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Ronald Chris Foster v. State of MS
Citation: Not availableDocket: 95-DR-00750-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; January 17, 1991; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Ronald Chris Foster, convicted of capital murder for the shooting of store clerk George Shelton during a robbery, filed an Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate Conviction and/or Death Sentence under Mississippi's Post-Collateral Conviction Relief Statute. Foster was sentenced to death on January 18, 1991, and his conviction was affirmed after he raised twenty-six assignments of error during his appeal, including issues related to juvenile death penalty findings and jury instructions. His petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied. Foster's execution was stayed by a federal district court, but the state successfully moved to vacate that stay. On July 21, 1995, Foster filed for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during both the sentencing phase of his trial and on appeal. His trial representation included attorneys from the Mississippi Capital Defense Resource Center, and he is currently represented by Andre de Gruy, while other attorneys from the Center remain on his case due to a denied motion to withdraw. The State raised concerns about potential ethical conflicts arising from the Resource Center's representation of Foster against members of its own firm regarding claims of ineffective assistance. However, the court indicated that it would not address the ethical conflict issue, as the State has other procedural options to address its concerns. Foster's application for post-conviction collateral relief is denied, as many issues raised are barred and all lack merit. The Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act is designed to address facts unknown at the time of judgment, focusing on matters that could not or should not have been raised during trial or direct appeal. Procedural bars such as waiver, res judicata, and the requirement to show cause or prejudice apply, particularly in capital sentencing cases. A defendant may not challenge issues that could have been addressed in prior proceedings under the premise of ineffective counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must show both deficient performance by the attorney and resulting prejudice to the defense. Deficient performance must undermine the adversarial process to the extent that the outcome cannot be deemed reliable. The second prong requires demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the trial's outcome would have differed. There is no constitutional guarantee of error-free counsel; rather, defendants are entitled to competent representation. Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test concludes the post-conviction relief application. Foster asserts that his trial counsel failed to properly investigate and present mitigation evidence, leading to ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase. However, it is noted that counsel did present mitigating evidence, including testimonies from Stevson and Lillie Mae Foster, and addressed various mitigating factors in closing arguments. Foster's specific concerns focus on his mental health, intelligence, and alcohol use, but the State argues that he has not sufficiently demonstrated counsel's deficiency or resulting prejudice. During trial, Attorney Farrow highlighted several mitigating factors, including Foster's age, lack of significant prior criminal history, mental disturbance at the time of the crime, duress, impaired capacity to understand criminality, limited intelligence, absence of a weapon, past head injury, intoxication during the crime, and personal circumstances, like having an infant son. Foster criticizes Farrow for not conducting a more thorough investigation of his psychiatric condition. Farrow did pursue a psychiatric evaluation, which the court approved, seeking an assessment of Foster's competency based on the McNaughten criteria. Farrow is criticized for failing to present a psychological report from the Whitfield Mental Institution, as mandated, and instead submitted school records to illustrate Foster's limited intelligence. Foster asserts that the Whitfield Report would have revealed his I.Q. of eighty and a mental age of thirteen, which he contends would demonstrate a mental disease or defect affecting his ability to comprehend the criminality of his actions or adhere to legal standards. However, the Whitfield Report indicates that the staff unanimously believed Foster possessed a rational understanding of courtroom proceedings and was capable of assisting in his defense. They concluded he recognized the difference between right and wrong at the time of the crime, and did not exhibit symptoms of psychotic or organic mental disorders. The report diagnosed him with Conduct Disorder and Personality Disorder featuring Antisocial and Narcissistic traits, suggesting a tendency to disregard societal rules and prioritize his own desires while minimizing accountability for his actions. Although he may not always cooperate with his attorney or the court due to these traits, the staff believed he could choose to cooperate. Additionally, Foster has displayed aggressive behavior in jail and during his observations, suggesting potential for continued violence. The report in question definitively addresses Foster's capacity to adhere to legal standards, indicating that he was aware of right and wrong, which undermines his defense that he was manipulated into committing robbery due to a weak mind. The admission of this report would be detrimental to Foster's defense, which claimed coercion and mental incapacity. Defense counsel's choice not to pursue psychological evidence was deemed reasonable, as the report would likely be harmful rather than beneficial. The court referenced Wiley v. State to support that the lack of further investigation did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase. Furthermore, Ake v. Oklahoma, which provides for independent expert assistance for indigent defendants, did not apply here since Foster did not assert an insanity defense nor did the State argue future dangerousness, making expert assistance unnecessary for cross-examination. The Whitfield doctors concluded after extensive