Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 18, 1837; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Ewing v. Burnet, the plaintiff, Ewing, sued Burnet for ejectment to recover a lot in Cincinnati, both claiming titles from John Cleves Symmes. Ewing's deed was dated June 11, 1798, while Burnet's was from May 21, 1803. Ewing argued that Burnet's title was invalid due to adverse possession, asserting that Burnet had not occupied the lot for the required twenty-one years under Ohio's statute of limitations.
The trial court instructed the jury that merely suing for trespass, paying taxes, or publicly claiming the property did not constitute adverse possession. To establish such possession, Burnet's use of the property must have been exclusive and notorious, indicating actual occupancy and enjoyment of the lot's benefits. The court clarified that adverse possession does not require fencing or a dwelling but could be established through cultivation, mining, or other significant use of the land.
The court also noted that had the lot adjoined Burnet's residence, the legal principle that possession extends to adjacent properties would apply; however, the intervening street prevented this extension. Ultimately, the jury ruled in favor of Burnet, leading to a judgment against Ewing, who then sought a bill of exceptions.
Storer, representing the plaintiff in error, argued that the circuit court incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of adverse possession of a contested lot for twenty-one years. He pointed out that the jury was misled by the charge, which applied legal principles relevant to a hypothetical scenario rather than the actual case. The defendant, Jacob Burnet, claimed ownership of the lot through a deed from 1804. His actions included occasionally expelling individuals from the lot and leasing sand-digging rights in 1820, but he did not build a fence around the property, which was frequently traversed by the public. Burnet resided across the street and owned a fenced property adjacent to the lot in question. He had been paying taxes on the lot since 1810 and had occasionally sued for trespassing.
To establish adverse possession, the law requires proof of actual possession over a continuous period of at least twenty-one years, which the defendant must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt. The plaintiff’s lessor held an older title, granting presumptive possession unless the defendant could prove otherwise. Adverse possession necessitates exclusive occupation and a claim against the rightful owner, with distinct and continuous boundaries marked over the required period. The law allows the true owner to reclaim their property unless there is unbroken, notorious, and hostile possession for the statutory duration. Mere sporadic acts of ownership do not constitute adequate possession claims; instead, they may indicate trespass rather than rightful ownership.
Title by possession cannot be assumed; it must be proven to counter a prior legal title with the same rigor required of the plaintiff to establish clear title. The principle of adverse possession is strictly interpreted, requiring clear and positive evidence rather than inferences, with all presumptions favoring the true owner's title. Adverse possession must be continuous for twenty-one years, remaining consistent in location without moving from one part of the property to another. Any gaps in the ability of the rightful owner to bring an ejectment action during this period negate the claim for adverse possession. Minimal or occasional use of the land does not equate to adverse possession, as demonstrated in cases where limited activities, like making sugar or cutting trees, were insufficient to establish a claim. Evidence presented in the current case failed to demonstrate continuous adverse possession for the required period, showing only sporadic acts of ownership. While fencing is not necessary to prove adverse possession, actual occupancy and a claim of title over a period are essential. The ongoing use of land without a fence can still constitute a bar to the true owner's rights if it establishes exclusive ownership.
A lot may be utilized for purposes such as a coal or lumber yard, where ongoing storage can demonstrate adverse possession comparable to physical enclosure. However, mere transient trespass, such as sporadically digging sand, does not equate to adverse holding. If accepted, this reasoning could allow anyone to claim ownership through occasional trespass, undermining property rights, especially for vacant urban lots. An individual with a questionable title should be required to visibly assert ownership, such as by erecting a fence, to alert others to their claim. The court does not intend to challenge the precedent established in Ellicott v. Pearl, which clarified that occupancy does not necessitate a fence or actual residence. Regarding jury instructions, the judge indicated that if the defendant paid taxes and pursued trespassers on a lot adjacent to their residence, that could indicate adverse possession. However, suggesting that the intent to maintain a view from an adjoining property could establish adverse possession is legally unsound, as it would jeopardize ownership of vacant lots and suggest that actual occupancy or enclosure is unnecessary. Consequently, the court deemed the jury instructions incorrect and potentially prejudicial to the plaintiff. Additionally, a point raised by the plaintiff’s counsel concerning the impact of a subsequent title derived from the same source as a prior title was not addressed in the circuit court and thus cannot be considered. The trial focused on the implications of the defendant's claimed adverse possession under Ohio’s statute of limitations, affirming that the jury should have considered evidence of possession.
