Phuc Hoang Tran v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 92-KA-01058-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; July 17, 1992; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Phuc Hoang Tran was convicted of murdering Chi Phuong Ho at the Anh Hong restaurant in Biloxi, Mississippi, on June 21, 1990. The incident occurred after an argument between Tran and Chi in the restroom, which escalated into a physical confrontation outside. Tran claimed he was assaulted and that Chi was armed. Afterward, Tran and his friend Xa Van Nguyen returned to the restaurant, where Tran discovered a shotgun in the back seat of a vehicle. Tran testified that upon seeing Chi outside, who threatened him, he retrieved the shotgun and fired it at Chi, resulting in Chi's death from multiple shotgun wounds. 

During the trial, a witness, Violet Nguyen, confirmed seeing a gun emerge from the passenger side of the vehicle but did not witness the shooting. The forensic pathologist, Dr. Paul McGary, indicated that Chi died from extensive shotgun injuries. Both Tran and Xa were arrested later, with Tran taken into custody in 1991. The jury found them guilty on July 17, 1992, and Tran was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

Tran appealed, arguing against the jury instruction S-1, claiming it improperly eased the prosecution's burden of proof, misdefined deliberate design, and was not sufficiently tied to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court of Mississippi ultimately reversed the conviction and remanded the case.

Instruction S-1 defines "deliberate design" as the intent to kill that is neither legally justifiable nor excusable, and which cannot be reduced to a lesser crime. The instruction states that such intent may be inferred from the unlawful and deliberate use of a deadly weapon. Tran's counsel did not object to the first paragraph of the instruction at trial, which constitutes a procedural bar to his argument against it, as established in *Mitchell v. State* and *Rogers v. State*. Despite the procedural issue, the court addresses the instruction to assist future cases.

Tran's objection is based on his interpretation of prior cases regarding "at the moment" instructions, particularly *Pittman v. State* and *Newell v. State*. The court clarifies that *Pittman* did not differentiate between malice aforethought and deliberate design, focusing instead on whether a killing is intentional or could be classified as manslaughter or justifiable homicide. Instruction S-1 avoids this issue by not asserting that deliberate design is formed at the moment of the act, thus allowing for the possibility of justifiable or excusable homicide.

In *Newell*, the court expressed concern over instructions that failed to acknowledge that an intentional act might not constitute murder. However, Instruction S-1 does not negate Tran's self-defense claim. Tran argues that the first paragraph may accurately describe malice aforethought but insufficiently defines deliberate design. The court counters that Mississippi law equates malice aforethought, premeditated design, and deliberate design as synonymous concepts. Therefore, Tran's objections to the first paragraph of Instruction S-1 lack merit.

Tran asserts that the second paragraph of a jury instruction is erroneous, referencing a long history of case law that has addressed similar instructions. Numerous cases, including Carter v. State and Blackwell v. State, have established that an instruction implying a presumption of malice from the use of a deadly weapon is appropriate only when the evidence does not clearly establish the circumstances surrounding that use. When conflicting testimony is presented, the determination of malice should be left to the jury, and granting such an instruction is deemed an error.

The Court has consistently ruled that presumptions of malice are misleading and can unfairly bolster the state's case when sufficient evidence has been presented. Specifically, in Johnson v. State, an analogous instruction was found to be reversible error due to its peremptory nature. The Court has emphasized that such presumptions should not be included in instructions when the circumstances of weapon use are already established by evidence.

Furthermore, the Court in Stewart highlighted that an instruction suggesting a presumption of malice creates an unfair reference to a non-existent presumption, as all the evidence should negate such presumptions. Chinn v. State reinforced that such presumptions should not be presented in a way that misleads the jury about their rebuttable nature. Overall, there is a clear judicial consensus against granting instructions that assert malice based solely on the use of a deadly weapon when the context has been sufficiently elucidated by the evidence.

Juries are permitted to draw inferences from the facts presented without interference from the trial court regarding presumptions or inferences. Once all evidence is presented, any initial presumption dissipates, allowing the jury to evaluate the evidence independently, even amidst conflicting testimonies. In particular, the question of malice should be determined by the jury when the evidence is sufficiently established. In the case of Tran, testimony regarding the shooting incident was given by multiple witnesses, despite conflicting accounts, warranting jury consideration of malice. The lower court's erroneous granting of a specific jury instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden of persuasion, constituting reversible error.

Additionally, Tran's flight from the Mississippi Gulf Coast and subsequent arrest were acknowledged by the prosecution. However, Tran contested the appropriateness of jury instruction S-6A, which allowed jurors to infer guilty knowledge or fear of arrest from his flight. The court emphasized that caution is necessary before providing flight instructions, which should only be considered when the flight is unexplained and demonstrates significant probative value regarding guilt. The court follows a two-prong test for such instructions: 1) only unexplained flight warrants instruction, and 2) the flight must have substantial probative value.

The case does not warrant a flight instruction due to Tran's self-defense argument, as flight is logically interpreted in the context of self-defense and suggesting it indicates guilt undermines that argument. The court ruled that granting such an instruction was a reversible error, and it should not be given on remand. Regarding jury instruction S-2, Tran's counsel failed to object, which serves as a procedural bar to appeal. However, the court addressed the instruction's merits for remand purposes. Instruction S-2 charges Tran with murder, specifying that if the jury finds he intentionally killed Chi Phuong Ho without self-defense, they must convict him. Tran contends this instruction improperly excludes lesser homicide considerations, referencing Smith v. State, where a similar instruction was deemed erroneous. The key distinction here is that S-2 allows the jury to determine if the shooting was self-defense, thus permitting consideration of lesser charges. Therefore, the instruction was not peremptory and was deemed appropriate.

Tran contends that jury instruction S-2 is defective because it only addresses self-defense, neglecting other circumstances under which the homicide could be deemed justifiable or excusable. However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the defense did not present any theories of manslaughter or accident; the sole focus was on self-defense, and the jury was adequately instructed on that point. As such, there was no necessity for the court to instruct on alternative theories.

Tran further argues that jury instructions S-1, S-2, S-6A, S-7, and D-12 are in hopeless conflict. He claims that S-1 misapplied the use of a deadly weapon and that S-6A improperly shifted the burden of persuasion to him. The court appears to agree that instructions S-1 and S-6A were erroneously given, favoring Tran in this respect.

Additionally, Tran asserts that the lower court erred by not directing a verdict in his favor based on the Weathersby rule, which mandates a verdict for the defendant if their testimony is reasonable and uncontradicted. However, Tran's account was contradicted by both his co-defendant and state witnesses regarding key details of the incident, thus invalidating the application of the Weathersby rule.

Ultimately, due to the erroneous jury instructions regarding the use of a deadly weapon and flight, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.