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Devon Adams v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 94-KA-00246-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; March 6, 1994; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Devon Adams appeals his conviction for the sale of cocaine, sentenced to 40 years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections, alongside a $1,000 fine and a $425 lab fee. The appeal raises three primary issues: 

1. The trial court's denial of Adams' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.
2. Restrictions placed on the cross-examination of a key witness, Stirling Gates.
3. The refusal to grant a lesser-included instruction for possession of cocaine.

The facts reveal that on July 1, 1992, Adams was approached by Gates, a confidential informant, in a beauty salon. Gates expressed a need to purchase crack cocaine for a relative. After an arrangement, Adams was taken by another informant, Dennis Gladney, to procure the drug. Adams received $100 from Gates and later delivered cocaine to an undercover officer, Ellington, near a school.

In the analysis, the court found no errors in the trial court's decisions. Regarding the speedy trial claim, Adams was arrested in August 1992, and the case faced delays due to re-indictments and the need for continuances related to the appointment of new counsel, which Adams did not contest. The trial was ultimately held in February 1994. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings, concluding that Adams' rights were not violated.

Adams asserts that the lower court erred by not dismissing his case due to a lack of a speedy trial. His right to a speedy trial began with his indictment in August 1992. The court must apply the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo to evaluate whether this right was violated: 1) Length of Delay: A delay of over eighteen months is presumptively prejudicial. 2) Reasons for Delay: The delay was partly due to Adams not requesting a trial during the August 1992 term and the State's reindictment in February 1993 after discovering new evidence. Adams' request for a continuance until February 1994 contributed six months to the delay. The trial court deemed the delay primarily due to Adams' actions and recognized it as having good cause, supported by credible evidence. 3) Assertion of Right: Adams did not file for a speedy trial until January 1994, during a period of his own requested delay. His motion for dismissal came less than a month before trial and did not equate to a demand for a speedy trial. Overall, while the delay was significant, the reasons largely favored the State, and Adams' own conduct played a substantial role in the timing of the trial.

In Perry v. State, the court weighed Adams' assertion of his right to a speedy trial against the State, determining that he did not demonstrate sufficient prejudice to constitute a constitutional violation. During most of the delay, Adams was incarcerated for another conviction, which did not deprive him of his liberty due to the State's actions. The court found that Adams’ presumptive showing of prejudice leaned heavily in favor of the State, ultimately concluding that his right to a speedy trial was not violated.

Additionally, the trial court erred by restricting the cross-examination of confidential informant Stirling Gates. The defense sought to question Gates about a past embezzlement charge, arguing it was relevant to his credibility under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608(b). The trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible due to its prejudicial effect and remoteness, a decision upheld by the appellate court as within the trial court's discretion.

Lastly, Adams contended that the trial court mistakenly denied his request for a lesser-included offense instruction for possession of cocaine. The court referenced precedent stating such instructions are warranted only if evidence supports them. It emphasized that a lesser-included offense instruction should be granted unless no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense while being not guilty of an essential element of the principal charge, suggesting that the trial court's refusal was erroneous.

To qualify for a lesser included offense instruction, the Appellant needed to provide evidence that would allow a jury to reasonably find him not guilty of the charged crime while finding him guilty of a lesser offense. The court determined there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction, leading to the trial court's correct denial of it. Although Adams testified he never possessed cocaine, he acknowledged his involvement in facilitating the drug transaction and accepting money for connecting the buyer and seller. If the jury believed Adams, they could only conclude he was an accessory to the crime, not guilty of the lesser offense of possession. Consequently, the court affirmed the conviction for sale of cocaine within 1500 feet of a school, imposing a forty-year sentence and a $1,000 fine, with costs assessed to Choctaw County. The sentence will run concurrently with another sentence but consecutively to any prior sentences.