Charles Sylvester Bell v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1998-CP-01128-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; July 10, 1998; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Charles Sylvester Bell appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief from the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi, related to his convictions for capital murder and armed robbery. He is currently serving two consecutive life sentences for capital murder and an additional 25 years as a habitual offender. This appeal marks the fourth time his case has been reviewed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, determining that Bell had knowingly waived his double jeopardy and ex post facto rights during the plea negotiations for his armed robbery conviction, which occurred after the overturning of his death sentence in 1982. The Court had previously remanded the case to assess this waiver, and the circuit court concluded that Bell was aware of his rights when he pled guilty as a habitual offender. The Supreme Court reiterated that it will not reverse a lower court's decision unless there is clear error, emphasizing that defendants can voluntarily forgo ex post facto claims in plea deals. The final judgment was issued on July 10, 1998, and the motion for rehearing was denied on March 2, 2000.

On remand, the lower court conducted a hearing where testimony was presented from Charles Sylvester Bell and Glenn White, the District Attorney during Bell's plea. Bell claimed he was unaware he was waiving his ex post facto rights when he pled guilty. In contrast, White asserted that Bell's plea to armed robbery as a habitual offender was made knowingly and was part of a plea bargain to avoid a potential death penalty. The lower court concluded that Bell had knowingly waived his rights based on the evidentiary hearing and a review of the guilty plea transcript.

The transcript revealed that on March 19, 1985, Bell pled guilty to armed robbery while being re-sentenced for a previous capital murder conviction. The Fifth Circuit had remanded the case, indicating Bell could face a death sentence again. White had sought to empanel a jury for sentencing but agreed to a plea deal that led to a life sentence instead. The court ensured Bell understood the implications of his guilty plea and the likelihood of serving life in prison. Although the plea proceeding transcript did not specifically mention that Bell was informed about his ex post facto rights, his attorneys claimed they had advised him on all constitutional and statutory rights.

During the evidentiary hearing, White testified that he consulted with Bell's attorneys about Bell waiving his rights, and they confirmed he was aware of the circumstances. The court found substantial evidence supporting that Bell's attorneys understood the ex post facto implications and had informed him accordingly. The incentive to waive these rights was strong due to the potential death sentence. Ultimately, the court upheld the determination that Bell knowingly waived his ex post facto rights, concluding that this finding was not erroneous and was supported by substantial evidence.

Bell claims ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his guilty plea to armed robbery, asserting it violates double jeopardy protections. The standard for evaluating such claims is established in Strickland v. Washington, requiring proof of both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice to the defendant. Specifically, Bell must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had his counsel been effective, he would have opted for a trial instead of pleading guilty. He faces a presumption that his counsel's performance was reasonable. Bell's claim is complicated by the context of a plea bargain aimed at avoiding the death penalty, with no evidence suggesting his double jeopardy claim wasn't waived. Additionally, the claim was initially raised in 1984, rejected by the trial court, and subsequently dismissed due to Bell's failure to pursue an appeal, making it procedurally barred under Mississippi law. The court upheld the lower court's findings, affirming the denial of post-conviction relief.