Khang Son Nguyen and Thi Mai Le appealed the Circuit Court of Jackson County's decision to overrule their demurrer to an indictment for receiving stolen property, which they argued was insufficient. They contended that the indictment failed to adequately specify the elements of the crime and did not sufficiently describe the stolen items, thereby impeding their ability to mount a defense and violating their due process rights. The State maintained that the indictment complied with Mississippi Rules and properly articulated the elements of the felony charge. The indictment stated that the appellants unlawfully received 114 stolen items valued over $250 in Jackson County on December 12, 1997. The court noted that an indictment must be a clear statement of facts constituting the offense and that if a statute defines an offense clearly, an indictment using statutory language suffices. The legal standard for reviewing the sufficiency of an indictment is broad, as established in prior cases. The relevant Mississippi statute defines the crime of receiving stolen property, emphasizing the necessity of knowledge regarding the stolen nature of the property.
The indictment charges the appellants with unlawfully receiving stolen items, indicating they were aware the items were stolen, thus placing them on notice of the felony offense of receiving stolen property. However, the appellants contend that the indictment fails to adequately specify the stolen property in question, which they argue is essential for their defense.
The sufficiency of the indictment is governed by Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 7.06, which outlines seven necessary elements for an indictment: 1) the name of the accused; 2) the date the indictment was filed; 3) a statement of prosecution authority; 4) the county and judicial district of the indictment; 5) the date and time of the alleged offense; 6) the signature of the grand jury foreman; and 7) the declaration of the offense against the peace and dignity of the state. The court may strike unnecessary language from the indictment.
While the indictment meets these seven requirements, the appellants challenge whether it provides a sufficiently definite statement of the essential facts, particularly the description of the stolen property. They argue that the indictment's language, while concise, lacks the required specificity. The appellants reference Wells v. State, asserting that the property must be described with the same level of detail as in larceny indictments to be adequate.
Wells remains in effect, as reaffirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hitt v. State, which mandates that an indictment for receiving stolen property must describe the property with the same specificity required for larceny. Specifically, the property description must: (1) allow the court to confirm the property is subject to larceny; (2) enable the jury to identify the items proven to be stolen; (3) inform the accused adequately to prepare a defense; and (4) ensure the judgment can bar future prosecutions for the same offense. The central question is whether the current indictment sufficiently describes the allegedly stolen property to inform the defendants of the charges and protect against double jeopardy.
The State contends that the indictment meets the Wells standard, drawing parallels to previous cases where less detailed descriptions were deemed adequate. Examples cited include descriptions such as a "diamond ring," "neat calf," and "110 pounds of dairy feed" that were accepted despite lacking exhaustive detail. The State argues that listing general categories of property, rather than detailing each of the 114 items, was appropriate and necessary to avoid excessive labor, referencing URCCC 7.06. Additionally, the State distinguishes Cummins v. State, asserting that, unlike in that case, the current indictment adequately identifies the nature of the stolen property.
The indictment in this case is found to be deficient for several reasons. It lacks specific details about the items allegedly received by the appellants, failing to inform them adequately of the charges, which hampers their ability to prepare a defense. The indictment refers to "114 items, including" but does not clarify the exact number or type of each item, leaving room for ambiguity regarding other unlisted items. The court emphasizes that discovery does not replace the requirement for an indictment to provide a clear and concise statement of the essential facts of the offense, as mandated by URCCC 7.06.
Additionally, the indictment erroneously cites a repealed statute (Miss. Code Ann. 97-17-69) for the offense of receiving stolen property instead of the current statute (Miss. Code Ann. 97-17-70). While misidentifying the statute isn't always reversible error, in this instance, it, combined with the inadequacies of the indictment, constitutes reversible error. The court concludes that the vagueness of the indictment also prevents it from being the basis for a plea of former jeopardy in future proceedings.
Ultimately, the court reverses the trial court's decision to overrule the demurrer to the indictment, quashing the indictment for its insufficiency. The dissenting opinion argues that the indictment provided enough notice for the appellants to prepare their defense, suggesting that due process was satisfied.
The indictment adequately alleges the elements of the felony of receiving stolen property and informs the defendants of the specific stolen items involved, complying with Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice. This rule mandates that indictments provide a "plain, concise and definite" statement of the essential facts of the offense. The indictment charges the defendants with receiving 114 items, explicitly listing categories such as TVs, VCRs, cameras, tools, and microwaves. The absence of ownership details in the indictment is not considered a fatal flaw, as established in Cummins v. State. The majority opinion contends that the defendants were insufficiently informed, but prior case law, including Daniel v. State, supports that a general description is legally adequate. The indictment in this case provides more specific information than previous cases, and requiring additional specificity contradicts the intent of Rule 7.06 and complicates the grand jury process.
