Charles Lucian Hall, Jr. appeals the June 7, 2008, order from the Circuit Court of Taylor County that granted summary judgment to Grafton Truss and Panel Company, Inc. The petitioner, represented by LaVerne Sweeney, claims injuries from a "tripping device" placed in his path by unidentified co-employees, John Doe and Jim Doe, at the company’s manufacturing facility. Hall argues that the pervasive misconduct of co-workers created a dangerous environment that the employer failed to address, constituting deliberate intent to harm and thus negating the immunity typically provided by the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically W.Va. Code § 23-2-6 (2010). He also alleges a history of abuse stemming from being labeled a "narc" by a fellow employee.
Hall filed his appeal on September 10, 2008, but proceedings were stayed due to the corporate respondent's bankruptcy filing on November 7, 2008. The appeal resumed on January 18, 2013, after the bankruptcy stay was lifted. The court's review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, applying the same standards as the circuit court. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the nonmoving party fails to prove essential case elements. The corporate respondent was a subscriber in good standing with the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Fund, and Hall received compensation for his injuries. The statute limits the loss of immunity to cases where the employer acted with a deliberate intention to cause injury, which must be proven by the petitioner.
The legal standard for establishing a deliberate intention claim requires proof of actual, specific intent, which cannot be met by mere allegations of negligence or unintentional conduct. An employee must demonstrate five specific factors: (A) existence of a specific unsafe working condition presenting a high risk of serious injury or death; (B) employer's prior actual knowledge of this unsafe condition and its associated risks; (C) violation of a relevant state or federal safety statute or an established safety standard; (D) intentional exposure of the employee to the unsafe condition by the employer despite the known risks; and (E) resulting serious compensable injury or death linked directly to the unsafe condition.
In this case, the petitioner failed to provide evidence of an inherently dangerous work environment or to establish that the employer acted with the necessary intent to cause injury. The petitioner described an incident on April 12, 2005, where he tripped on a stretched table saw cord after leaving his workstation. No witnesses were present, and he had previously encountered a similar hazard without incident. He did not report believing he was intentionally harmed nor did he discuss the incident with anyone. When questioned, he could not identify who might have tied the cord or if it was done intentionally, indicating uncertainty about whether the cord was intentionally placed to cause him to trip.
Petitioner's testimony revealed a lack of detail regarding alleged maltreatment by co-workers, including incidents of drywall throwing, being hit by nails, and witnessing dangerous behavior without reporting them. He identified one co-worker, Brian Roy, who he claimed engaged in multiple acts of harassment, including setting his nail pouch on fire, which led to Roy's termination following an off-premises altercation after the petitioner reported the incident. The petitioner also mentioned being choked by David McMasters, but faced no disciplinary action as McMasters apologized afterward. The testimony included instances of pranks but provided little substantiation. The petitioner only reported problems to supervisors on rare occasions, and when he did, the employer appeared to take corrective action. Notably, ongoing abuse claims involved only one employee, whose employment ended long before the petitioner’s tripping incident. There was no evidence of continued issues or that the employer was aware of any dangerous conduct. Consequently, the court found no basis for the petitioner's claims of deliberate intent to cause harm by the employer. The ruling was affirmed, with the concurrence of all justices involved.
