Donnell Washington v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 97-KA-00656-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; April 21, 1997; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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Michael Donnell Watson, also known as Donnell Washington, was indicted on September 19, 1996, for conspiracy to sell cocaine and intent to sell cocaine. After a jury trial on March 27, 1997, presided over by Judge John L. Hatcher, Watson was found guilty of conspiracy to sell cocaine but not guilty of intent to sell. His co-indictee, R.D. Bowdery, had charges nolle prossed. Watson received a five-year sentence, to run consecutively with any previous sentences, and was ordered to pay a $200 crime lab fee upon release. Watson's post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) and a new trial were denied, prompting an appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court. He raised two issues: whether the trial court erred in denying a jury instruction related to the conspiracy charge and whether it erred in denying his motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial. 

The case involved an undercover operation led by narcotics officers Jerome Hudson and Kerry Ellington, who attempted to purchase crack cocaine at Essie's Place. During the operation, Watson was observed handing something to Franklin, who later provided the officers with crack cocaine in exchange for $20. Evidence included an undercover videotape, which captured the transaction and was presented in court.

Edwina Ard, a crime lab analyst, confirmed that a substance analyzed was cocaine base weighing 0.12 grams. R.D. Franklin, a coconspirator, testified he delivered cocaine to Jerome Hudson on August 15, 1996, in exchange for $20, which he then gave to Michael Watson, the appellant. Franklin, testifying under a plea bargain, was uncertain about the outcome of his charges post-testimony and initially claimed no arrangement to sell cocaine but later implicated Watson as the person who directed him to deliver the cocaine.

Watson, denied a directed verdict, presented evidence from three bystanders who did not see him hand anything to Franklin, although their memories were questioned due to their frequent presence at the location. After jury instructions and deliberation, the jury convicted Watson of conspiracy to sell cocaine but acquitted him on the intent to sell charge.

Watson's first assignment of error challenged the trial court's refusal to give jury instruction D-1 for a not guilty verdict on the conspiracy charge. He argued the State failed to establish a prima facie case, claiming no agreement existed between him and Franklin since Franklin denied any arrangement to sell drugs. The court's standard of review for denying the peremptory instruction aligned with that of a directed verdict, assessing the evidence favorably towards the verdict. The trial judge concluded there was sufficient evidence to infer a conspiracy, arguing that the agreement could be demonstrated through the conduct of the involved parties.

Miss. Code Ann. 97-1-1 establishes that conspiracy occurs when two or more individuals plan to commit a crime or achieve an unlawful goal, requiring each conspirator to acknowledge and intend to further a common illegal purpose. The conspiracy does not need a formal agreement; it can be inferred from actions and circumstances, and circumstantial evidence alone can prove membership in a conspiracy. Legally sufficient evidence must demonstrate each element of the crime to convince a rational jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Watson argues that he and Bowdery lacked recognition of a common plan to conspire to sell cocaine, claiming insufficient direct evidence of intent. However, this assertion is unfounded, as direct evidence is not necessary to establish conspiracy. Testimony from co-conspirator Franklin confirmed Watson's role in directing him to obtain cocaine from undercover officers, while additional witness testimony and a videotape supported the existence of an agreement between them. The forensic analyst also verified that the substance exchanged was cocaine.

Contradictions in Franklin's testimony do not undermine the jury's verdict, as the judicial process often relies on co-conspirators' testimonies, which may include inconsistencies. The court acknowledges that some contradictions are normal and that the reliability of testimony can be assessed through cross-examination and the jury's judgment. A co-conspirator's testimony is typically sufficient for a conviction unless it is unreasonable or significantly impeached.

Franklin's testimony revealed contradictions that seemed more rooted in confusion than substantive issues, particularly regarding his understanding of the charges against him and the plea bargain, which enhanced his credibility as a witness. The jury held the responsibility to evaluate Franklin's statements and determine his overall credibility. The court affirmed that in cases of conflicting evidence, it is the jury's role to judge the credibility of witnesses, as established in prior rulings. 

Evidence indicated that Watson instructed Franklin to ascertain the officers' intentions and explicitly provided him with cocaine to sell to Hudson, establishing Watson as an organizer rather than a mere bystander. The trial judge acted within discretion in denying a peremptory instruction, and the appellate court found no clear error in the trial court's determination of sufficient evidence to support the ruling.

Watson contested the denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.) or a new trial, reiterating claims that the State did not prove a prima facie case for conspiracy to sell cocaine. He pointed to Franklin's testimony, which he argued negated the existence of an agreement to sell cocaine. However, the analysis of the evidence supported the existence of an agreement between Franklin and Watson, evidenced by their conduct.

The standard for reviewing post-trial motions is based on whether the trial judge abused their discretion, with new trials being granted only in cases of overwhelming evidence against the verdict. The appellate court referenced multiple cases establishing that it would not intervene unless the verdict resulted in an unconscionable injustice.

A jury's verdict is upheld unless it is determined that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for a new trial. The court must view evidence favorably supporting the verdict and resolve factual disputes through the jury. The appellant's claim that the jury's findings on conspiracy and sale of cocaine are contradictory is unfounded; conspiracy is a distinct offense and does not merge with the underlying crime. The circumstantial evidence presented, including testimony from state witnesses and a co-conspirator, substantiates the guilty verdict for conspiracy to sell cocaine. The trial judge acted within discretion by denying the motion for a new trial and rejecting a peremptory instruction. The evidence showed an agreement between the co-conspirators, affirming the conviction of conspiracy and a five-year sentence, which will run consecutively with any prior sentences. The court's rulings were collectively affirmed by all justices involved.