Michael Parker v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 93-KA-00299-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; March 10, 1993; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Michael Parker was indicted for capital murder in the 1988 forcible rape and murder of Rachel Morgan. After an initial guilty verdict in 1989, the case was reversed and remanded due to evidentiary issues. In a second trial, Parker was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on March 11, 1993. He subsequently filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, which were denied. Parker appealed, claiming errors in jury selection, prejudicial closing arguments, an amendment to a defense instruction, and the manner in which the state called a rebuttal witness.

The court affirmed the lower court's decisions regarding the first three issues, finding them without merit. However, it determined that the fourth issue regarding the state's handling of Josephine Parker as a rebuttal witness was valid, leading to the reversal of the lower court's ruling and a remand for a new trial.

The facts of the case include the discovery of Rachel Morgan's body, which was found in a compromising position and covered in a syrupy substance, and the initial police investigation, which involved interviews with Parker that revealed scratches on his body and inconsistencies in his statements about his activities on the night of the crime.

Ethel Harris witnessed Parker on the night of January 25, 1988, between 10:30 and 11:00 PM, where he mentioned he was going "to get him some." Billy Joe Seales saw Parker and Morgan around 11:00 to 12:00 AM, noting they were about 20 feet apart and unlikely to see each other. Dr. James Neal conducted Morgan's autopsy on January 26, revealing extensive bruising and abrasions, particularly around the neck and a fracture in the throat, concluding that Morgan died from strangulation. Mark Davis provided Parker a ride on the morning Morgan’s body was discovered, observing no unusual behavior. Don Evans Huddleston and Dorene McAffee both reported seeing Parker near the gin early on January 26. Jimmie Lee Shannon saw Parker at his wash house washing frozen clothes between 6:30 and 6:45 AM. 

Deborah Haller from the Mississippi Crime Lab found that both Parker and Morgan were non-secretors, with Morgan's vaginal swab indicating seminal fluid from a non-secretor but could not confirm if McDougal was involved as a partner. George Herrin testified that DNA from the vaginal swab matched Parker’s and included McDougal’s DNA as well. Juanita Parker, Parker's sister, stated he returned home at approximately 11:30 PM, became ill, and went to bed, remaining there until 6:00 AM. Kenyata Pace confirmed that Morgan was at a friend's house that night and left to look for McDougal, who arrived shortly after midnight and lingered before leaving.

Morgan expressed fear for her safety, specifically mentioning her concern about Mike McDougal potentially assaulting her the night before her murder, as testified by her friend Tara Bufkin. Forensic scientist Joe Andrews analyzed evidence from the crime scene, noting that the red thread and hair samples found did not match those of the victim or Parker. Ethel Jones observed McDougal washing his truck early on January 26, 1988. The trial court faced several legal challenges, including improper jury selection and racial bias, prejudicial statements during closing arguments, and erroneous amendments to defense instructions. The court found these challenges lacked merit. Additionally, the court erred by allowing the state to call Josephine Parker as an adverse rebuttal witness after both sides had rested, which included attempts to impeach her with statements she denied making. The defense objected on the grounds of procedural missteps, asserting that Parker should have been called earlier and that the state did not demonstrate surprise in impeaching its own witness.

The lower court's decision to allow Mrs. Parker to testify as a rebuttal witness is evaluated for potential error. Citing precedents, it is noted that evidence should not be withheld for rebuttal if it rightly belongs in the case-in-chief. Given the ambiguous nature of the situation, discretion is granted to the circuit court, particularly since the defendant had the chance for surrebuttal but declined. Consequently, the court finds no error in permitting Mrs. Parker's testimony.

However, the document also addresses whether the State improperly attempted to impeach its own witness and call rebuttal witnesses against her. Case law indicates that a party cannot cross-examine a disinterested witness after obtaining favorable testimony unless it demonstrates surprise or unexpected hostility. The State argued surprise due to Mrs. Parker's unexpected testimony, but this claim is undermined by the assertion that she had crucial firsthand information, suggesting she should have been called earlier. Ultimately, since the State did not demonstrate surprise or hostility, it should not have impeached Mrs. Parker.

The court found that the State improperly used out-of-court pretrial unsworn inconsistent statements made by Mrs. Parker as substantive evidence against her son, Michael Parker. Despite the State's attempt to impeach Mrs. Parker's credibility, the context of the closing arguments indicated that these statements were intended to be treated as substantive evidence, violating established case law. The court emphasized that unsworn statements should not be treated as substantive evidence unless proper jury instructions are provided to mitigate potential unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. In this case, no such instruction was given, leading to an erroneous admission of testimony from witnesses Anderson and Walker. Consequently, the lower court's decision to allow the State to use Mrs. Parker's impeachment for substantive purposes was deemed a reversible error, denying Parker a fair trial. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Justice Smith dissented, arguing against the majority's reliance on previous rulings regarding evidentiary matters.

An analysis of the record reveals that the majority's conclusions are based on speculation rather than evidence. There is no indication that the prosecutor anticipated Josephine Parker's contradictory trial testimony, which was unexpected given her prior statements and her relationship as the defendant's mother, suggesting potential bias. The court previously established that a lack of surprise is essential for a party to impeach their own witness, but the circumstances here differ from prior cases where the party was aware of expected inconsistencies. Josephine Parker's inconsistent testimony permitted the prosecutor to impeach her with other witnesses' statements, a decision supported by the trial court's better position to assess the situation. The trial court appropriately allowed this impeachment, and the case falls into a gray area regarding the classification of evidence as part of the State's case-in-chief or rebuttal, warranting judicial discretion. Notably, the defendant had already laid the groundwork for rebuttal through prior testimony and declined an opportunity for surrebuttal. The dissent asserts that the trial court's observations should be respected, and asserts that the conviction for capital murder should be upheld. Additionally, the defense's theory suggested another suspect, McDougal, as the actual killer.