Greenleaf v. Birth

Citations: 34 U.S. 292; 9 L. Ed. 132; 9 Pet. 292; 1835 U.S. LEXIS 351

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 18, 1835; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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James Greenleaf, the plaintiff, initiated an ejectment action against James Birth, the defendant, in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff demonstrated legal title to the disputed property through a chain of title originating from a patentee, which was not contested by the defendant. However, the defendant introduced various documents to assert that the title had transferred from the plaintiff to himself. Key documents included:

1. An agreement from July 10, 1795, where Greenleaf sold his title to multiple lots in Washington, excluding certain previously sold lots.
2. A deed from May 13, 1796, reaffirming the prior agreement and excluding specific lots, particularly square 500 and adjacent square 506.
3. An October 26, 1796, deed from Morris and Nicholson to Duncanson, Deakins, and Forrest, which included an exception for any previously sold properties by Greenleaf or the others.
4. An August 16, 1797, deed from Duncanson to Deakins and Forrest, transferring interest in the aforementioned squares.
5. William Deakins' will, which transferred his rights to square 75 to his brother, Francis Deakins.
6. A May 31, 1802, deed from Francis Deakins to Uriah Forrest, including disputed lot 17 in square 75.
7. An agreement dated October 16, 1799, to convey lots 16 and 17 to John Shaw and James Birth, contingent on payment of specified notes.
8. A November 23, 1807, deed from Forrest's assignees to Shaw and Birth for the contested lot.
9. An August 7, 1828, deed from Shaw's trustee to Birth for the same lot.

The court's opinion, delivered by Justice M'LEAN, encompasses the full context and implications of these documents in determining the title dispute.

Forrest communicated with W. Cranch, the trustee of Greenleaf, regarding the sale of lot 17, acknowledging Cranch's potential claim to the estate. Forrest proposed that if the property was determined to belong to Greenleaf's estate, the purchase money should replace the property. Cranch agreed to this proposal under specific conditions in a letter dated November 2, 1799. 

Witness Thomas Monroe testified that the first occupation of lot 17 occurred in May 1802, with residents Shaw and Birth. He noted that the lot is situated along the main avenue from the President's house to Georgetown. Monroe observed that the plaintiff was present in Washington in 1794 and 1795 but not between 1795 and 1802. He mentioned a contract involving General Walter Stewart, Greenleaf, Morris, and Nicholson for the lot and other properties, indicating that Stewart built some houses before becoming insolvent around 1796. After the plaintiff's deed to Morris and Nicholson, they managed the property and were recognized as responsible for the sales of Greenleaf's joint properties. 

It was also established that lot 17 was assessed to Shaw and Birth from 1803 to 1828, with the first tax assessment recorded in 1803. The evidence showed that lot 17 was not part of the squares described in the plaintiff's deed to Morris and Nicholson. Shaw and Birth took possession of the lot in October 1799, after an agreement with Forrest, who had managed it as an agent for U. Forrest prior to that. 

To counter the defendant's evidence, the plaintiff presented a written contract dated February 19, 1795, between Morris, Nicholson, Greenleaf, and Stewart, which included the lot in question. Walter C. Livingstone's deposition indicated his failure to locate the original contract among Nicholson's papers, as Nicholson had died insolvent. The plaintiff's affidavit claimed that duplicates of the agreement existed, with one original left with Cranch, who was believed to have delivered it to Nicholson in 1796, but the plaintiff had been unable to find it despite extensive searches.

William Cranch, acting as the plaintiff's agent for several years, was responsible for managing the plaintiff's papers and became familiar with property transactions involving Morris, Nicholson, and the plaintiff. He attests that a valid contract existed on July 10, 1795, and May 13, 1796, between Morris, Nicholson, Greenleaf, and General Walter Stewart for the sale of a disputed lot. Cranch received a letter from Greenleaf in February 1795, providing a copy of this contract, which included a covenant to convey the property to Stewart by June 1, 1795. Following Stewart's death, George Davis represented his estate regarding the property.

Cranch recalls seeing the original contract, which he believes he compared to a copy in his records. He mentions notifying certain purchasers about lots related to the Stewart contract but does not recall informing Shaw and Birth. An argument arose regarding the admissibility of the Stewart contract copy, with the defense claiming a lack of sufficient foundation for its admission; however, the court indicated that the defendant could only raise this issue if he had previously objected.

The plaintiff's counsel argued that the defendant failed to demonstrate a sufficient legal title to the disputed premises through the evidence presented. The court noted that the defendant, who was merely claiming possession, could not rely on an outstanding title without establishing it beyond controversy. The defendant presented several deeds to show a chain of title, including one from Morris and Nicholson to Duncanson and others, which included the contested property unless excluded by an exception in the plaintiff's deed. It was concluded that Birth held a legal title to half of the disputed lot at the time the lawsuit began, barring any exclusions from the previous deed.

The determination of whether a specific lot is excluded from an exception depends on evidence beyond what the referenced deeds provide, with the jury having the role of evaluating this evidence. The circuit court appropriately declined to instruct the jury that the defendant failed to prove a sufficient legal title. Instead, the court instructed that if the jury found that Uriah Forrest was in possession of the premises prior to October 1799, had agreed to sell them to Shaw and Birth on October 16, 1799, and that these parties, along with the defendant, maintained continuous possession and paid taxes since 1803 without any claims until the suit in 1818, they could presume that the title passed from James Greenleaf through the deed of May 13, 1796, and was not included in any exceptions of that deed. However, the conclusion drawn from these hypotheticals does not necessarily follow, as the defendant’s possession did not bar the statute of limitations nor did sufficient time pass to presume title. The instruction was criticized for relying on partial evidence, excluding the plaintiff's evidence regarding a contract with Stewart, which indicated that the lot was sold to Stewart in February 1795, thus falling within the deed's exceptions. The defendant must demonstrate the lot is not included in these exceptions, while the plaintiff may show it is, which would maintain his title and right to recover possession. The court's instruction erroneously permitted the jury to presume a conveyance without considering the full evidence, particularly the contract with Stewart. The plaintiff’s request for the court to instruct the jury on the annulment of the contract was also appropriately denied, as it asked the court to assess the evidence's implications.

The jury is responsible for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, and it is acknowledged that some evidence existed regarding the rescission of the contract, as the court was requested to instruct the jury on the insufficiency of that evidence. The court is required to instruct the jury when there is no evidence supporting a specific fact but cannot instruct that removes the jury's right to weigh evidence and determine its impact. The circuit court correctly refused the instruction requested by the defendant since it was based on only part of the evidence. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, with instructions to issue a new venire facias.