Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 18, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs-Appellants Ntchwaidumela Bey and Ajama Jabari Bey appeal the District Court's orders that granted summary judgment to defendants and dismissed their claims regarding violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as New York anti-discrimination laws. The case stems from the plaintiffs' termination as corrections officers for the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC) after an investigation revealed over 1,000 employees, including the plaintiffs, filed false tax documents. Of these, 70 were arrested, and those convicted were automatically terminated. The Inspector General recommended the termination of 21 employees, including the plaintiffs, who were found to have willfully filed false tax documents to defraud the city and state.
The plaintiffs, claiming discrimination based on their adherence to the Moorish-American faith, assert that they were unfairly targeted for disciplinary action compared to similarly situated employees who were not disciplined. To succeed on their selective enforcement claim, they must show they were treated differently from comparable employees and that this treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race or religion. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs were only similarly situated to the other 21 disciplined Moorish employees and not to any non-disciplined DOC employee, mainly because plaintiffs submitted more than just forms to support their tax exemption claims. The appellate court affirms the denial of the motion to strike but vacates the summary judgment for further proceedings, indicating a need to explore whether the plaintiffs were indeed similarly situated to those not disciplined.
Employees asserted claims of immunity from arrest, taxation, and U.S. jurisdiction, with some identifying as Moors. Other non-Moorish employees made similar claims without facing the same disciplinary actions. Defendants argued that the Moors' claims, which included immunity from New York laws, were distinct from the non-Moors', but this distinction was deemed insufficient to warrant summary judgment. A jury could find that the disciplined Moors were similarly situated to their non-disciplined counterparts and might perceive defendants' distinction as a pretext for discrimination based on religious identity.
Additionally, the plaintiffs were linked to the Great Seal Association of Moorish Affairs, a group described in a 1996 NYPD memorandum as potentially dangerous. Defendants contended that this justified targeting the Moors due to security concerns. However, the memorandum lacked detail and did not name any plaintiffs. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs were disciplined based on a reasonable belief of their affiliation with a criminal group, but this finding was criticized for its reliance on insufficient evidence.
The nature of the plaintiffs' connection to the Great Seal remains unclear, raising questions about whether it is a criminal conspiracy or a broader religious association. The reasonableness of DOC's security concerns requires further factual exploration, making summary judgment inappropriate. Consequently, the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' equal protection claims was vacated.
The District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim regarding freedom of association was found to be in error. If plaintiffs can show that the Department of Corrections (DOC) imposed special discipline on them due to their religion, this could substantiate a violation of their rights. The plaintiffs contested the denial of their motion to strike certain evidence, arguing its relevance and admissibility. The Court found no error in the District Court's decision, noting that while the relevance of evidence concerning the treatment of arrested versus non-arrested employees may be limited, it is not irrelevant. The defendants’ security concerns, which were not mentioned during the plaintiffs’ OATH hearing, are deemed relevant for understanding the enforcement focus on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also challenged the denial of their motion for a continuance of discovery under Rule 56(f), but this issue will not be addressed now. On remand, plaintiffs may seek further discovery, specifying the facts needed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Court vacated the summary judgment, affirmed the denial of the motion to strike, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It was noted that other non-arrested DOC employees faced discipline years later.
