Lee Floyd Dancer, Jr. v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 96-KA-01025-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; September 6, 1996; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The case, Lee Floyd Dancer, Jr. v. State of Mississippi, involves convictions for armed robbery and murder, which were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The incident occurred on April 28, 1995, at Charlie's One Stop grocery store in Columbus, Mississippi, where the owner, Blanche Welch, was fatally stabbed during a robbery. 

Following the murder, police officer Commander Donald Freshour, while canvassing the area, encountered a group of boys, including Dancer, who claimed to have witnessed the crime. Dancer described seeing two white men in a green Malibu vehicle committing the robbery and identified details about the crime that had not been publicly disclosed, thereby establishing his credibility as a witness.

Dancer was taken to the police station for questioning as a potential witness, not a suspect, and was not handcuffed. Upon his arrival, investigators were initially engaged with other suspects but later decided to interview Dancer. Despite some skepticism from one investigator regarding his claims, they opted to proceed with the interrogation. The court ultimately found no errors in the circuit court proceedings that would warrant a reversal of Dancer's convictions.

Turner and Dancer were conversing in a room when Dancer reiterated his account involving two white men connected to a crime. Turner observed a stain on Dancer's shoes, inquiring if it was blood, to which Dancer denied involvement in a woman's death. Subsequently, Turner read Dancer his rights, which Dancer claimed to understand. After several hours, Dancer confessed to his role in a robbery where he had been approached by Uron Bush, who recruited him to be a lookout. Dancer claimed he entered Charlie's One Stop store later but did not intend to assist in the robbery. During the crime, he froze while Bush stabbed the store owner, Mrs. Charlie. After the robbery, Dancer fled to a friend's house, later fabricating a story about white men to protect himself from Bush's threats. 

At the end of the first interrogation, Dancer confirmed that he was not coerced and was voluntarily giving his statement. In a subsequent interrogation, Dancer provided further details, indicating he was unaware of Bush's intent to kill Mrs. Charlie. Following a mistrial due to a hung jury, Dancer was convicted of armed robbery and murder, receiving a life sentence for murder and thirty years for robbery, to be served concurrently. He later filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Dancer is now appealing his convictions, arguing that he was in custody during the police interview and did not properly waive his rights, emphasizing his age (thirteen), lack of prior criminal experience, and low achievement test scores.

Dancer's appellate counsel argues that Dancer, a thirteen-year-old, did not understand he was being arrested and that special precautions should have been taken to ensure he comprehended his constitutional rights. They reference *Morgan v. State* to support this claim. In contrast, the State provides evidence that Dancer voluntarily engaged with law enforcement and willingly offered information about the crime, asserting he was not under arrest at the time, but was questioned as a potential witness. Commander Freshour, who interviewed Dancer, did not suspect him of involvement in the crime, and Dancer was not handcuffed or treated as a suspect during transport to the police station. Upon arrival, Dancer reiterated the "white men from Alabama" narrative, which investigators found unconvincing, leading one to suggest he go home, further indicating he was not under arrest. During the interview, Dancer eventually made an incriminating statement regarding a bloodstain on his shoes after being questioned, at which point he was read his Miranda rights. The conclusion drawn is that Dancer was not under arrest prior to making his incriminating statement, and his assertion of being under arrest from the beginning is unsubstantiated.

For a confession to be admissible, it must be voluntary, meaning it cannot result from promises, threats, or coercion. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the confession's voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, typically demonstrated through testimony from officers or witnesses confirming no coercion was involved. When a trial court decides on the admissibility of a confession, its findings are typically upheld unless clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of evidence. There is no automatic rule that mental retardation makes a confession involuntary; instead, the accused's mental abilities are just one aspect considered in determining voluntariness. The determination of whether a confession was made knowingly and voluntarily is a factual inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances. In this case, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing and found that the defendant, Dancer, a thirteen-year-old who could read and write and had completed sixth grade, voluntarily confessed without coercion. Testimony from officers supported this finding, and Dancer did not testify or present witnesses during the suppression motion. The State presented Dancer's statements, including a taped confession where he acknowledged understanding his rights and stated that he was acting freely when he confessed. This statement was later documented in writing and signed by Dancer.

The trial court determined that Dancer's confessions were given voluntarily and thus were admissible, with no evidence indicating that this determination was erroneous or contrary to the evidence presented. The court referenced Foster v. State to affirm that a confession can be considered voluntary if there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. Dancer's claim of mental infirmities impacting his understanding was addressed, comparing it to McGowan's case where minimal evidence did not support a finding of involuntariness. 

In Dancer's case, no evidence of mental weakness was presented during the suppression hearing. Testimony from Dr. Bob Hudson indicated that Dancer scored below average on various achievement tests, with national percentiles ranging from the fourth to sixteenth percentile. However, Dr. Hudson acknowledged that these achievement tests did not measure Dancer's overall cognitive functioning or ability to understand events. Notably, Dancer performed better in specific categories, scoring above average in reading and spelling. Additionally, Dancer's cumulative school records indicated satisfactory performance in early grades, with a decline beginning in the fifth grade, coinciding with significant school absences.

Dancer's intelligence was assessed in relation to his ability to waive Miranda rights, with the evidence indicating no overwhelming proof of incompetence. A recorded conversation contradicted his claims of misunderstanding the situation and consequences. Dancer's counsel did not present any evidence regarding his IQ during the suppression hearing or trial, leading to the trial court's rejection of Dancer's motion to suppress his statements, which was deemed appropriate.

In his final error claim, Dancer argued that the trial court wrongly overruled his objection to the prosecutor's potentially prejudicial remarks during closing arguments, specifically comments suggesting the jury's responsibility regarding Dancer's future in their community. Dancer's counsel objected to these comments, but the objection was dismissed. The State contended that the remarks were not inherently inflammatory but rather a reiteration of defense counsel's position that Dancer was merely a frightened child without involvement. The context of the case, including the location of the crime and trial, was emphasized as supporting the remarks.

The propriety of prosecutorial comments is evaluated based on context, considering whether they produce unjust prejudice against the accused. Although prosecutors can argue based on evidence, any comments that introduce prejudicial facts not supported by evidence are considered errors. Citing case law, the document notes that appealing to juror fears or suggesting a defendant poses future danger is inappropriate and has been ruled as error in prior cases.

The prosecutor's comment about Dancer potentially going free in the jurors' neighborhood was deemed improper, similar to arguments rejected in prior cases. This statement was not based on evidence relevant to Dancer's guilt or innocence and appeared to be intended to intimidate the jurors. However, the court determined that this improper comment did not constitute reversible error. The key test for determining if a prosecutor's improper argument necessitates reversal is whether it creates unjust prejudice against the accused, influencing the jury's decision. In previous rulings, the court stated that inflammatory comments warrant reversal only if they prevent a fair trial. In this case, the court found the comment harmless, as overwhelming evidence, particularly Dancer's voluntary confessions regarding his involvement in the armed robbery and murder, supported the verdict. Dancer's claims of prejudice due to the comment were rejected. Consequently, his convictions for armed robbery and murder, with sentences of thirty years and life imprisonment, were affirmed. The sentences are to run concurrently. Additional notes include testimony about the victim's cause of death being disclosed in news broadcasts before Dancer's interrogation, and Dancer's arrest occurred after he indicated he would leave the interrogation room.