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Linnox Marcus Walker v. State of Mississippi
Citation: Not availableDocket: 97-DP-00763-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; May 23, 1997; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Linnox Marcus Walker appealed his conviction for capital murder and death sentence from the Marshall County Circuit Court, presided over by Judge R. Kenneth Coleman. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction while reversing the sentencing, remanding for a new sentencing hearing and directing a Batson v. Kentucky hearing regarding jury selection. On May 11, 1994, Walker and Mario Jeffries traveled to Oxford, Mississippi, stopping briefly at a friend’s house before deciding to return to Marshall County to buy beer, which was illegal in Oxford. Walker expressed intent to rob the store run by Bobby Dean Henderson, despite Jeffries warning him about Henderson's armed status. After Walker entered the store, Jeffries heard a gunshot and subsequently saw Walker exit with a cash drawer and a gun, which Jeffries believed belonged to Henderson. Walker, without any beer, asked Jeffries if he thought Henderson was dead, implying guilt. The next morning, Henderson's body was discovered at the store by a passerby, Danny Thomas, who reported the incident to authorities. After the incident, Walker and Jeffries returned to the friend’s house, where Jeffries did not report the crime due to concerns about Walker’s reaction. Jeffries woke to find Walker counting money and armed with guns and a cash drawer containing $1,700. They traveled to Jeffries' home, during which Jeffries disposed of the cash drawer but kept the pistol. Before leaving Walker's car, Jeffries was warned not to speak of the incident, which he interpreted as a threat to his life. Later, he confided in his brother about the robbery. A few days later at a crap game, Jeffries encountered Walker but they did not discuss the robbery. Jeffries observed Walker practicing with the pistol afterward but never saw it again. A week post-incident, Anthony Gardner approached Jeffries, claiming Walker had recounted the robbery and shooting of Bobby Dean Henderson. Following this, Gardner rode with Walker, who detailed the robbery to him. Gardner later confirmed the events to Jeffries and subsequently provided a statement to Sheriff Kenneth Dickerson implicating both Walker and Jeffries, leading to their arrest and indictment for capital murder. Jeffries accepted a plea deal for manslaughter, while Walker denied involvement. During the trial, Jeffries testified he did not suspect Walker's intentions during the robbery, noting Walker was unmasked and ungloved. He claimed Walker owed him $100 after the crime. Gardner testified for the State, admitting to initially conflicting statements due to fear, but maintained that Walker had confessed the details of the robbery to him. The State's case included testimony from Sheriff Dickerson, who responded to the homicide scene on May 11, 1994, finding Henderson's body and the missing cash drawer. Dickerson investigated the crime scene, taking photographs that were admitted as evidence during the trial. The images included various angles of the store, evidence of the robbery, and the positioning of the victim, Bobby Dean Henderson, whose body was found on the floor. Dickerson opined that Henderson was likely kneeling when shot, despite defense objections regarding his qualifications to make such a statement. The defense also sought to exclude graphic photographs of the body, arguing they were prejudicial, but only one was excluded. No fingerprints were recovered from the twelve-pack of beer or the scene. Dr. Stephen Hayne testified as a forensic pathology expert, stating that Henderson died from a close-range gunshot wound to the forehead, with evidence suggesting the shooter was positioned above him. Cooper Epps testified that his cellmate, Walker, confessed to shooting a white man at close range. Epps had no prior knowledge of the robbery or murder before their incarceration. The defense presented Alan Thompson, who found no physical evidence linking Walker to Henderson's death. Walker denied any involvement in the murder or robbery, acknowledging he knew Epps but claimed he never confessed to him. The jury convicted Walker of capital murder, leading to a death sentence by lethal injection. Walker's post-trial motions were denied, and he appealed, claiming a violation of Batson v. Kentucky due to the State's use of peremptory challenges against black jurors. The trial judge found no systematic exclusion of black jurors and did not require the State to provide race-neutral reasons for its challenges, with the State arguing Walker did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in peremptory challenges, a defendant must demonstrate: 1) membership in a cognizable racial group, 2) that the prosecutor has removed jurors from that race, and 3) circumstances indicating that the challenges were used to strike minorities, as outlined in Batson v. Kentucky. If a prima facie case is made, the prosecution must