Witnesses testified that the defendant had possessed the lot for over twenty years, which the court could not disregard. While title by possession is a legal claim, specific facts must support it, and the court had the obligation to outline these facts. The court did correctly instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to both parties, leaving the plaintiff without grounds for complaint. Although it is generally accepted that there cannot be two constructive possessions of the same property, the defendant asserted actual possession rather than constructive possession. The plaintiff could have pursued ejectment against the defendant at any time.
The case originated in November 1834 as an action of ejectment over lot No. 209 in Cincinnati, with the legal title held by John Cleves Symmes. Both parties claimed through different deeds: the plaintiff through a series of conveyances from 1798, and the defendant through a deed from 1803 and claimed adverse possession. The lot, located on Third and Vine streets, had no permanent improvements until shortly before the suit, was unsuitably shaped for fencing, and was primarily utilized for extracting sand and gravel. The defendant had resided nearby since 1804, paid taxes on the lot from 1810 to 1834, and claimed the exclusive right to remove sand and gravel, enforcing his rights through leases and trespass actions. Testimonies indicated he consistently asserted his claim without acknowledging any adverse claims for over twenty-one years prior to the lawsuit.
The evidence presented indicated that the defendant had maintained possession of the disputed lot since at least 1804, with various witnesses asserting that his possession was exclusive and continuous. Samuel Williams, the plaintiff's predecessor, lived in Cincinnati from 1803 until his death in 1824 and was aware of the defendant's claim and deed from Symmes, yet there was no evidence of him exercising ownership or demanding possession of the lot. Williams frequently declared his intention to claim the lot, but remained impoverished throughout. The court overruled the plaintiff’s motions to instruct the jury that he was entitled to a verdict and that the defendant had not established adverse possession. The court stated that it could not grant the first motion unless it found no evidence that could prevent the plaintiff's recovery. The jury had the exclusive role of assessing the credibility of witnesses and determining which facts were proven. Since the jury could have discredited the plaintiff’s witness regarding Williams's ownership notice, the court's decision to exclude this testimony meant the plaintiff's case relied solely on the deed for title. The legal implications of the deed were the only matter for the court to instruct the jury on in relation to this exception.
The plaintiff held the elder legal title to the disputed lot, granting him a right of possession and legal seisin, which persisted until he was ousted by actual adverse possession or another legal bar. Evidence presented by the defendant indicated he claimed the lot under color of title from 1804 to 1834, exercising acts of ownership known to the plaintiff and others for twenty years prior to Williams's death. The jury could infer that the defendant had no actual notice of Williams's claim, which was not publicly known, while the defendant's claim was visible. Williams had not asserted any claim from 1803 until his death in 1824. The jury might conclude that the defendant maintained strict and exclusive possession of the lot, relying on the plaintiff's unnotified deed against the defendant's evidence. The jury could presume a release or abandonment of Williams's claim given the defendant's possession since 1804, which, while not strictly adverse in legal terms, could still be presumed sufficient to protect the defendant's possession for thirty years. The court found no error in dismissing the plaintiff's motions, affirming the jury's conclusion that the defendant's entry in 1804 constituted an ouster of Williams's legal possession due to the defendant's claim of right. Adverse possession does not require physical markers like fences, as long as visible and notorious acts of ownership were demonstrated for twenty-one years under a claim of title. The nature of the property and its use complicate the establishment of a precise rule for adverse possession.
Acts of ownership over land, if publicly evident and uninterrupted for twenty-one years with the knowledge of an adverse claimant, can serve as evidence of ouster and adverse possession. Actual occupation or residence is not mandatory if the property does not allow for permanent improvement, as long as the claimant's actions reflect a clear claim of ownership. The jury's role is to determine whether the evidence supports the claim of adverse possession, which was deemed sufficient in this case. The court's instructions reiterated the requirements for establishing adverse possession, including exclusive appropriation, public notice, and enjoyment of profits. The defendant's continuous use of a sand-bank for personal benefit met these criteria. Additional factors, such as tax payments and proximity to residence, were noted to illustrate the intent behind the ownership claims and reinforced the assertion of right to the property. Arguments suggesting the defendant's possession was unfair due to prior notice of another claim were countered by the jury's authority to disregard such notice and the statute's provision that allows for adverse possession, even if the original title is flawed. The circuit court's judgment was ultimately affirmed.
