Craig A. Southerland v. Susan Diane Shoemaker Southerland

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2000-CT-00421-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; February 9, 2000; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Craig A. Southerland and Susan Diane Shoemaker Southerland were involved in a divorce case in the Mississippi Court of Appeals. The trial court, presided over by Judge Dennis M. Baker, granted the divorce based on Craig's prolonged adulterous relationship with a former foster child. As part of the judgment, Susan was awarded $50,000 in lump sum alimony, payable in monthly installments of $1,500, and $1,000 per month in child support for their fourteen-year-old daughter. Craig appealed, arguing that the alimony amount was excessive and that the child support figure was set arbitrarily.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that the chancellor had broad discretion in financial matters relating to divorce. At the time of the divorce, Craig earned a net monthly income of $5,111 while Susan made $1,150 per month. The couple had minimal assets, and the chancellor highlighted Susan's sacrifices during the marriage, including her abandonment of her career to support Craig's ministry studies. The court referenced the Cheatham factors for determining alimony, which consider contributions to wealth accumulation, recognizing that the couple had limited financial resources despite their efforts in aviation-related activities in Florida. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the chancellor's decisions regarding alimony and child support.

Mr. Southerland's previous business failure ultimately provided him with valuable industry contacts and a high-paying job, while Mrs. Southerland, by mutual agreement, returned to a small town in Mississippi, which limited her economic prospects. The chancellor recognized this situation as a significant factor supporting a substantial lump sum alimony award. The couple was married for approximately 24 years, and Mr. Southerland's adulterous conduct added to the inequity of leaving Mrs. Southerland with limited financial resources while he maintained a large income and lifestyle.

Both parties lacked significant separate estates, with Mrs. Southerland's income described as "meager" compared to Mr. Southerland's disposable monthly income, which was over three times greater. The chancellor concluded that without alimony, Mrs. Southerland would not achieve financial security solely through her job as a bank employee. Given Mr. Southerland's monthly take-home salary exceeding $5,000, the chancellor determined that a lump sum award of $50,000, payable in monthly installments of $1,500, was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

In terms of child support, Mr. Southerland's net monthly income was established at $5,111, amounting to $61,332 annually. The chancellor set child support at $1,000 per month, which Mr. Southerland argued exceeded statutory guidelines that suggest 14% of the obligor's adjusted gross income should be approximately $715.54 for one child. The chancellor was required to assess whether strict adherence to these guidelines was reasonable given Mr. Southerland's income exceeding $50,000 annually. After the chancellor's decision, Mr. Southerland's counsel pointed out potential discrepancies with the statutory guidelines.

The chancellor acknowledged that both parties agreed to enroll their child in private school prior to the divorce, viewing the associated tuition of approximately $368 per month as an extraordinary expense not included in the statutory child support guidelines. Even disregarding Mr. Southerland's income above $50,000, the guidelines suggest a child support amount of $583 per month. Including the private school tuition, the total support calculated would be $951 per month. The chancellor determined that Mr. Southerland had the financial capacity to cover this additional expense, while Mrs. Southerland would struggle to meet typical living costs for their daughter with a reduced support amount of $600 to $700. 

Under Mississippi Code Ann. § 43-19-103, variations from the standard child support percentages are permissible, especially considering the greater needs of older children. The chancellor's decision to adjust the support amount was not deemed an abuse of discretion.

Regarding attorney's fees, Mrs. Southerland's counsel requested $4,000 for approximately twenty hours of work plus $332.40 in expenses. The chancellor reduced the fee to $3,750, ordering Mr. Southerland to pay it. On appeal, Mr. Southerland claimed that Mrs. Southerland failed to demonstrate her inability to pay these fees. However, evidence indicated she earned less than her monthly expenses, had no significant assets, and was solely responsible for their daughter's support, which limited her financial capacity. Conversely, Mr. Southerland had disposable income of $2,600. The court found it more equitable for him to bear the temporary financial hardship of paying the attorney's fees rather than imposing it on Mrs. Southerland. The chancellor's decision to award fees was thus upheld.

Mr. Southerland is ordered to pay $1,875 in attorney's fees to cover Mrs. Southerland's representation in the appeal, affirming the Chancery Court's decision in Panola County. The court assessed additional attorney's fees and costs to the appellant. The judgment noted agreement among most justices, with one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

The excerpt cites precedent requiring the spouse requesting attorney's fees to provide positive evidence of their inability to pay, as established in cases like Overstreet v. Overstreet. Mrs. Southerland demonstrated her financial situation through detailed documentation of her expenses and income, which supported the chancellor's finding of her inability to pay the $4,082.40 in accrued fees. 

The court reiterated that no error exists in awarding attorney's fees if supported by evidence of financial inability. However, it emphasized that chancellors should document specific findings regarding the considerations influencing their decisions on fee awards, including the financial capabilities of both parties, the attorney's qualifications, and the complexity of the case. The dissenting opinion expressed concern that the chancellor failed to provide the necessary findings and reasoning behind the awarded fees, advocating for greater specificity in such decisions due to the sensitive nature of domestic cases.

In family law, particularly regarding divorce, child custody, and child support, the chancellor is tasked with handling sensitive matters with care and providing thorough explanations for decisions that significantly impact the lives of all parties involved. The Mississippi Supreme Court emphasizes the necessity for specific findings in domestic matters, as established in cases such as Ferguson v. Ferguson and Albright v. Albright. These rulings stress that chancellors are required to articulate detailed reasoning in their decisions related to alimony and child custody, as well as to adhere to statutory guidelines for child support unless justified by specific findings.

Despite the implications from the Sobieske case suggesting that reviewing courts might assume adequate findings were made even when not recorded, it is argued that chancellors should consistently document detailed findings in family law cases. The dissenting opinion opposes the majority's view that sufficient findings were made regarding child support awards exceeding statutory limits, asserting that the chancellor failed to provide the necessary written or specific findings to justify such an increase. The dissent highlights that while the chancellor noted the expenses for private schooling, this was not sufficiently articulated as the basis for the child support adjustment, indicating a lack of clarity and specificity in the chancellor's reasoning.

The chancellor's decision to increase child support based on private school tuition is questioned. The child had been attending private school prior to the Southerlands' divorce, and the tuition was already a regular expense, meaning it should not qualify as an added financial burden post-divorce. If the child had been in public school before and switched to private school afterward, the situation might warrant a different assessment. The opinion emphasizes that the private school expense was part of the couple’s previous financial obligations and should not justify an increase in child support. Furthermore, the chancellor failed to provide the specific written findings required regarding child support deviations from statutory guidelines, necessitating a remand for more detailed findings. The author expresses disapproval of Craig Southerland's actions but stresses that personal feelings should not influence legal assessments, urging future chancellors to articulate their decisions clearly and consider the sensitive nature of such matters.