evaluation that Foster was violent and uncooperative by choice, competent to stand trial, and free of any significant mental dysfunction. This assessment negated any basis for requesting further psychiatric assistance for mitigation purposes. The State highlighted Foster's failure to demonstrate that his counsel did not seek further inquiries from Whitfield's doctors or how additional expertise could have been secured. While Dr. Zimmerman, Foster's expert, supported the Whitfield diagnosis, he suggested it could be mitigating. However, the State found the Whitfield assessment more credible. Ultimately, the decision to use or withhold the psychiatric report was characterized as a tactical choice. Attorney Farrow effectively navigated challenges in developing a trial strategy that highlighted Foster's low intelligence through school records and his strange behavior stemming from two head injuries, supported by parental testimony. Legal standards suggest that strategic decisions made after thorough investigation are typically unchallengeable; those made with less investigation are deemed reasonable if supported by professional judgment. Counsel must conduct reasonable investigations or justify the absence of such. The decision to introduce or withhold psychiatric reports is considered tactical. Prior cases affirm that a defendant could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel when a psychiatric evaluation occurred but the results were inconclusive, especially if any diminished capacity was partially due to intoxication. Furthermore, failure to present mitigating evidence of mental impairment does not equate to ineffective assistance if the decision was based on the assessment that the evidence was insubstantial. Farrow demonstrated reasonable counsel by ordering a psychological evaluation and recognizing that the evidence was unlikely to convince the jury. He concluded that Foster's issues were more related to attitude than emotional disturbance, leading him to focus on "limited intelligence" and "mental health" mitigators. Farrow’s decision not to pursue additional psychological testing after receiving the Whitfield Report was reasonable both at the time and in hindsight. The document outlines the evaluation of defense counsel's performance in a case involving a defendant named Foster. It highlights that Foster's low academic performance and school absenteeism were presented to the jury as mitigating factors, despite his borderline intellectual functioning indicated by an I.Q. of eighty. Testimony from Foster's parents suggested limited intellectual capacity, as they struggled with basic literacy, which could impact juror perception of Foster's background. The defense attorney, Farrow, did not pursue further investigation into Foster's childhood head injuries, as a psychological report indicated no significant mental disorder, making further inquiry likely unproductive. The document references a legal precedent (Faraga v. State) where tactical decisions made by counsel, including the admission of guilt and lack of expert testimony, were not deemed ineffective assistance. Unlike a previous case (Woodward v. State), Foster did not exhibit severe mental disturbance at the time of the crime, making the introduction of psychiatric evaluations potentially harmful due to the risk of revealing damaging information. Farrow's strategy included presenting school records, parental support, and details of Foster’s situation, such as his lack of a weapon and personal circumstances, which the court found reasonable. The analysis concludes that Farrow's actions did not meet the deficiency standard of the Strickland test, eliminating the need to assess potential prejudice. Additionally, there is criticism of Farrow for not exploring Foster's traumatic upbringing more thoroughly, which could have provided the jury with further context for understanding his actions. Foster asserts that more witnesses, including his siblings and friends, should have been called to testify, claiming their testimonies would have highlighted his father's alcoholism and his own early drinking habits, thus supporting mitigating factors like "lack of self-control" and "extreme disturbance." He references a dissenting opinion in *Pruett v. State*, emphasizing the defense's duty to conduct thorough pretrial investigations into a defendant's background. However, the prosecution's witness, Vincent Harris, testified that Foster had consumed twelve beers by the time he decided to commit robbery, which the defense acknowledged as a mitigating factor. The defense argued that bringing in additional witnesses could imply Foster had a high alcohol tolerance, potentially undermining the intoxication defense. The affidavits provided do not substantiate Foster's claims of severe alcohol-related issues. The court concluded that without evidence showing that additional witnesses would have changed the outcome, Foster did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, referencing *U.S. v. Green* and *Neal v. State* to support that the defense made strategic choices in presenting evidence. Additionally, Foster's claim regarding the failure to transfer him to youth court, framed as a matter of ineffective assistance, had already been addressed in a previous appeal and was not deemed a new issue. A defendant is barred from challenging the constitutionality of a capital sentencing scheme in a post-conviction relief petition if the issue could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal but was not, unless the defendant shows cause or actual prejudice for this omission. Therefore, the question of the death penalty's constitutionality due to a lack of specific findings in the youth court is procedurally barred as it was previously addressed on direct appeal. Post-conviction relief is limited to issues that were not detectable during trial or appeal. In Foster's case, the only viable question is whether his trial attorney was ineffective for not requesting a transfer from circuit court to youth court, and if so, whether this ineffective assistance prejudiced his defense. At the time of Foster's trial, Mississippi law permitted a circuit judge to transfer proceedings to youth court if it was in the child's best interest and in the interest of justice, prior to jeopardy. However, youths charged with offenses punishable by life