Billy Joe Barnett v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 95-KA-00353-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; September 30, 1994; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Billy Joe Barnett appeals his conviction for the capital murder of Jerry Tavares from the Attala County Circuit Court, where he was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The appeal raises multiple issues, primarily focusing on the admissibility of a statement made by Barnett during plea discussions, which the court found to be erroneous and in violation of evidentiary rules. 

Tavares was killed on the night of May 11 or early morning of May 12, 1992, with his body discovered by Gloria Guillory. The investigation revealed multiple gunshot wounds and two nine-millimeter shell casings at the scene, linking the crime to a nine-millimeter pistol recovered later. Barnett was indicted alongside others for capital murder on February 16, 1994, and re-indicted on September 6, 1994, on charges of capital murder and conspiracy. The conspiracy charge was later severed, leading to Barnett's trial starting September 27, 1994. 

The jury delivered a guilty verdict on September 30, 1994, and recommended life imprisonment. The court ruled that Barnett's statement to law enforcement, claimed by the State to not be a part of plea negotiations, was admissible. However, Barnett contended it should not have been allowed due to its connection to plea discussions. The Supreme Court of Mississippi ultimately reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings based on this evidentiary error.

Mississippi Rule of Evidence 410 restricts the admissibility of statements made during plea negotiations, stating that certain types of statements cannot be used against a defendant in any legal proceedings. Specifically, it prohibits the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, nolo contendere pleas, and statements made during plea negotiations that do not result in a guilty plea. The Court's recent ruling in *Evans v. State* involved a defendant charged with capital murder after confessing to murdering a child following plea negotiations with an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA). The AUSA suggested that the defendant could receive some consideration if he disclosed the child's location. Despite extensive discussions, no formal agreement was reached, and the AUSA instructed that no actions should proceed without advising the defendant of his right to remain silent. After the AUSA left, the defendant drafted a document acknowledging he had been advised against making statements. He ultimately provided three statements, including confessions to kidnapping, murder, and sexual assault of the victim.

On appeal, the defendant contended that his confessions were made during plea negotiations. The Court examined whether these confessions fell under Rule 410, which excludes certain discussions from admissibility if made "with an attorney for the prosecuting authority." It determined that the confessions were made to a detective and an FBI agent, not a prosecuting attorney, and that the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) had ceased discussions with Evans before any statements were made. The Court referenced Mississippi law, stating that cooperative discussions with law enforcement aimed at leniency do not constitute inadmissible plea negotiations. 

Citing United States v. Robertson, the Court clarified that not all discussions between an accused and government agents qualify as plea negotiations. It emphasized that true plea negotiations involve discussions aimed at reaching an agreement for a plea in exchange for concessions. The analysis of Evans's situation revealed that the AUSA explicitly stated he was not engaged in plea negotiations. Furthermore, while some agreements were mentioned, they were not explicitly linked to a plea. The AUSA terminated discussions after Evans refused to sign a waiver, and no plea terms were established. Consequently, Evans's expectation that his confessions would be protected from state prosecution was deemed unreasonable.

The current case presents a different scenario, as the State argues that Barnett's statement to a law enforcement officer, made after receiving Miranda warnings, indicates that Rule 410 does not apply. However, the Court is not convinced that the mere presence of a prosecutor after the statement was given alters the applicability of Rule 410.

Lieutenant Hathcock's testimony indicated that he believed Barnett's statement was part of a plea bargain, supported by the prosecutor's remark about "the deal" being off due to Barnett's lack of truthfulness, which led to a trial and a death penalty pursuit. This suggests prior discussions between Barnett and the prosecution regarding a statement in exchange for not seeking the death penalty. Barnett’s agreement to provide a statement was closely linked to this deal, contrasting with the Evans case where admissions were independent of plea negotiations. The court concluded that Barnett reasonably expected his statement would not be used against him at trial, thus Rule 410 applied, resulting in the statement's inadmissibility. The court reversed and remanded the case.

Barnett also claimed his life without parole sentence violated ex post facto laws, as the option was not available under the statute at the time of his 1992 crime. However, the court found he failed to timely object to this sentencing option during jury instructions. The objection raised during a motion for a new trial was deemed too late, as issues must be raised at the appropriate time to avoid procedural barring. Consequently, Barnett's argument was rejected, affirming the sentence.

Life without parole has been permitted for defendants whose capital offenses occurred before the amendment of the relevant statute, as it is considered a less severe punishment than death and does not violate ex post facto laws. In this instance, Barnett was aware that the jury could impose a life without parole sentence and relied on this option to avoid the death penalty. His claim against this sentencing option is deemed waived for the duration of the case. Furthermore, Barnett's statement during plea negotiations is inadmissible at trial under Rule 410, leading to a reversal and remand for further proceedings.

A dissenting opinion argues that Barnett's life without parole sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, as the law in effect at the time of the offense allowed for a lesser penalty of life imprisonment. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive changes that increase punishment or alter the definition of crimes. While ex post facto claims are usually barred if not raised in trial, Barnett did present such a claim in his motion for a new trial, distinguishing his case from others where claims were procedurally barred.

A sentence that is not legally authorized is void ab initio, as established in Lanier v. State, where a plea agreement for life imprisonment without parole for capital murder was invalid because the defendant was not a habitual offender. Consequently, Barnett, who was also not a habitual offender and faced a life sentence after the jury's decision against the death penalty, could not receive a life sentence that precluded parole either. The rationale from Irving v. State does not apply here, as it involves constitutional rights that cannot be restricted by subsequent legislation under ex post facto principles. The amendments to Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-21 affected Barnett's substantive right to be sentenced under the law in effect at the time of his offense, constituting an unconstitutional change in punishment severity. Thus, Barnett should have been sentenced under the statute applicable at the time of Tavares's death, and the trial judge erred in failing to do so. The majority's assertion that Barnett waived his ex post facto claim is disputed, as no valid waiver was made; hence, the dissent argues against this interpretation. Other assignments of error raised by Barnett were reviewed and found to lack merit, leading the Court to decline further examination of those issues.