Densyl Alexis Diaz Rodriguez appeals a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court, which denied his motion to quash service of process, set aside the default, and vacate the default final judgment in a foreclosure case initiated by HSBC Bank. The original return of service was deemed defective, lacking details regarding the manner and time of service and inaccurately stating Rodriguez’s marital status. Rodriguez claimed he was never served, supported by testimony that he resided at a different address in Cidra, Puerto Rico, while the return listed an incorrect service address. Following Rodriguez's motion, HSBC submitted amended returns of service that still did not sufficiently rectify the defects. During an evidentiary hearing, the bank sought to treat the amended returns as relating back to the original service, a request the court ultimately accepted despite Rodriguez's objections. The court concluded that the second amended return was valid, placing the burden on Rodriguez to prove improper service. Rodriguez testified he was unaware of the foreclosure until after the judgment was entered and confirmed the address on the return was not where he lived at the time. The court ultimately reversed the order, affirming that HSBC failed to prove proper service.
Rodriguez and his wife returned home at the year's end, but the bank's attorney challenged Rodriguez's claim of residence by referencing a bankruptcy petition from 2019, which stated he had lived at the Cidra home continuously for three years. The process server testified that he lacked independent recollection and documentation of serving Rodriguez on July 21, 2018, yet was "pretty sure" he had done so based on the original return of service. He admitted to errors in recording the method and time of service but asserted he must have served Rodriguez individually as he did not document any substitute service. During cross-examination, he explained that he estimated the time of service as 3:10 p.m. based on his typical Saturday schedule. The court accepted the amended returns of service, ruling that Rodriguez bore the burden of proving improper service since the second amended return appeared valid. Despite the process server's credibility concerns regarding the specifics of the service, the court found Rodriguez's testimony unconvincing, particularly in light of his bankruptcy claim. The court denied Rodriguez's motion to quash service and vacate the judgment, leading to Rodriguez's appeal. The appellate review will consider legal rulings de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The document emphasizes the necessity of strict adherence to service of process statutes and due process protections regarding property rights, noting that jurisdictional defects can invalidate court proceedings.
The Court in Koster clarified that the return of service is essential for establishing a court's jurisdiction over a defendant. It serves only as evidence for the trial judge to ascertain whether valid service has been achieved. A party seeking to invoke jurisdiction must demonstrate valid service before a judgment can be made against the opposing party. If the return of service is regular on its face, the court can presume valid service unless the served party proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Conversely, if the return is defective, it cannot support a presumption of valid service, and the burden remains on the party seeking jurisdiction to prove service validity through other means.
Florida Statutes section 48.21 outlines that a return of service is invalid if it lacks specific details such as date and time of service, manner of service, and the name of the person served, particularly in a representative capacity. Amendments to the return can be made to include omitted information, which would retroactively validate service as if the return had originally contained all required facts. In this case, the original return was deemed defective for omitting crucial information. Rodriguez contested the court's acceptance of amended returns filed post-default judgment, arguing that the bank should have been required to prove the omitted facts. The court's acceptance of the amended returns before any evidence was presented was inappropriate, placing the burden on Rodriguez to challenge the presumption of valid service, contrary to the statutory requirements.
The court erred in accepting the second amended return of service as valid for amending the original return and establishing a presumption of valid service. The bank was required to demonstrate the facial validity of the return or prove that service was valid despite any facial deficiencies. The evidence presented by the bank was insufficient; the process server could not recall the specifics of the service, had no supporting documentation, and chose a time of service randomly. This speculative testimony did not constitute competent substantial evidence, leaving the return defective and unable to support a presumption of valid service.
Additionally, the process server's testimony contradicted itself, as he indicated a lack of clarity regarding serving Rodriguez, who was confirmed to be married, contradicting the server's assertion that the person served was unmarried. The bank did not provide any other evidence of proper service. The court thus erred in denying Rodriguez’s motion to quash service of process and vacate the default judgment. As a result, the appellate court reversed the previous order and mandated the lower court to vacate the default and judgment, quash the service, and conduct further proceedings.
The appellate court emphasized that even if the second amended return of service was deemed acceptable, the default and judgment still needed to be vacated due to jurisdiction issues stemming from the original return's deficiencies. Previous case law supported that defects in the return suspend personal jurisdiction, preventing the clerk from entering a default until proper evidence of service is provided. Thus, any jurisdiction over Rodriguez remained dormant due to the original return's facial defect, nullifying the court's authority to enter the default judgment.
