Marion C. Mullen, operating Mullen Trailer Park, contested a ruling by Green Tree Financial Corporation-Mississippi regarding the possession of a mobile home. Green Tree initiated a replevin action on June 9, 1994, seeking possession of the trailer, which Mullen held due to a landlord's lien for unpaid rent. Initially, on November 28, 1994, the court ruled in favor of Green Tree, granting them possession. Mullen's counsel sought reconsideration, leading to an amended ruling on April 4, 1995, requiring Green Tree to pay one year’s rent and attorney’s fees before taking possession. This amended ruling was finalized on May 1, 1995.
Green Tree appealed, and the Circuit Court reversed the May 1 ruling on August 17, 1995, determining that the November 28 ruling was final and the December 5 letter from Mullen's counsel did not constitute a proper motion. The circuit court also found the amended ruling erroneous on its merits.
The case involves a lease agreement from May 1, 1990, between Mullen and the Sims, who subsequently abandoned the mobile home and left unpaid rent. Green Tree sought possession based on its security interest in the trailer and also requested attorney fees. Mullen argued for the enforcement of the landlord's lien. The Supreme Court of Mississippi will review the case under a de novo standard, focusing on procedural and legal issues rather than factual findings.
The primary issue to resolve is whether the November 18, 1994 ruling by the county court judge constitutes a final judgment. Green Tree asserts that this ruling is final, as no timely motion to amend or notice was filed, rendering any subsequent county court actions void. Conversely, Mullen argues that the November 18 ruling was not final and that the county court retains authority to amend until a final judgment is entered, as supported by Griffin v. Tall Timbers Dev. Inc.
The county court's ruling on November 28, 1994, granted Green Tree immediate possession of a manufactured home and was recorded in the county court minutes on November 30, 1995. The circuit court judge found this ruling to be final and appealable, indicating that it expressed an intention for a judgment to be included. However, this conclusion is challenged by Rule 58 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires judgments to be documented on a separate instrument titled 'Judgment.' The document in question lacks this title, disqualifying it as a final judgment.
Furthermore, the April 4, 1995 'Amended Ruling' also fails to meet the criteria for a final judgment under Rule 58. The necessity for clarity regarding final judgments is emphasized, as litigants must know when such judgments exist to appropriately pursue motions for amendment, relief, or to perfect an appeal.
A final judgment was ultimately established on May 1, 1995, which was compliant with Rule 58, bearing the title 'Judgment' and recorded on May 10, 1995. Green Tree appealed this judgment, providing the circuit court with jurisdiction to consider the appeal under relevant Mississippi statutes.
The circuit court's decision included both procedural and substantive findings, which allows it to enter its judgment without a new trial if deemed appropriate. The case's resolution hinges on statutory interpretation regarding the priority of a landlord's lien versus a purchase-money security interest in a mobile home. Specifically, Mississippi Code § 75-9-104(b) excludes landlord's liens from the Uniform Commercial Code's Chapter 9, indicating that its priority rules do not apply.
Green Tree asserts its perfected security interest takes precedence over Mullen's statutory landlord lien, while Mullen contends the opposite. Mullen cites Mississippi Code § 89-7-1, which stipulates that goods cannot be removed from leased premises until all unpaid rent is settled. Conversely, Green Tree references § 89-7-51(2), which establishes that a landlord's lien on personal property is subordinate to prior perfected liens. This statutory framework governs the resolution of the priority dispute between the parties.
The statutes in question appear contradictory but are reconcilable upon closer examination. Green Tree cites Hicks v. Thomas to support the claim that Section 89-7-1 grants no rights to unpaid landlords over third-party property on the premises. However, this interpretation is flawed due to differing factual contexts; in Hicks, the landlord attempted to lien a vehicle owned by a third party, while in the current case, the mobile home is owned by the lessees, the Sims, with Green Tree holding only a perfected purchase money security interest.
Mullen contends that Section 89-7-1 is authoritative for lien procedures and amounts. Although it outlines a remedy, Section 89-7-51(2) indicates that a landlord's lien on personal property is subordinate to prior perfected security interests, unlike agricultural products, for which the landlord's lien is superior under Section 89-7-51(1). The last sentence of Section 89-7-51(2) asserts that laws regarding rent attachment apply to the landlord's lien under this section, positioning Section 89-7-1 as merely procedural for landlords with liens defined in Section 89-7-51(2).
Further, the clear language of Section 89-7-51(2) establishes that a landlord's lien on personal property is subject to prior perfected security interests. Historical cases, such as Walker v. First National Bank, reinforce that landlords do not inherently possess liens on leased property for unpaid rent. The court concludes that only Section 89-7-51(2) creates a landlord's lien on personal property, while Section 89-7-1 defines the procedural aspects relating to the priority of such liens.
The court rejects Green Tree's claim that Section 89-7-1 pertains solely to statutory liens, affirming that a landlord’s lien does not automatically fall behind all secured interests. If a landlord's lien is established before the perfection of a security interest, the landlord's lien will take precedence, allowing for remedies under Section 89-7-1 for unpaid rent.
The Sims executed a retail installment contract with Green Tree, which involved filing a financing statement on May 21, 1990, to secure a security interest in a mobile home. Under Mississippi law, a mobile home is classified as consumer goods, and filing is not necessary to perfect a purchase money security interest. The lien is deemed to attach when the goods are placed on the property or when tenancy begins. In this case, Green Tree's security interest attached before the mobile home was placed on Mullen's property, thus taking priority over Mullen's landlord lien. This conclusion aligns with similar rulings in other jurisdictions.
The circuit court awarded Green Tree $1,878.60 in attorney's fees; however, the record lacks clarity on the statutory authority for this award. Mississippi law states that attorney's fees cannot be granted without contractual provisions or statutory authority unless punitive damages are also awarded. Due to the absence of such authority mentioned by the circuit court, the case is remanded for further consideration of the attorney's fee issue.
In summary, the court affirmed the priority of Green Tree's security interest over Mullen's landlord lien, reversed the attorney fee award, and remanded for clarification on the legal basis for the fee award. The decision was supported by the concurrence of several justices.
