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Ray v. Tucson Old Pueblo Credit Union
Citation: 228 F. App'x 682Docket: No. 05-15838
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 9, 2007; Federal Appellate Court
Bernadine Ray appeals the district court's summary judgment in favor of Tucson Old Pueblo Credit Union (TOPCU) regarding her age discrimination lawsuit. The court affirms the ruling, agreeing that Ray met the low threshold for demonstrating her job performance in her prima facie case. However, TOPCU provided nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, shifting the burden back to Ray to show these reasons were pretextual and that age discrimination was the actual motive. Ray presented claims of direct evidence of bias, specifically referencing a 1998 inquiry about her retirement plans. The court found this inquiry insufficient as it was posed by examiners, not the Board, and occurred three years prior to her termination, serving a legitimate purpose in succession planning. Additionally, comments made during Board meetings were interpreted as critiques of management performance rather than evidence of age bias. The closest comment suggesting discrimination did not meet the standard necessary to survive summary judgment. Ray argued that her termination was motivated by false charges in a "Pattern of Concern" document. Although she cited Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. to argue that undermining the employer's reasons could imply discriminatory intent, the court noted that the allegations in the document pertained to her performance, not her age. Furthermore, any ulterior motive from Board member Harrington was linked to personal ambition rather than age discrimination, with Ray herself acknowledging Harrington’s motivations regarding her termination. The court ruled that both Ray's federal claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and her state law claim under Arizona law were subject to the same standards, thus resolving both claims using federal analysis. The court did not address Ray's "cat's paw" argument, as her claims of discriminatory intent from individual Board members failed. Summary judgment was correctly granted, and the decision is affirmed. The ruling is not published and serves no precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.