State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell

Citations: 231 Ariz. 153; 291 P.3d 350; 653 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7; 2013 WL 85349; 2013 Ariz. LEXIS 3Docket: CR-09-0199-AP

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; January 9, 2013; Arizona; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Shawn Ryan Grell was convicted of murdering his two-year-old daughter, Kristen Grell, by setting her on fire. Initially sentenced to death, his case was remanded after the U.S. Supreme Court's Atkins v. Virginia decision, which prohibits the execution of individuals with mental retardation. The trial court later determined that Grell did not prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence, a ruling that was upheld on appeal. However, the case was remanded again to ensure Grell's right to a jury sentencing under Ring v. Arizona, resulting in another death sentence verdict. 

On appeal, Grell claimed mental retardation should reduce his sentence to life imprisonment, despite acknowledging his culpability. The court conducted an independent review and concluded that Grell had proven mental retardation, leading to a sentence reduction to natural life. The jury had identified three aggravating factors: a prior serious offense, the heinous nature of the murder, and the young age of the victim, all of which were affirmed as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Arizona law defines mental retardation by three criteria: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant impairment in adaptive behavior, and onset before age eighteen. The court applied this definition and a preponderance of the evidence standard in its evaluation of Grell's mental retardation claim.

"Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" is defined as an IQ of 70 or lower, as per A.R.S. 13-753(K)(5). Grell has taken seven IQ tests since 1981, with valid scores of 72 (1981), 67 (1984), 69 (1984), 70 (1987), and 65 (1989), all indicating "significantly subaverage" intellectual functioning, leading the State to stipulate that he meets this criterion for mental retardation.

"Adaptive behavior" refers to how well an individual meets societal standards for personal independence and social responsibility, as defined by A.R.S. 13-753(K)(1). In a 2005 hearing following a remand, the trial court considered the opinions of Drs. Globus and Wicks, who assessed Grell’s adaptive behavior as severely deficient, versus Dr. Scialli, who diagnosed Grell with antisocial personality disorder and referenced a Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale indicating only slight deficits. The court, favoring Dr. Scialli's evaluation, concluded that Grell did not prove significant adaptive behavior deficits by clear and convincing evidence, a decision affirmed in 2006.

In the current inquiry, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, which is less stringent than the clear and convincing standard from the pre-trial phase. The review does not defer to jury findings or the weight of evidence as presented at trial. At the 2009 resentencing hearing, Grell provided substantially more convincing evidence of adaptive skill deficits than in 2005. Notably, previous school records that supported his inclusion in special education highlighted his "high adaptive skills," contradicting the claims of significant deficits.

The trial court recognized that school officials had determined Grell had a mental disability requiring special class placement, but dismissed these assessments due to the absence of a formal diagnosis of mental retardation prior to Grell's murder. In 2009, the defense presented witnesses from Grell’s educational background to clarify previous records. Frederick Krueger, the special education director, explained that his program used "mental disability" as synonymous with "mental retardation," adhering to the DSM's definition. He consistently concluded that Grell qualified for special education based on these criteria. Social worker Charlene Thiede elaborated that Grell’s assessments of "high adaptive skills" were comparative to peers with disabilities, revealing significant impulsivity and social understanding deficits. Thiede confirmed Grell met the school’s criteria for mental retardation. Special education teacher Nona Smith supported this view, stating Grell's skills were only considered "good" relative to disabled children, advocating for his placement in mental retardation classes rather than behavioral or learning disabled classes. Another teacher, Marilyn Charron, concurred, identifying mental retardation as Grell's primary disability amid behavioral issues. The State contended that the educational diagnoses lacked clinical rigor, but the defense countered that these evaluations were based on DSM criteria and accurately reflected Grell's adaptive skill deficits. The trial court's earlier interpretation of the school records suggested better adaptive skills than were actually present, which, when contextualized, indicated Grell's long-standing adaptive behavior deficits. These school records, created for educational purposes, were deemed credible, with no evident motive for distortion by the educators involved.

New evidence regarding Grell’s school records and evaluations has emerged, indicating significant changes from 2005 to 2009. In 2009, experts Drs. Globus, Wicks, and Scialli reiterated their previous opinions, while the defense introduced two additional experts who effectively countered the State's evidence regarding Grell’s adaptive skills. Dr. Mark Cunningham, a seasoned forensic and clinical psychologist, assessed Grell’s records and identified severe deficits in adaptive skills, linking them to mental retardation rather than antisocial behavior. Cunningham highlighted Grell’s persistent behavioral issues and immaturity, arguing that his actions were not merely rule-breaking but indicative of deeper deficits.

Cunningham critiqued the trial court’s reliance on Grell’s ability to fabricate a false identity, suggesting this did not demonstrate strong adaptive skills, as a child of Grell’s functional intelligence could feasibly engage in such behavior. He also raised concerns about the administration of the Vineland test used in 2005, stating it was improperly conducted, which likely compromised its validity. The mother’s responses were inconsistent with classroom observations of Grell, revealing impulsivity and communication difficulties, leading Cunningham to believe the true score would be lower. Evidence suggested the mother may have been biased against labeling Grell as "mentally retarded," further undermining the test's reliability.