or death are under the circuit court's original jurisdiction, eliminating the need for a youth court certification procedure. Consequently, Foster, at 17, could be tried as an adult for a capital offense without a preliminary youth court determination. Mississippi law allows a defendant under 18 to request a hearing for consideration of transfer to youth court, which would provide individualized consideration similar to a youth court certification hearing. The analysis must focus on whether Foster’s counsel acted reasonably in not requesting such a motion and whether this failure prejudiced Foster's defense. Foster's post-conviction application does not cite any authority suggesting that failure to request a transfer hearing constitutes ineffective assistance. He claims his counsel was unaware of the procedure, equating this ignorance to a failure to know the law. However, the record indicates counsel was aware of the juvenile statutes and made a good faith argument regarding their application, demonstrating that the decision to not seek a transfer was within the sound discretion of the circuit judge. Foster's claim regarding trial counsel's failure to request a transfer to youth court is deemed unmeritorious due to a lack of demonstrated prejudice. The court retains discretion in deciding such transfers, guided by the statute's use of "may," which indicates flexibility based on the child's best interests and justice. Even if counsel had made the request, the trial judge would have likely considered Foster's age (seventeen and a half), lack of significant criminal history, and his violent tendencies as reasons to deny the transfer. The judge would have found it difficult to accept that Foster's immaturity was the sole reason for his criminal actions, as he was already close to adulthood. The Supreme Court's requirement for individualized consideration for offenders under eighteen does not necessitate particular findings, and Foster was given appropriate consideration regarding his maturity and moral culpability. Counsel's efforts to apply juvenile confession statutes were made in good faith. The claim is procedurally barred, as any new legal theories raised now are not permissible under Mississippi law, which states that litigation of a factual issue constitutes a waiver of other legal theories unless actual prejudice can be shown. Foster's petition fails to meet this requirement. Foster is attempting to relitigate the constitutionality of his death sentence, claiming he was placed in adult court without specific findings regarding his age. Born on January 8, 1972, he was 17 years and 6 months old at the time of his capital murder offense on June 10, 1989. The jury did consider his age as a mitigating factor, and the Supreme Court's focus on individualized consideration for defendants under 18 does not necessitate particularized findings as constitutional requirements. The Court's decisions in *Stanford v. Kentucky* and *Thompson v. Oklahoma* affirmed that the death penalty could be applied to those over 16 if appropriately certified. Although twelve out of thirty-seven states do not allow the death penalty for 17-year-olds, this was deemed insufficient evidence of changing societal standards. Foster's claim had previously been addressed by the court on direct appeal, and the statute of res judicata applies to all issues decided at trial and on appeal, barring his current claim. His previous petition to the Supreme Court was denied. Furthermore, Foster failed to meet the *Strickland* standard for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure to raise the issue of jury instructions on appeal. The trial court denied his proposed jury instruction on manslaughter, which he argues constituted ineffective assistance, but this issue was not raised on appeal. Overall, Foster's claim is repetitive, lacks new legal or factual theories, and is barred by res judicata. Ron Chris Foster believed it necessary to shoot George Shelton to prevent imminent death or serious harm to himself, but this belief lacked reasonable cause and was not justified as self-defense. If the jury finds that Foster's belief was unreasonable, they must convict him of manslaughter. If the State fails to prove any elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must acquit him. The court instructed the jury that a person who provokes an altercation or attempts a crime cannot claim self-defense if they remain the aggressor. If evidence shows that Foster provoked the conflict or attempted robbery while remaining the aggressor, he cannot invoke self-defense. Two jury instructions relevant to Foster's case were granted: one permitting a self-defense claim if he was not the aggressor, and another defining manslaughter as a killing without malice, in the heat of passion, and by using a weapon. For a manslaughter conviction, the jury must find that Foster killed Shelton without malice and in a passionate state. Additionally, issues regarding jury instructions that were accepted or rejected must have been addressed in a direct appeal, as procedural bars apply to post-conviction relief, and matters that could have been litigated at trial or on appeal are not grounds for such relief. The doctrine of res judicata applies to all issues decided at trial and during the direct appeal process. The Court will not examine whether jury instructions were erroneously excluded or if those admitted were sufficient, as these matters are res judicata. Instead, the focus is on whether appellate counsel acted reasonably in not raising the jury instruction issue on appeal. The standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel applies equally to appellate and trial performance. Appellate counsel is not constitutionally obligated to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. The Court finds that the jury was adequately instructed on both theories of manslaughter, as the instructions provided a complete and accurate understanding of the law. The rejection of one instruction does not invalidate the jury's consideration if its essence is included in another instruction. The validity of the jury instructions is upheld, as they did not preclude consideration of a self-defense plea. Regarding the failure to object to aggravating circumstances, this issue has been raised in direct appeal and is therefore procedurally barred from