provide race-neutral reasons for the challenges, which do not need to meet the standard for challenges for cause. The trial court is responsible for determining whether purposeful discrimination occurred. In the case at hand, the State used seven out of nine peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, resulting in a jury of ten whites and two blacks, despite a 50% black population in Marshall County. The trial court ruled there was no prima facie case of discrimination due to the presence of two black jurors, but this was erroneous as prior rulings indicate that accepting some black jurors does not negate a Batson claim. The court concluded that Walker presented sufficient inference of racial discrimination, and the failure to conduct a Batson hearing was an error. The case is remanded for a Batson hearing to allow the State to articulate race-neutral reasons for its challenges, with Walker permitted to rebut those explanations. If purposeful discrimination is found, a new trial will be ordered; if not, the court must provide factual findings. Additionally, Walker contended that his motion to exclude certain photographs should have been granted on the grounds of being cumulative, enlarged, gruesome, and inflammatory. However, the admissibility of photographs lies within the trial judge's discretion, which will be upheld unless abused. Autopsy photographs are admissible if they have probative value, and their gruesome nature does not preclude admission if relevant. Photographs presented in court show Henderson lying face down in a pool of blood, the scene of his body, a blood-splattered broom nearby, and the store entrance with Henderson behind the counter. Walker objected to the admission of an enlarged photo of Henderson's gunshot wound, but the court allowed the photographs after assessing their probative value against potential prejudicial impact, ultimately determining they were not overly gruesome or cumulative. Consequently, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the images. Walker also challenged Sheriff Dickerson's testimony regarding Henderson's positioning at the time of the shooting, arguing that Dickerson was unqualified to provide expert opinion. While Walker's objection was based on qualifications rather than a discovery violation, the State maintained that Dickerson's testimony was permissible lay opinion. During his testimony, Dickerson, who was a former Highway Patrol Investigator, described the blood's location and indicated that the presence of blood on the broom suggested Henderson was kneeling when shot. Despite Walker's repeated objections to Dickerson's qualifications, the court permitted him to describe his observations without requiring expert qualifications, concluding that his insights were based on common sense and personal observation. Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence allows a qualified expert to testify with specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact. Expert opinion requires a witness to have experience or expertise beyond that of an average person. A witness must be formally tendered as an expert to provide expert testimony; otherwise, their opinions are limited to those rationally based on their perception and helpful for understanding the case. In this instance, Sheriff Dickerson, while not formally presented as an expert, provided specialized testimony regarding the position of Henderson when shot, which could be construed as expert opinion due to his experience in crime scene investigations. However, the State failed to qualify him as an expert, resulting in an error in admitting his opinion. This error was ultimately harmless, as other testimony supported the same conclusion regarding Henderson's position at the time of the shooting. Additionally, Walker argued a discovery violation concerning Dickerson’s expert status but failed to raise this issue during the trial, waiving the argument for appeal. Lastly, Walker contended that the trial court should have sustained his objection to testimony regarding his gang affiliations, but this point requires further consideration. Walker moved to exclude Epps' testimony regarding gang signs during the sentencing phase, arguing it was irrelevant and prejudicial as it suggested involvement in other crimes. The State claimed the testimony was pertinent to illustrate Walker's threats against Mario Jeffries and his efforts to evade prosecution. During the guilt phase, Walker denied any gang involvement and threats against individuals involved in the case, asserting he was unaware of Mario's involvement until his arrest. He consistently refuted claims of gang affiliation and threats, stating other inmates were misrepresenting his actions. No supporting evidence for the State's assertions about threats or gang membership was presented until the sentencing phase, leading Walker to object to Epps' testimony. The absence of corroborative evidence raises concerns regarding the potential arbitrariness of the death penalty, as mandated by Mississippi law. Questioning without a factual basis can mislead jurors into believing the prosecutor possesses credible evidence, thereby creating prejudicial and inadmissible impressions that are difficult to counteract. In *United States v. Silverstein*, the prosecutor implied the existence of conversations between the defendant and an uncalled inmate, leading to an appellate finding that such insinuations require substantiation through evidence. Similarly, in *Hosford v. State*, the court determined it was erroneous for the prosecutor to insinuate guilt of unproven crimes, labeling such questioning as inflammatory and prejudicial. The *Scott v. State* case also illustrated this principle, where insinuations made without evidence during cross-examination were deemed harmful to the defendant. The Arizona Court of Appeals in *State v. Ballantyne* criticized the practice of implying prejudicial facts without evidence, highlighting a prosecutor's failed attempts to substantiate claims about the defendant's gang affiliation. The Florida case *Jones v. State* further reinforced these principles by ruling that insinuations regarding threats made by the accused, unsupported by evidence, constituted prejudicial error. In *People v. Lediard*, the New York court ruled that the prosecutor's cross-examination of a witness regarding the defendant allegedly displaying a pistol was erroneous due to the absence of evidence supporting this claim, leading to potential prejudice against the defendant. Similarly, in *Alexander v. State*, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned a murder conviction because the prosecutor failed to substantiate claims of gang involvement presented in the opening statement with any evidence during the trial, which the court found prejudicial. In the current case, the prosecutor did not provide evidence of threats or gang affiliation related to Walker during the guilt phase. Witness Mario Jeffries indicated that Walker implied he would shoot him if he disclosed information, but this did not constitute a direct threat. The trial court's admission of gang-related testimony was deemed erroneous due to the lack of supporting evidence. During the sentencing phase, hearsay was the only evidence presented regarding Walker's supposed gang involvement and threats to witnesses. Testimony from Cooper Epps, who claimed Walker drew signs on their shared cell wall, was undermined by Epps's lack of familiarity with gang signs. Additionally, extensive questioning about gangs, particularly the "Black Gangster Disciples," failed to produce any credible evidence linking Walker to gang membership or threats, as the State did not call key witnesses to support such claims. Mario Jeffries's testimony about Walker's threats was also ruled inadmissible hearsay, with no substantive proof of gang affiliation or direct threats made by Walker. The trial court erred by allowing these inquiries, given the absence of a factual basis. During the sentencing phase of a capital murder case, the State can only present evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances defined in Miss. Code. Ann. 99-19-101. Testimony regarding Walker's gang signs was deemed irrelevant, as it did not pertain to the aggravating factors listed. The court found the State's argument that this evidence was relevant to Walker's intent to avoid arrest to be unconvincing, noting that the statements were made two years post-incident while Walker was already in custody. This improper admission of evidence necessitated a remand for a new sentencing hearing. Walker also contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to allow testimony regarding his willingness to take a polygraph test. The court upheld that polygraph results are inadmissible under Mississippi law, leading to the dismissal of this point. Additionally, Walker challenged various jury instructions, including the amendment to Instruction S-2A, which included the phrase "with or without deliberate design." He argued this amendment was unsupported by evidence and objected to its inclusion based on the grounds that only a jury can return an indictment. The court noted that specific objections to jury instructions must be articulated during the trial to be considered on appeal. A party on appeal cannot argue that a jury instruction was erroneous based on a new reason not raised during the trial. In this case, Walker's objection to Instruction S-2A differed from his current argument, thus waiving the right to review any alleged error. Walker contended that the trial court improperly denied Instructions D-4 (self-defense) and D-5 (provocation). Instruction D-4 stated that the jury should assess Walker's actions based on the circumstances he faced at the time of the incident on May 12, 1994, and if he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger from Bobby Dean Henderson, he should be found not guilty. Instruction D-5 indicated that a killing could be excusable if done in response to sudden and sufficient provocation. Walker argued that evidence supported both instructions, citing testimony from Mario Jeffries about Walker's claim of feeling threatened. However, the court determined that the