Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 18, 1832; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the Court's opinion, emphasizing the significant legal implications of the case, wherein the defendant is a state exercising governmental authority over individuals who reject its jurisdiction, while the plaintiff, a Vermont citizen, is imprisoned under a law he argues violates U.S. constitutional principles. The Court must carefully assess its jurisdiction before proceeding, starting with verifying the record's proper submission. The record is certified by the court clerk and authenticated by the court's seal, attached to a writ of error served appropriately. The judicial act's procedural requirements have been followed, and historical precedents confirm that a judge's signature is not mandatory for the return of the record in both civil and criminal cases. The current case involves an indictment against the plaintiff and others for unlawfully residing in the Cherokee nation without the necessary state license or oath, raising questions about the case's cognizability before the Court.
The defendant, Samuel A. Worcester, argues that the court lacks jurisdiction over his case because he is a resident of the Cherokee Nation, where the alleged crimes, if any, occurred. He asserts his status as a citizen of Vermont and a duly authorized missionary working under the U.S. government's auspices to minister to the Cherokee people and translate the Bible into their language. Worcester contends that his activities were permitted by the Cherokee Nation and align with U.S. policy towards Native American communities.
He further claims that the state of Georgia should not pursue this prosecution due to multiple treaties between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, which recognize the latter as a sovereign entity with self-governance rights. These treaties, ratified by the U.S. Senate, guarantee the Cherokee Nation's territory and assert that actions within it fall outside the jurisdiction of state laws. Specifically, the treaties stipulate that U.S. citizens may not enter Cherokee territory without proper authorization. Worcester concludes that the treaties affirm his legal position and support his plea against the court's jurisdiction.
The defendant asserts that the acts charged in the indictment occurred within territory recognized as belonging to the Cherokee Nation and guaranteed by the United States, thereby claiming immunity from Georgia's laws and jurisdiction. The defendant argues that Georgia's laws purporting to extend state authority over this territory, particularly an act aimed at preventing unauthorized actions by individuals under Cherokee pretext, violate treaties with the Cherokee Nation, which are part of the supreme law under the U.S. Constitution. These laws are deemed unconstitutional and void for several reasons: they impair contracts between the Cherokee Nation and the United States, they interfere with congressional control over relations with the Cherokee Nation, and they conflict with a federal statute regulating trade and intercourse with Indian tribes. Consequently, the defendant contends that the court lacks jurisdiction to compel further responses or punish for the alleged offenses. The court, however, overruled this plea, leading to the defendant's arraignment and a not guilty plea. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty, resulting in a four-year sentence of hard labor. The court's overruling of the plea indicates that the issues raised do not preclude the prosecution, necessitating examination of the plea's validity under the provisions of the relevant judicial act. The plea also emphasizes that the indictment involves actions taken with the authority of the U.S. President and the Cherokee Nation's approval, reinforcing the claim of sovereignty and self-governance rights of the Cherokee Nation, free from state legislative interference.
The plea in question challenges the validity of treaties between the United States and the Cherokee Indians, as well as the legality of a Georgia statute alleged to be in conflict with U.S. constitutional provisions and laws. The judicial act specifies that the Supreme Court may review state court decisions that question the validity of federal treaties or statutes, or the constitutionality of state laws. In this instance, the Georgia statute is claimed to undermine the political existence of the Cherokee Nation by imposing state jurisdiction over it, particularly through provisions that penalize white residents without proper licenses and allow the governor to organize a guard for law enforcement within Cherokee territory. The court holds a duty to assess whether Georgia's actions violate U.S. laws and treaties, given the assertion of jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation by the state legislature. The examination will focus on the specific statute related to the indictment and its implications for Cherokee sovereignty.
America was inhabited by distinct, independent nations with their own institutions and laws, existing separately from Europe. The notion that either continent could claim rightful dominion over the other or that discovery nullified the rights of indigenous peoples is questioned. European explorers, motivated by nautical advancements, encountered a land primarily occupied by people engaged in hunting and fishing, raising the question of whether discovery alone granted rightful ownership or dominion over the land and its inhabitants.
Power dynamics, including war and conquest, establish rights that are typically recognized after possession. As European nations discovered various parts of America around the same time, a consensus was needed to prevent conflict over territorial claims. The principle established was that discovery granted title to the discovering nation's government against other European powers, provided it was followed by possession. This principle created an exclusive right for the discovering nation to acquire land and establish settlements, but it did not negate the existing rights of indigenous peoples or those who had prior claims.
The rights of European discoverers were acknowledged among themselves, but they did not impact the rights of the original inhabitants. The relationship between Europeans and Native Americans depended on the authority of the government asserting pre-emptive rights. The United States inherited Great Britain's territorial and political claims, but these claims remain dormant if not actively exercised. Charters were granted to companies to establish colonies, emphasizing the economic motivations behind colonization.
