Albert Edmond v. Mississippi Department of Corrections

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2000-CP-00086-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; December 20, 1999; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Albert Edmond appeals a December 21, 1999, judgment from the Greene County Circuit Court which dismissed his habeas corpus petition against the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), the Mississippi Parole Board, and the State of Mississippi. Edmond argued that his 1982 parole revocation was unlawful due to a lack of proper revocation procedures. The Circuit Court, presided over by Judge James W. Backstrom, ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the unlawful revocation and noted that Edmond admitted to violating parole terms. Consequently, the court denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and remanded the case on April 12, 2001, citing insufficient record evidence to determine if Edmond received due process during the revocation. The court noted that Edmond was convicted of forcible rape in 1974 and paroled in June 1982. After reporting a potential parole violation voluntarily, he was arrested for malicious trespass and sentenced to time served without consultation with a parole officer or attorney. Subsequently, Edmond's parole was revoked without a preliminary hearing, and he has not had his parole reinstated.

The State contended that Edmond's claims were time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations and were also subject to the doctrine of laches. The case was remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether Edmond was provided the necessary due process during his parole revocation.

Edmond contends he was denied proper revocation procedures during his 1982 parole revocation, citing Morrissey v. Brewer and Mississippi Code Ann. 47-7-27. He argues the circuit court incorrectly denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. The court found Edmond's claims are not time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations under the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) and lacked sufficient evidence to ascertain whether proper revocation procedures were followed, leading to a reversal and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

The State contended that Edmond's claims were time-barred under UPCCRA, but the court rejected this, affirming that Edmond's initial habeas corpus petition is construed as an exception under the UPCCRA. The UPCCRA does not preclude constitutional habeas corpus rights, and the limitations imposed do not violate these rights. The court upheld that Edmond's claims fall within an exception of the UPCCRA's three-year limitation, specifically for cases where a prisoner can demonstrate unlawful revocation of parole. Thus, the court determined that Edmond's claims should be permitted under the statute's exceptions.

In Alexander v. State, it was established that challenges to parole revocation fall within the exception of Mississippi Code § 99-39-5(2), which allows such claims to bypass the three-year limitations period. The UPCCRA is clear in its exemption of unlawful parole revocation claims from this timeframe. However, the doctrine of laches may apply, requiring the State to demonstrate prejudice from any delay, which must be evidenced at a hearing.

Edmond asserts that his due process rights were violated during his parole revocation, referencing Morrissey v. Brewer, which outlines necessary due process protections such as written notice of violations, disclosure of evidence, the opportunity for a hearing, and a neutral decision-maker. The circuit court dismissed Edmond's petition without an evidentiary hearing, citing his admission of violating parole terms and a lack of evidence supporting an unlawful revocation. However, it was noted that Edmond's admission regarding "entering into an unknown house" led to an investigation and arrest for malicious trespass, yet it remains unclear whether he was formally charged or convicted of this offense, raising questions about the basis for his parole revocation. The absence of documented charges or convictions in the record challenges the justification for the revocation.

Edmond's claim of entering an unknown house is the only evidence of suspicious activity in the record, with no clear indication of his purpose for entering. The lack of documented terms and conditions of his parole and details surrounding the 1982 revocation hampers a fair assessment of his claims. The State did not provide any affidavits or records to contest Edmond’s assertions regarding the revocation process, leaving the record insufficient to determine if he received due process. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing to evaluate whether proper revocation procedures were followed, and to clarify the terms of Edmond's parole. 

Justice Smith dissents, arguing that Edmond's claim is time-barred under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). He asserts that the three-year limitation period should start when the revocation becomes final, thus rendering Edmond's petition untimely. Smith contends that the majority misinterprets the UPCCRA by suggesting that parole revocation claims are exempt from this time limit, arguing that the statute implies the limitation begins at the time of revocation.

The Legislature intended for Section 99-39-5(2) to exclude prisoners who claim unlawful parole revocation from the three-year limitation on filing petitions following their conviction or its affirmation. It is illogical to allow unlimited time to challenge parole revocations while imposing a three-year limit on conviction challenges, contradicting legislative intent. The Mississippi Legislature's amendment to the UPCCRA, which specifies a one-year filing period for post-conviction relief in capital cases, illustrates its precise approach to limitations, suggesting that if it intended unlimited time for parole revocation challenges, it would have articulated this clearly. Therefore, the three-year limitation for challenging parole or probation revocations should commence at the time of revocation, rendering Edmond's petition for post-conviction relief time-barred. The dissenting opinion notes the absence of documentation regarding Edmond's conviction and revocation proceedings, with the State relying on facts presented by Edmond.