Subsequent adaptive skills tests conducted by both the defense and prosecution yielded conflicting results. The defense's tests indicated severe deficits, while the State's adult version of the Vineland suggested average skills, but its administration was questionable due to the biases of the evaluators. As a result, both sides' testing results are deemed unreliable and given little weight in the review.

In the 2009 hearing, Dr. Denis Keyes, an educational psychologist specializing in mental retardation, testified regarding Shawn Grell's significant adaptive behavior deficits. Dr. Keyes, with decades of relevant experience and involvement in the DSM's definition of mental retardation, conducted an assessment revealing that Grell's adaptive skills were severely underdeveloped, indicating an inability to conform to adult social standards. Keyes noted that Grell's family perceived him as incapable of self-care and making informed decisions, and his lifelong impulsivity demonstrated a failure to develop essential adaptive behaviors. 

Dr. Keyes' conclusions were based on his assessments and family interviews, which the document suggests may be downplayed. He identified Grell's low intellectual functioning, poor learning from mistakes, and inadequate communication and social skills as evidence of mental retardation. Despite the State's argument that Grell's ability to behave appropriately on occasion negates claims of impulsivity and adaptive deficits, Dr. Keyes clarified that such behavior does not definitively prove adequate adaptive skills. He emphasized that maladaptive behavior disorders, such as antisocial personality disorder, can coexist with mental retardation, a point unchallenged by the State.

Witnesses also indicated that individuals with mental retardation can learn in structured environments, suggesting Grell's temporary compliance might stem from external structure rather than genuine adaptive capability. In contrast to the 2005 proceedings, Grell effectively rebutted the State's position, which relied solely on Dr. Scialli, a psychiatrist lacking experience in diagnosing or educating those with mental retardation.

Dr. Scialli prepared for his testimony by reviewing Grell's educational and correctional records and interviewing family members. He utilized the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2), administered post-murder, which indicated that Grell's response pattern suggested a personality disorder. Dr. Scialli diagnosed Grell with antisocial personality disorder, alcohol and amphetamine abuse, cannabis abuse, learning disorders, and ADHD, but did not consider mental retardation. In 2005, the trial court favored Dr. Scialli’s testimony over that of Drs. Globus and Wicks regarding Grell’s mental retardation claims. However, subsequent evidence in 2009 prompted a reassessment. 

Dr. Scialli conceded his lack of expertise in diagnosing mental retardation and acknowledged he relied on interviews with individuals who only knew Grell as an adult, rather than focusing on significant impairments before age eighteen, as required by law. He initially overlooked school records that referenced Grell’s adaptive skills but later recognized their existence. Additionally, the MMPI-2's reliability was questioned due to possible comprehension issues during testing, with Grell receiving assistance from the administrator. Dr. Scialli also noted that having antisocial personality disorder does not preclude the possibility of mental retardation. 

In contrast to Dr. Scialli’s conclusions, Dr. Cunningham's analysis remained unchallenged, and Dr. Keyes’ testimony, while somewhat advocacy-driven, was still considered credible due to his expertise. The school records and testimonies indicated that Grell exhibited deficits in essential adaptive skills during childhood, including social interactions and personal care, supporting the claim of mental retardation.

Grell has a documented history of social and adaptive deficiencies dating back to childhood, characterized by behavioral issues such as tantrums, fighting, school truancy, running away, criminal activity, and a lack of job stability. Observers identified him as having an intellectual disability, noting deficits in affection, empathy, and overall adaptive functioning. This mental health history supports the conclusion that Grell experiences a "significant impairment" in meeting personal independence and social responsibility standards as defined by A.R.S. 13-753(K)(1). The evidence demonstrates that he has "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" and notable adaptive behavior deficits that emerged before the age of eighteen, qualifying him as mentally retarded.

Under the Supreme Court decision in Atkins, executing individuals with mental retardation is deemed cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Court acknowledged that while such individuals may understand the difference between right and wrong, their impairments diminish their ability to process information, communicate, reason logically, and control impulses, which affects their moral culpability. Grell's case exemplifies these characteristics; he shows some awareness of right and wrong but struggles significantly with comprehension, communication, reasoning, and impulse control.

Despite the gravity of Grell's crime and its impact on the victim's family, constitutional protections for those with mental retardation necessitate a conclusion that he is ineligible for the death penalty. Consequently, the court vacated the death sentence and imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The decision was supported by the Chief Justice and additional justices.

Grell's appeal issues are not listed to prevent preclusion. Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer, designated under Article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, has since been appointed to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court, through independent review, determined that Grell has demonstrated mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence, barring a death sentence under federal law. Vice Chief Justice Bales concurs with sentencing Grell to natural life imprisonment. 

The trial court initially ruled in 2005 that Grell did not show mental retardation based on evidence from 2001 but denied a motion for reconsideration during the 2009 penalty phase, citing a lack of procedural means. However, new evidence presented in 2009 could have justified revisiting the earlier determination. Arizona law mandates the trial court to apply a clear and convincing standard for pretrial mental retardation assessments, allowing defendants to present evidence during the penalty phase if the initial burden is not met.

The statute does not explicitly require consideration of whether a defendant has shown mental retardation by a preponderance as a barrier to execution, yet the Court's ruling affirms that such a finding prevents a death sentence. For cases not subject to independent review, further clarification on applying the preponderance standard during mental retardation assessments will be necessary, potentially influencing future legislative measures, as states have discretion in implementing procedures following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins.