Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 18, 1841; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The United States filed a petitory action against John Fitzgerald and Hipolite Fitzgerald regarding a 160-acre tract of land in Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana. The defendants claimed the land under a pre-emption right based on their possession and cultivation that began in 1833. They had formally entered the land and paid the purchase price to the government in June 1836, while John Fitzgerald served as a customs inspector stationed on public lands. The government later sought to reserve the land for its use, asserting that the Fitzgeralds had no legal title because their possession was for government purposes, given Fitzgerald's status as a federal officer. The Circuit Court dismissed the United States' petition, confirming the Fitzgeralds' title to the land. The United States then appealed this decision. The Attorney-General for the United States argued that the land had been used for government purposes since at least 1830 and referenced congressional actions from 1829 and 1831 aimed at improving navigation and building lighthouses in the area.
The boarding-station in question is deemed by Congress as the only feasible location for such a station in the region. In 1833, the collector of customs at New Orleans appointed John Fitzgerald as an inspector and stationed him at the south-west pass, where he occasionally went ashore to a designated spot that had historically been utilized for this purpose. Although there was a house on the property, it remains unclear who built it, as there is no evidence suggesting it was constructed by the United States or Fitzgerald. The collector continued to station Fitzgerald there without direct instructions from higher authorities.
On March 6, 1834, Louisiana's legislature ceded civil and criminal jurisdiction over the land to the United States. An act passed by Congress on May 29, 1830, granted pre-emption rights to settlers on public lands, allowing those who had cultivated land in 1829 to claim up to 160 acres. This act contained stipulations regarding proof of occupancy and cultivation, stating that no entries could be made on reserved or appropriated lands. The law was set to expire after one year, with subsequent rules issued on June 10 and September 14, 1830, clarifying these provisions.
On June 10, 1834, the pre-emption act was revived, extending its privileges for two years to those who had cultivated land in 1833. Additional rules were issued on July 22 and February 29, 1836, detailing the proof required for claims, especially in cases of multiple claimants. On June 2, 1836, John Fitzgerald and his wife, Hipolite, filed an affidavit to purchase 160 acres of land, claiming they had cultivated and occupied the property at the time the law was enacted.
On June 3rd, a deposition was taken from two individuals affirming the truth of Fitzgerald and his wife's application. An additional application for 160 acres was made on June 18th, the day the initial act expired, but it lacked their signatures. On the same date, a certificate from the register in New Orleans confirmed the total of 327.5 acres at a price of $1.25 per acre. On November 3, 1836, the commissioner of the general land-office notified that John Walker’s application for section 8 was reserved from sale due to its importance for a custom-house and instructed to inform Fitzgeralds that no entry would be allowed. Despite this, after leaving his position as inspector, Fitzgerald persisted in claiming his pre-emption rights to the land, which had increased in value due to the construction of a lighthouse.
On January 15, 1837, the district attorney filed a petition in the U.S. circuit court in Louisiana challenging Fitzgerald's claim and seeking possession of the land for the United States. The defendants responded on February 20, 1837, with John Fitzgerald admitting his role as boarding officer and asserting his right under the pre-emption law, requesting dismissal of the suit.
On December 29, 1839, the circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants, quieting their possession and denying the plaintiffs any relief. A writ of error was issued on April 21, 1840, arguing the judgment was erroneous for three reasons: 1) the decree to quiet possession was inappropriate against the United States; 2) the defendants could not claim pre-emption rights at the time of the suit; 3) the land was not subject to entry under the act of June 19, 1834. The judgment was deemed unnecessary as the United States needed to establish their title to gain possession, and the court's ruling was not requested by the defendants.
The court decision in Cullivec v. Garick highlights significant principles regarding property rights and the validity of titles. The plaintiff in an ejectment case must rely solely on their title; if they fail to substantiate it, their claim is lost. If the court examines the defendant's title, which was not presented by the plaintiff, it risks overstepping its bounds. The defendants lacked a legal title to the property, which remained with the United States, and even an equitable claim was absent. A register's certificate does not confer title; it only documents facts necessary for acquiring a title. The court's judgment granting the defendants a complete title is problematic, as it effectively gives them rights equivalent to a patent, which is not permissible against the rightful owner. The law historically recognizes patents as definitive evidence of title, while certificates are inferior. The district judge erred by assuming the validity of the defendants' title instead of dismissing the insufficient claim of the plaintiff. Additionally, the defendant Fitzgerald failed to establish a possessory title under the pre-emption law of 1834 due to lack of necessary actions, such as settlement, improvements, and legal recognition, as defined by the law. His claim did not meet the requirement of bona fide residence or cultivation, which are essential for establishing a legitimate settlement.
