United States v. Robert Legg

Citations: 404 U.S. App. D.C. 334; 713 F.3d 1129; 2013 WL 1689046; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7834Docket: 11-3077

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; April 19, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Legg pled guilty to persuading an individual to travel across state lines for criminal sexual activity, specifically relating to minors. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison and 180 months of supervised release. Legg's appeal focused on the conditions of his supervised release, particularly those governing his computer and Internet usage. 

On November 11, 2010, Legg engaged with a profile on a social-networking site, which belonged to an undercover detective, Timothy Palchak, posing as someone interested in sexual activities with minors. In their online exchanges, Legg expressed his interest in meeting a fictitious 13-year-old boy for sexual activities and made arrangements to meet Palchak. He was arrested shortly after confirming his identity in person.

During sentencing, the district court considered Legg's mental health issues, history of drug abuse, and the nature of his crime, concluding he posed a danger to the community. Consequently, the court mandated conditions for his supervised release aimed at rehabilitation and public safety, including sex offender registration, treatment for substance abuse and sexual offenses, restrictions on pornography, prohibitions against alcohol and drug use, limitations on his employment around children, and bans on possessing cameras or recording devices without permission from the probation office. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment.

The district court placed several restrictions on Legg's computer and Internet use during his 180-month supervision period. Specifically, he is prohibited from using a computer or online service without prior approval from the probation office. He must disclose all computer systems and Internet-capable devices he intends to access and submit to random searches and monitoring software installations. Additionally, he is limited to possessing only one personal Internet-capable device, though the court clarified this excludes workplace equipment. At sentencing, Legg's counsel acknowledged that most restrictions were standard but raised concerns about the single-device limitation, emphasizing that modern devices like phones and tablets can access the Internet. The court explained that while Legg could have a cell phone, he must choose between Internet access on his computer or cell phone, not both, to facilitate monitoring by the probation office.

Legg appealed the restrictions, challenging the conditions on computer access and Internet use. District courts can impose supervised release conditions that are reasonably related to the nature of the offense and the defendant's characteristics, ensuring no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary for deterrence and public protection. Conditions must align with the U.S. Sentencing Commission's policy statements. While sentencing judges have broad discretion, the imposition is reviewed for abuse, and unobjected conditions are reviewed for plain error. Legg objected only to the single-device restriction, leading both parties to agree on the review standards: plain error for unobjected conditions and abuse of discretion for the single-device restriction. Legg argued that the conditions were unreasonable since his crime predominantly involved a telephone, though the court noted that limiting computer use is a recommended condition for offenses like his, especially where the Internet was used to facilitate crimes against children.

Legg's use of a computer to initiate and facilitate his criminal offense is undisputed. He accessed a social networking site to engage with Detective Palchak, expressing interest in sexual encounters with a minor and coordinating an in-person meeting. The court emphasized that without computer usage, Legg's offense would not have occurred, asserting that the subsequent phone communications do not diminish this fact. Comparisons to prior cases, like Laureys, are invalid as they similarly involved online interactions. Unlike Burroughs, where the defendant did not use a computer to commit his crimes, Legg's case involved direct computer facilitation. Although the district court chose not to enhance Legg's sentence for computer use, it recognized the need for restrictions on his internet access due to his criminal conduct. Legg's objection to a condition limiting him to one internet-capable device was deemed insufficient, as the court justified it as necessary for effective monitoring of his internet use, given its relevance to his offense. The limitation allows for continued access to the internet while ensuring adequate oversight to deter future criminal behavior.

Legg is permitted to use one Internet-capable personal device but can also utilize non-Internet devices at work and may possess a cell phone alongside a home computer, provided only one is Internet-enabled. The court acknowledges the potential for future technological changes that could render current restrictions inadequate or excessively burdensome. However, it emphasizes that judges cannot predict technological advancements. The court affirms that the imposed restriction is justified and allows Legg to request modifications to his supervised release conditions if necessary. Ultimately, the district court's decision to limit Legg to one Internet-capable device is upheld, with no abuse of discretion found.