Johnnie Ruth Hudson v. Morrison Heights Baptist Church

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1999-CA-01815-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; October 4, 1999; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Residents of Morrison Heights Subdivision sought to have Morrison Heights Baptist Church held in civil contempt for violating a prior injunction regarding property use, and to invalidate amendments to the subdivision's restrictive covenants. The court affirmed that the amended covenants, adopted by a majority of lot owners, are valid and not in violation of public policy, although they must comply with local zoning laws if those are more restrictive. 

The procedural history reveals that in 1988, residents sued the church, alleging violations of the original covenants, leading to a permanent injunction. These covenants, established in 1959, allowed for amendments if a majority of owners agreed. The church, having purchased multiple lots, was later re-zoned by the city to quasi-public facility status. Residents Johnnie Hudson, Joel Hudson, and Helen Ogletree subsequently filed a complaint to enforce the injunction and hold the church in contempt, but the court found no violations by the church and upheld the validity of the amended covenants, despite applying the incorrect legal standard in its reasoning.

Following the adoption of new covenants, the McDonalds subdivided their property, selling most to MHBC while retaining a small part for themselves. By 1995, MHBC owned several lots, including lots 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and part of lot 2, and subsequently requested a re-zoning as a quasi-public facility, which was approved on December 2, 1997. On the same day, property owners Johnnie Hudson, Joel Hudson, and Helen Ogletree (the appellants) filed a complaint against MHBC, alleging violations of a permanent injunction by parking in yards, allowing property deterioration, and seeking a zoning variance. The trial court ruled that MHBC had not violated the injunction and that the covenants were validly amended.

The injunction specifically prevents MHBC from paving or parking on certain properties and from adversely altering their external residential appearance. The appellants claimed that MHBC violated these provisions by neglecting maintenance on Lot 11, including unpainted surfaces, deteriorating wood, and the presence of signs and logs. However, the court determined that the posting of signs was not prohibited by the injunction, and the failure to construct a privacy fence was not a violation since it wasn't a stipulated term of the injunction. 

The court acknowledged that whether the lack of repairs and maintenance constituted an adverse alteration of the property's appearance was a factual issue, supported by evidence presented at trial. Regarding Lot 7, the appellants argued that maintenance vehicles were improperly parked, but the evidence showed only minor equipment, which did not substantiate their claims. The chancery judge found sufficient evidence to support his conclusions, ruling in favor of MHBC on all counts.

Appellants contend that the house on Lot 5 is in disrepair, claiming significant issues such as a deteriorating roof, untrimmed tree lines, a partially fallen chain link fence, overgrown weeds, and unsecured crawlspace access. They also note concerns about frequent open doors, persistent lighting, sparse landscaping, and handmade signs on the house. However, photographs suggest the roof's condition is not as severe as alleged, and the overgrown area may extend beyond Lot 5's rear property line. 

While the posting of signs is prohibited by an injunction, evidence does not confirm the presence of such signs. The Appellants' claims about the adverse alterations to the property are deemed insufficient on their own, yet a combination of factors could potentially constitute an adverse alteration, a determination left to the discretion of the chancellor, who based their decision on substantial evidence.

The Appellants also argue that cars were improperly parked on the church properties, but the injunction specifically prohibits parking in the yards of Lots 5, 7, and 11. Evidence shows only minimal instances of yard parking, and the chancellor determined that there was no clear link to church members or visitors, which would fall under the injunction's scope. Parking on public streets is permissible unless marked as a no-parking zone.

Lastly, the Appellants claim a violation of the injunction due to MHBC's request for the City to re-zone its property. However, the injunction does not prevent such requests, nor does re-zoning violate the injunction. Zoning changes do not nullify existing property usage restrictions, allowing enforcement of original plat restrictions to continue.

Chancellor findings can only be overturned if there is a clear error in fact interpretation or legal standard application. In this case, substantial evidence supports the chancellor's conclusion that the 1988 injunction was not violated, thus affirming the chancery court's judgment. The court erred by interpreting restrictive covenants to allow one vote per lot instead of one vote per owner; however, this error is deemed harmless as the outcome remains unchanged. The original covenants for Morrison Heights Subdivision mandated no amendments for the first 25 years, with subsequent renewals occurring every ten years unless a majority of lot owners agreed to changes. The chancellor's interpretation that "a majority of the then owners of the lots" meant one vote per lot was incorrect; it should mean one vote per owner, as supported by case law in Arizona and Montana. The original covenants' amendment was valid due to a majority agreement among owners, and the developer's intention is preserved as the covenants could not be amended until 25 years had elapsed. The Utah Court of Appeals held a different interpretation, favoring one vote per lot due to concerns over voter numbers; however, this issue does not arise here since the covenants prohibit lot subdivision. The chancellor correctly determined that a sale of a portion of Lot 2 violated the covenants, ruling that the buyer, Al Ashford, should not have been considered an "owner" for voting purposes.

At the time of adopting the amended covenants, lot owners MHBC, Edward and Mary McDonald, and David and Dorothy Hopkins voted in favor, while Johnnie and Joel Hudson, Helen Ogletree, and Pam Jones opposed. The original covenants stipulate that changes require a majority vote based on one vote per lot. Since the amended covenants were approved by a majority, they are deemed valid. Despite the chancellor applying an incorrect legal standard, the outcome remains unchanged, rendering the error harmless.

The Appellants argue that the amended covenants conflict with public policy because they permit uses prohibited by the R-1 residential zoning of the lots, which violates the Clinton Zoning Ordinance. However, restrictive covenants cannot override zoning laws; any use of property that violates zoning regulations is illegal, and such covenants do not nullify existing zoning ordinances. Therefore, the amended covenants are not void as against public policy and do not alter existing rights and duties established by the injunction.

Regarding attorney fees, the chancellor retains discretion to award them based on credible evidence. The chancellor found that there was no violation of the injunction by Morrison Heights Baptist Church or its affiliates, a determination supported by substantial evidence, thus justifying the decision to deny attorney fees.

In conclusion, the chancellor's finding that the church did not breach the injunction is upheld, the amended covenants are valid as they were adopted by a majority and do not violate public policy, although they are subject to more restrictive zoning laws. The chancery court's judgment is affirmed.