A public officer, Fitzgerald, was sent to a remote piece of public land for official duties, not with the intent to settle or improve it. His actions, including occupying a cabin, were strictly temporary and for the purpose of his role as a boarding-officer. The document questions whether such an occupation can confer pre-emption rights typically reserved for settlers. It emphasizes that Fitzgerald did not improve the land, as he merely utilized an existing structure, and asserts that there is no evidence of timely compliance with legal requirements for claiming pre-emption rights, such as necessary documentation from the register and receiver.
Furthermore, the text argues that even if Fitzgerald's claim were valid, the law prohibits pre-emption on land reserved for public use. Fitzgerald’s assignment to the land for public duties constitutes a clear appropriation, reinforcing that the land had been used for public purposes prior to his arrival. The case of Wilcox v. Jackson is cited to support the notion that long-term public use of land prevents private claims under pre-emption laws. Overall, the document concludes that Fitzgerald's situation does not meet the legal criteria necessary for claiming pre-emption rights on the land in question.
The act explicitly reserves from pre-emption every tract designated for the United States' use, either by presidential directive or congressional act. It further reserves areas that were actually appropriated or utilized for public purposes without the need for explicit reservation. An express reservation by the Secretary of the Treasury for a specific tract for the custom-house in New Orleans was noted, indicating prior acknowledgment of its importance. The land in question, which included a lighthouse on an adjacent island, was integral to public commerce. The court found that the lower court erred in granting an absolute title to the defendant, as they failed to demonstrate adequate title under pre-emption law. The defense argued that the land was public and subject to pre-emption rights, asserting that John Fitzgerald occupied it for personal use rather than for the government, as the government had not provided suitable accommodations. The argument emphasized that public officers are entitled to purchase and improve public land for personal benefit, with no legal exclusion from pre-emption rights. It was concluded that no formal appropriation of the land for public use had occurred, and the Secretary of the Treasury's instructions could not unilaterally reserve public land without congressional authorization, as such authority lies with Congress according to the Constitution.
The president of the United States has the authority to appropriate land for government use, a privilege not extended to the head of the treasury department. This case involves a petitory action filed in the circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana, where plaintiffs seek to recover 160 acres of land claimed by defendants under the pre-emption law of June 19, 1834. Plaintiffs allege that defendants, claiming entitlement to section No. 8, entered the land in June 1836 under false pretenses and that the land had already been designated for public use, specifically for the custom house in New Orleans.
Defendants, led by John Fitzgerald, acknowledge his role as a customs officer and assert that he was compelled to secure a dwelling due to a lack of accommodations provided by the government. They claim compliance with pre-emption laws and assert their entitlement to the land. Evidence presented during the trial included Fitzgerald's appointments as inspector of customs and boarding-officer, with the acknowledgment that the collector of customs had not been instructed to assign the land for Fitzgerald's residence, nor was there any request to reserve the land for that purpose.
A letter from the acting commissioner of the general land-office confirmed that the land was reserved from sale for the custom-house's use, which was noted as evidence. Defendants demonstrated possession and cultivation of the land per legal requirements and paid the necessary fees. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendants, quieting their possession and denying the plaintiffs' claims.
The United States has appealed this judgment, raising two objections: first, that Fitzgerald, as a federal employee residing on public land, could not establish a pre-emption right through possession and cultivation, and second, that the court lacked authority to quiet defendants' possession since the land's fee remained with the United States.
An officer of the United States is not stripped of the rights afforded by pre-emption laws, which allow citizens to acquire public land through common purchase methods. If a tract of land had been legally severed from the public domain for public use, an officer could not claim rights through cultivation or possession, not due to their status but because the land would no longer qualify under pre-emption laws. The pre-emption law of May 19, 1830, and its revival on June 19, 1834, state that pre-emption rights do not apply to lands reserved from sale by Congress or the President or appropriated for any purpose. For defendants to lose their pre-emption rights, any reservation or appropriation must have been valid at the time of the June 1834 act. The land in question was not reserved by any congressional act or presidential order prior to the defendants’ rights accruing, as a later directive from the Secretary of the Treasury did not constitute a valid reservation. Further, any appropriation of public land requires congressional authority, which was not demonstrated for the collector at New Orleans. Although it was argued that an 1831 act to erect a lighthouse indicated an appropriation of this land, the evidence showed the lighthouse was built on Wagoner's Island, unrelated to the contested tract, thus not constituting an appropriation that would negate the defendants' pre-emption rights.
The land in question was not reserved or appropriated for any specific purpose. The United States' claim to recover the land was based solely on the argument that it was not subject to the defendants' pre-emption rights due to its prior appropriation for custom-house officers in New Orleans; this argument was rejected. Consequently, the United States could not succeed on a secondary objection regarding the judgment’s technicalities, as the judgment conformed to standard Louisiana court practices and was just. Although allegations of fraud by the defendants were raised, the record indicated fairness in the process, and the defendants appeared legally entitled to the land patent. If fraud had occurred, the plaintiffs could pursue recourse through chancery courts for contract rescission. The judgment from the lower court was affirmed.
