Margaret Sheppard v. Bobby Pace

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1998-CA-01658-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; October 6, 1998; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of *In the Matter of the Last Will and Testament of J. E. Sheppard, Sr.*, Margaret Sheppard appeals a decision from the Hinds County Chancery Court regarding alimony payments following the death of her ex-husband, J. E. Sheppard, Sr. The divorce settlement stipulated that alimony would terminate only upon Margaret's death or remarriage, with no mention of the husband's death. The court found that the agreement was binding on the parties and their successors. 

Margaret, who had been married to Buddy for over 25 years and had not remarried after their 1984 divorce, claimed $15,000 plus interest was owed at the time of her filing, along with $3,000 monthly payments. She sought a lump sum of $412,853.95 to cover future payments based on her life expectancy. Buddy had remarried Patricia Hall Sheppard and designated her as the primary beneficiary in his will, which was admitted to probate after Buddy's death.

Bobby Pace, the appointed executor, along with Patricia, contested Margaret's claim, arguing that the alimony payments should cease based on the statutory provisions for periodic alimony. The chancery court agreed and denied Margaret's claim. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed this decision, concluding the alimony payments should continue as specified in the divorce agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The court's review of a chancellor's decision is limited to cases where the decision is "manifestly wrong" or based on an erroneous legal standard. A husband may agree that his obligation to make periodic payments to his wife survives his death and binds his estate. This principle is supported by case law indicating that parties can contract for periodic payments to continue post-death. In the case of In re Estate of Peacocke, the court held that absent an explicit provision for alimony payments to continue after the payor's death, such obligations do not transfer to the estate. 

The relevant agreement includes a provision for the husband to pay the wife $4,000 monthly for five years, reducing to $3,000 thereafter until her death or remarriage. The chancery court mistakenly determined that this agreement constituted periodic alimony, which would terminate upon the husband's death, without properly considering whether it bound his estate. Instead of focusing on the substance, the court relied on the label of "periodic alimony." This is a misapplication of the law, which emphasizes examining the contract's substance rather than its nomenclature. 

Since the agreement did not specify that the husband's death would terminate the payments, under established legal interpretation, it is inferred that his death was not intended to be a terminating event. Additionally, the agreement's language binds Buddy's estate, ensuring the alimony payments continue despite his death.

Pace and Patricia argue that Paragraph 6 of the agreement indicates the parties anticipated the consequences of Buddy's death, specifically suggesting that the life insurance policy of $160,000 with Margaret as the primary beneficiary implies that alimony would cease upon his death. Patricia believes the insurance serves as a substitute for lost alimony payments. However, the court disagrees, citing precedents from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania that demonstrate life insurance does not terminate alimony obligations binding upon the obligor's estate. 

In *McDonnell v. McDonnell*, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that alimony was enforceable against the husband’s estate despite a life insurance requirement. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in *Taylor v. Gowetz* rejected the argument that life insurance was meant to replace alimony, insisting that monthly payments must continue after the husband's death. In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court in *In re Estate of Ervin* affirmed that life insurance could supplement alimony payments rather than replace them.

The current agreement lacks any language linking the life insurance policy to the alimony payments, indicating no intent for the insurance to substitute alimony. Consequently, the court concludes that the alimony obligation remains binding on Buddy's estate. The chancery court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for the distribution of Buddy's estate while leaving the specifics of fulfilling the alimony obligation to the chancellor. A lump sum payment requested by Margaret is not ordered.

Justice Sullivan dissents, joined by Justices Mills and Waller, regarding the chancellor's decision to terminate periodic alimony payments upon the death of Buddy Sheppard. The dissent argues that this decision aligns with the property settlement agreement from Sheppard's divorce and Mississippi law, which states that periodic alimony ceases upon the remarriage of the recipient or the death of the payer. The relevant agreement stipulated that Sheppard would pay his ex-wife $4,000 monthly for five years, reducing to $3,000 per month thereafter until her death or remarriage. The dissent emphasizes that there is no express provision in the agreement requiring alimony payments to continue from Sheppard's estate after his death. As such, any claims against the estate for alimony should be dismissed. The dissent asserts that the chancellor's ruling did not involve any legal error, supporting the dismissal of claims by Margaret Sheppard. The legal principle cited is "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," indicating that the explicit mention of one thing excludes others.