Richard J. Leuer, Jr. appealed a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) and careless driving, stemming from an incident on November 11, 1995, where he was stopped by Officer Brian Harper after his vehicle swerved and exhibited signs of intoxication. Leuer admitted to consuming alcohol earlier in the evening but denied drinking later. He encountered difficulties with the breath test at the police station, leading to a dispute over whether he refused the test.
On June 14, 1996, Leuer filed a motion claiming the applicable laws were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. At a bench trial on August 21, 1996, he was found guilty. The County Court sentenced him to fines and court assessments totaling $1,006, mandated attendance at a driving course, and a 48-hour jail term, with credit for time served. Leuer appealed to the Circuit Court of Rankin County, which upheld the conviction.
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the statutes in question provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct, affirming the lower court's judgment. A motion for rehearing was filed and subsequently denied, with the mandate issued on September 30, 1999.
Leuer argues that Miss. Code Ann. 63-11-30(1)(a) (1995) is unconstitutionally vague, failing to inform citizens about permissible alcohol consumption levels before incurring criminal penalties. He claims it also lacks adequate guidance for law enforcement enforcement. The statute prohibits operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating substances or with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) above specified levels. It is primarily invoked when test results are unavailable, when a BAC is below 0.10%, or when a DUI test is refused. The distinction between common law DUI and per se DUI is clarified, where common law DUI applies when a driver's ability is impaired regardless of BAC, while per se DUI applies when BAC is at or above 0.10%. The statute’s vagueness violates due process if its terms are so indeterminate that individuals cannot discern what conduct is prohibited. The void for vagueness doctrine requires that statutes provide clear guidance to avoid arbitrary enforcement and ensure individuals can understand what actions are punishable. Key cases cited include Hedrick v. State and Meeks v. Tallahatchie County, which address the clarity required in criminal statutes.
In *Government of Virgin Islands v. Steven*, 134 F.3d 526 (3rd Cir. 1998), the Third Circuit reaffirmed that courts have consistently rejected vagueness challenges to statutes using the term 'under the influence.' It upheld the constitutionality of Title 20 V.I.C. 493(a)(1), which criminalizes driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, noting that the term is widely understood to indicate a state of intoxication that impairs clarity and control. The court referenced historical cases confirming this common understanding and its alignment with the purpose of drunk driving laws to prevent unsafe driving due to diminished capacity.
The court concluded that Miss. Code Ann. 63-11-30(1)(a) is not void for vagueness, as it provides clear notice regarding the prohibition of driving after consuming intoxicating liquors. Evidence in the case indicated that Leuer's behavior—driving erratically late at night, the strong smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, and slurred speech—supported the conclusion that he was under the influence. Although Leuer denied drinking after 10:30 p.m. and refused a breathalyzer test, his admission of prior drinking and the officer's observations substantiated the DUI charge. The absence of BAC results did not affect the prosecution, as subsection (1)(a) allows for proving DUI through alternative evidence.
Leuer argues that the careless driving statute, Miss. Code Ann. 63-3-1213, is unconstitutionally vague, specifically challenging the phrase "careless or imprudent manner" as lacking clear, objective standards for conduct. The court states that it typically interprets statutes based on their "plain meaning" and legislative intent, referencing established case law. The court concludes that the statute aligns with tort law, which requires drivers to exercise the standard of care expected of a prudent person under similar circumstances. It notes that other jurisdictions have upheld similar language in careless driving statutes, equating it to standards of negligence. Furthermore, when considered alongside relevant traffic rules, the statute provides sufficient specificity to meet constitutional standards. Consequently, the court finds no merit in Leuer's claims and affirms his convictions for both careless driving and driving under the influence, upholding the associated penalties and requirements, including a jail sentence and driving course attendance.