evidence did not substantiate self-defense or provocation, as the circumstances indicated a robbery was occurring, which negated the justification for the killing. Consequently, the trial court was justified in denying both instructions. Additionally, Walker argued that the State failed to provide evidence supporting a specific part of a sentencing instruction related to committing a capital offense to avoid lawful arrest. The court noted that if there is reasonable evidence suggesting that a killing occurred to conceal the killer's identity or evade arrest, it is appropriate for the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. In this case, as in previous rulings, there was no evidence indicating that Walker was disguised during the incident, leading to the conclusion that the trial court’s decisions were valid. Walker, a regular customer at the store, was aware of the weapons kept behind the cash register and was recognized by Henderson during his visits. During the robbery and subsequent murder, Walker did not disguise his identity, which led to an inference that he shot Henderson to evade arrest. The trial court correctly granted a jury instruction regarding this motive. Walker contended that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight and sufficiency of the evidence and argued for a not guilty verdict based on perceived insufficiencies. In assessing the jury's decision, the court emphasized that it must accept evidence supporting the verdict as true and disregard evidence favorable to the defendant unless it would undermine a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that reversing a jury verdict is only warranted if the evidence does not reasonably support a guilty finding. Walker claimed the conviction relied solely on circumstantial evidence, primarily from witnesses Mario Jeffries and Cooper Epps. Evidence indicated that both participated in the robbery, with Jeffries testifying that Walker entered the store armed and later exited with cash and a gun. Walker was seen counting $1,700 shortly after the robbery, and he made a cryptic remark to Jeffries regarding Henderson's death. Gardner corroborated that Walker confessed to the shooting and robbery. Epps also testified to Walker's admissions about the crime, describing the specifics of Henderson's killing. Despite Walker's challenges to the credibility of Jeffries and Epps, the jury found the State’s evidence credible, which is sufficient for conviction, even based on an accomplice’s testimony, as long as it is reasonable and not significantly impeached. Substantial evidence supporting a jury's verdict must be of sufficient weight and quality to allow fair-minded jurors to reach different conclusions while maintaining the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's verdict in Walker's case was upheld, as they had adequate evidence to find him guilty, and the trial court justifiably rejected his request for a peremptory instruction. Walker contends that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, primarily arguing that the prosecution's case heavily relied on the testimonies of accomplices Epps and Jeffries. However, the court has previously upheld death sentences in similar cases where accomplice testimony was deemed sufficient for both conviction and sentencing. The court also noted that, per Mississippi Code Ann. 99-19-105, it must consider whether the death sentence was influenced by arbitrary factors, whether statutory aggravating circumstances were supported by evidence, and whether the sentence was excessive compared to similar cases. Walker's conviction relied significantly on Jeffries' testimony, who received a lesser sentence for manslaughter, and other witnesses indicated that Walker had confessed. Although past cases have affirmed death sentences based on accomplice testimony, the current case presents complications due to improper testimony during the sentencing phase regarding alleged threats and gang affiliation, which the State argued related to aggravating circumstances. The court found that the State's attempt to present evidence of threats by Walker and his alleged gang affiliation was flawed, lacking proof of actual threats or gang membership. This questionable evidence unduly influenced the jury's decision in imposing the death penalty, leading to a conclusion that prejudiced the defendant. Consequently, the death sentence was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. A Batson hearing was also ordered to investigate potential discrimination; if found, a new trial on guilt will be required. Should no discrimination be detected, the trial court must provide factual findings. The court emphasized the necessity of a new sentencing trial regardless of the Batson hearing's outcome. The opinion included concurring views from Justices Mills, Pittman, and Waller, with Mills expressing reservations about claims regarding Walker's gang signs and threats, suggesting they may have been attempts to evade prosecution. Additionally, the document lists eight aggravating circumstances that could influence the death penalty decision.