that were written off by the hospital. Smith argued that since no one was liable for the written-off amounts, they did not represent actual expenses incurred by Locke, constituting a potential windfall rather than proper compensation. 

Justice Waller also concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the affirmation of the trial court's decision regarding Mr. Locke but dissenting on the denial of the directed verdict related to Rita Locke's loss of consortium claim, which he believed lacked sufficient evidence of relationship deterioration and damages.

The trial court approved a jury instruction for loss of consortium in favor of Rita Locke, allowing the jury to award damages for loss of companionship, assistance from her husband, and joint participation in home activities. Rita Locke's testimony revealed her husband's emotional struggles post-injury, indicating frustration and withdrawal, but her responses were largely generalized and did not substantiate specific damages she experienced, such as mental anguish or impacts on their intimate relationship. The dissenting opinion argues that the evidence presented did not sufficiently demonstrate distinct damages suffered by Rita due to her husband's injuries, citing legal precedent that requires proof of separate damages for a loss of consortium claim. Consequently, the dissenting opinion advocates for reversing the decision on Rita Locke's claim due to the lack of evidence supporting her assertions. The dissent is joined by Justices Mills, Cobb, and partially by Justice Smith.