review in a post-conviction relief petition. Foster argues against the applicability of procedural bars to aggravating circumstances, but the Court clarifies that such circumstances do not receive special treatment. The procedural bar exists due to a failure to object during trial or to raise the issue on appeal. The merits of whether failing to object to three aggravators constituted ineffective assistance of counsel are independently considered. Specifically, Foster argues that using robbery as an aggravating circumstance, when it is also an element of capital murder, constitutes double counting and fails to rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. This issue has been previously addressed by the Court in Leatherwood v. State. The appellant contends that the sentencing process is biased against him due to an aggravating circumstance attributed to him, which he believes undermines his ability to present mitigating evidence. He argues this practice resembles the mandatory sentencing statutes criticized in Furman v. Georgia. The court disagrees with the appellant, clarifying that under the capital murder statute, a jury is not compelled to impose the death penalty following a conviction for capital murder arising from a robbery. Instead, the jury can choose to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment regardless of the presence of mitigating evidence, distinguishing this framework from previous mandatory execution laws. Regarding the "Avoiding Arrest Aggravator," the appellant's challenge based on insufficient evidence is procedurally barred since no objection was raised at trial, and the issue was not appealed. The court emphasizes that unless the appellant shows cause and actual prejudice, this claim cannot be reconsidered during post-conviction review. On the merits, the court notes that if evidence suggests the killing was intended to conceal the identity of the perpetrator to evade arrest, it is appropriate for the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. In this case, testimony indicated that the appellant shot the victim to prevent him from calling the police, supporting the inference that avoiding arrest was a substantial motive for the crime. The killing was primarily motivated by an intent to evade lawful arrest, leading to the conclusion that Foster’s counsel was not ineffective for not contesting this aggravator. The claim regarding the "double use" of the "robbery" and "pecuniary gain" aggravators has been previously rejected on appeal, rendering it procedurally barred under Mississippi law. Foster's reference to a prior ruling (Willie v. State) that prohibits double counting for the same conduct is inapplicable, as that ruling was established post-Foster's trial, which occurred in January 1991. Therefore, Foster’s counsel had no grounds for objection at that time. In seeking post-conviction relief, Foster vaguely asserts his counsel's ineffectiveness based on unspecified judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, claiming cumulative prejudice to his defense, but fails to provide specific details to support his claims. This generality does not meet the burden of proof for ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court has thoroughly addressed all errors raised during the direct appeal, including the cumulative error argument, which is now subject to res judicata. The court is confronted with the issue of whether Foster's claims of cumulative errors by counsel sufficiently demonstrate prejudice to his defense. Foster seeks to eliminate the requirement of proving prejudice as outlined in Strickland and Stringer, advocating instead for an inference of prejudice that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected in Cronic. It is established that without errors in individual claims, cumulative errors cannot be established—if there is no reversible error in any part, there is no reversible error overall. Consequently, the court concludes that Foster has not proven ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial or appellate levels, leading to the denial of his post-conviction relief application. In dissent, Justice Banks argues that the majority overlooks the nature of the petition, which seeks permission for Foster to present a motion for post-conviction relief at the trial court level. He emphasizes that the inquiry should focus on whether Foster's claims present a colorable argument warranting trial court consideration, rather than whether the evidence currently suffices to vacate the judgment. Banks believes Foster has presented a plausible claim of ineffective assistance during sentencing, suggesting that he should be allowed to substantiate this claim in court. Foster claims that evidence regarding familial alcohol abuse and its effects was not adequately presented, which could have served as substantial support for mitigating circumstances. Trial counsel did not identify or utilize critical evidence in Foster's defense, including the Whitfield report, which could have been beneficial. Given the death penalty context, each juror must personally assess aggravating and mitigating evidence, making it difficult to ascertain which specific failures of counsel adversely affected Foster's plea for life. Consequently, these shortcomings cannot be classified as having "prejudiced" Foster's case. The court and the State are not positioned to determine the plausibility of differing expert assessments of Foster's mental and emotional state, which should be evaluated by the trial court under the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. Furthermore, the assertion that a lack of evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance is procedurally barred is contested; the statutory framework obligates a thorough examination of the evidentiary basis for such findings. Despite the procedural bar, the majority agrees that sufficient evidence exists to uphold the aggravating circumstances determined by the trial court. Additionally, the author aligns with previous dissenting opinions from the original case hearings, which are not currently under consideration. The historical context of the statutory language regarding petitions for writs of error coram nobis is noted, with a reference to three justices who previously voted to substitute the death sentence with life imprisonment for Foster.