In the case of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, Inc. v. Herman C. Sakwa, the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed an appeal arising from a circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Herman Sakwa. The plaintiff, a Maryland hospital, sought to recover $107,188.34 in unpaid medical bills for treatment provided to Sakwa's minor child, Stephanie, whose custodial parent was Diane Sakwa. The court applied Maryland law, which holds non-custodial parents liable for their children's medical expenses.
Herman Sakwa, a Mississippi resident, contended that he was not a party to the contract between the hospital and Diane Sakwa and argued that the hospital was estopped from pursuing him due to a prior judgment against Diane for the same debt. His motion to dismiss was denied, but the court later granted summary judgment in his favor. The hospital appealed, questioning whether it could hold a non-custodial parent liable for medical expenses under either statutory or common law.
The court utilized the "center of gravity" test to determine the applicable law and concluded that Maryland law was appropriate given the significant connections to the state. This conclusion aligned with findings in a related case, further reinforcing the application of Maryland law to the issues at hand. The final disposition of the case was a reversal of the lower court's decision and a remand for further proceedings.
Maryland law holds that a non-custodial parent can be liable for necessary medical expenses of a minor child, as established in Sheppard Pratt Physicians and Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law. § 5-203(b). The Sheppard Enoch Pratt Hospital is attempting to collect $107,188.34 for medical services provided to Herman Sakwa's daughter, Stephanie, with the amount remaining after insurance and other payments. The trial court's summary judgment favoring the appellee was incorrect, as it failed to recognize the right of third-party medical providers to pursue collection from non-custodial parents under Maryland law. The issue of whether the medical services were necessary remains to be tried. A dissenting opinion argues against allowing third-party providers to collect from non-custodial parents without a court judgment specifying liability. The dissent also highlights the lack of evidence regarding the necessity of the medical expenses. The court's procedural review of the summary judgment emphasized the requirement for no genuine issue of material fact to warrant such a judgment. The case is reversed and remanded for a trial on the necessity of the services rendered.
Herman Sakwa, in his alternative summary judgment motion, argued that under Mississippi or Maryland law, a non-custodial parent cannot be held liable in a direct action by a third-party medical provider for a child's medical expenses. He provided an affidavit stating he was not consulted about or agreed to the medical care for his daughter, Stephanie, at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital. Sakwa cited case law indicating that without a court order mandating payment for medical expenses, he could not be held liable.
Sheppard failed to demonstrate that the medical expenses exceeding the coverage of Sakwa's insurance policy were reasonable and necessary, as required by the precedent set in McLain v. West Side Bone Joint Ctr. The record did not clarify the nature of Stephanie's injuries, and Sheppard did not prove that Sakwa was involved in her admission or liable for expenses beyond the insurance terms defined in the divorce decree. The Arizona court's divorce order obligated Sakwa only to provide insurance for Stephanie, with Diane Sakwa granted permanent custody. Any changes to parental obligations should originate from the divorce decree, not the current court.
Additionally, referencing Govan v. Medical Credit Serv. Inc., the court found that one spouse cannot be responsible for a former spouse's debts without consent. The circuit court concluded that Sheppard was not entitled to summary judgment on an implied contract theory, given that Sakwa had complied with his child support obligations as ordered by the court and had no significant connection with Sheppard or the hospital. Sakwa's insurance covered a significant portion of Sheppard's bill, and he had no substantial involvement in Stephanie's treatment decisions, which were solely made by Diane Sakwa.
Sheppard did not demonstrate that the expenses for Stephanie Sakwa were reasonable and necessary. The majority cites Kriedo v. Kriedo, which establishes that, under Maryland common law, a non-custodial parent must pay necessary medical expenses for a minor child only if such expenses were not covered by a previous child support award. The ruling emphasizes that this obligation, traditionally seen as a father's duty, has evolved; both parents now share a moral responsibility for their children's reasonable and necessary expenses. In the context of divorce, each parent must prove that expenses are reasonable and necessary prior to requiring payment from the other.
Mississippi law (Miss. Code Ann. 93-13-1) does not grant third-party medical providers the right to collect unpaid medical bills from parents, and general parental support obligations do not create a basis for third-party actions. One spouse cannot be held liable for the other’s debts without explicit consent, preventing potential misuse of one spouse’s assets by the other.
Herman Sakwa has fulfilled his obligations by providing medical insurance for Stephanie, which covered her treatment as per the policy. The divorce decree outlines shared responsibilities for dental and specific medical expenses. Any further determination regarding the parents' obligations should occur in the domestic relations court, which has the authority to interpret and modify the divorce decree to address Stephanie's current medical needs.
The Court should reject Sheppard Enoch Pratt Hospital's arguments regarding the obligation of non-custodial parents to pay for a child's medical expenses, as such a blanket requirement could lead to potential abuse by custodial parents. A third party seeking reimbursement from a non-custodial parent must demonstrate that the medical expenses are reasonable and necessary, supported by a contract, implied contract, or court order. In the case of Herman Sakwa, there has been no modification of the divorce judgment requiring him to provide anything beyond health insurance for his child, Stephanie. Since Sheppard did not establish that the medical expenses were reasonable, necessary, or supported by any contractual basis, the trial court's decision should be upheld. The dissent notes that Sheppard's appeal does not address whether the laws of Arizona, Maryland, or Mississippi apply to implied contracts or the implications of the divorce decree. The Arizona divorce order explicitly requires Sakwa to maintain health insurance for his children until they turn 18, and potentially until age 21 if available through his employment.