The charters discussed were issued prior to any territorial possession and intended to convey land from the Atlantic to the South Sea, despite the presence of numerous indigenous nations capable of defending their territories. They did not bestow legitimate power to govern or occupy the land broadly but were understood to grant only the right to purchase land from willing natives. The crowns could not grant what they did not claim, and the charters conferred a limited power to engage in defensive warfare against unauthorized inhabitants. While they allowed for offensive actions against native adversaries under just cause, such powers were specifically framed within a context of defense and repulsion of invasions. The charters, such as those to William Penn and Lord Baltimore, recognized the threat posed by "barbarous nations" and the need for military readiness. The charter for Georgia emphasized the charitable intent behind colonization and acknowledged the vulnerability of English settlers to attacks from indigenous groups. Overall, these charters asserted rights primarily against European entities and were not recognized as legitimate claims over native lands, with an overarching aim of promoting the civilization and conversion of indigenous peoples through peaceful means rather than conquest or extermination.
Conflicting claims among various groups led to tensions and violent disputes, prompting neighboring nations to engage in diplomatic relations with them. Instead of asserting dominance, foreign powers such as the English, French, and Spaniards sought alliances through flattery and gifts, recognizing the groups' autonomy and self-governance. The British crown maintained a non-intrusive approach toward Indian affairs, only interfering to prevent foreign influence. Land was acquired from the Indians willingly and at mutually agreed prices, without coercion. The British government emphasized justice and humane treatment towards the Indians, prohibiting unauthorized land purchases and ensuring that any land cessions were conducted through public consensus among the tribes. The 1763 royal proclamation reinforced this by reserving lands for the Indians and forbidding colonial governors from granting land rights without royal permission, thereby underscoring the British commitment to respecting Indian territories.
All individuals who have settled on lands not ceded or purchased and reserved for Indigenous peoples must vacate those areas immediately. A 1772 proclamation by Governor Gage emphasizes that unauthorized settlements beyond treaty-defined boundaries, particularly along the Ouabache, violate royal orders and require immediate departure. Britain's policy regarded Indigenous nations as sovereign entities capable of self-governance, leading to treaties that the crown recognized as binding. This context persisted through the American Revolutionary War, during which there were concerns that Indigenous nations might ally with Britain. In response, Congress prioritized maintaining good relations with these nations, establishing departments and appointing commissioners to negotiate peace and prevent their involvement in the conflict. The first treaty, with the Delawares in September 1778, reflected this conciliatory approach, emphasizing mutual forgiveness for hostilities and a commitment to perpetual peace and cooperation in mutual defense. The treaty also ensured free passage for American troops through Delaware territory and stipulated that legal disputes involving citizens of either party would be resolved through fair trials, respecting the customs and laws of both parties.
The fifth article establishes equitable trade regulations between the contracting parties. The sixth article addresses the United States' efforts to counteract false accusations from enemies suggesting that the U.S. intended to exterminate the Indians and seize their land. To dispel these claims, the U.S. guarantees the Delaware nation their territorial rights as defined by previous treaties, contingent upon their adherence to the friendship established. Additionally, the agreement allows for other tribes allied with the U.S. to form a state led by the Delaware nation, which would have representation in Congress.
The treaty closely resembles those between European monarchs, reflecting Congress's desire to refute harmful allegations regarding the rights of Indians during the Revolutionary War. After the war, the U.S. aimed to assert its authority over the Cherokees, who had sided with the British, implying a shift in tone towards demanding respect for Congress similar to that previously afforded to the British crown. The text suggests that Cherokee leaders, who could not read or write, likely relied on interpretations of the treaty.
The treaty was framed as a peace offering from the U.S. to the Cherokees, questioning whether both parties genuinely sought peace. The treaty's location at Hopewell, rather than New York, implies a different context for the negotiations. The first two articles focus on the mutual return of prisoners, while the third acknowledges the Cherokees' protection under U.S. authority alone, a common clause in treaties with Indigenous nations. This reflects historical norms governing relations between Indigenous peoples and European powers, where trade and support were primarily derived from the recognized sovereign.
The government intervened to protect the Cherokee Nation from disorderly intrusions and violence, with the Cherokees understanding this protection as a safeguard against aggressions, without implying any claim over their lands or personal dominion. This relationship was seen as one of a dependent ally to the British Crown, allowing the Cherokees to maintain their national identity while benefiting from the protection of a powerful neighbor. The same understanding was applied to the Cherokee's relationship with the United States, as they acknowledged their protection under U.S. governance exclusively. The stipulation of protection did not entail the subjugation of the Cherokees but rather established clear boundaries between their lands and U.S. citizens.
The use of terms like "allotted" and "hunting grounds" in treaties was likely misunderstood by the primarily non-literate Cherokees, who may not have grasped their legal implications, leading to potential misinterpretations regarding land cessions. The primary focus of the Cherokees during these negotiations was likely the delineation of borders rather than an understanding of ceding lands. The language of the treaties historically did not imply any right for the British or U.S. governments to seize Cherokee lands or interfere with their governance. Further, the fifth article of the agreement stipulates withdrawal of U.S. protection for any citizen settling on Cherokee lands, allowing the Cherokees to enforce their own laws against such settlers. The sixth and seventh articles address the punishment of citizens from either nation committing offenses against the other’s citizens.
The United States recognized the Cherokees as a distinct nation. The ninth article of a treaty grants Congress exclusive rights to regulate trade with the Cherokees and manage their affairs, but does not imply a surrender of self-government. The article primarily addresses Indian trade, and while its intent may be to benefit the Cherokees and prevent oppression, it cannot be construed as allowing the U.S. to dictate their land cessions or expose them to intruders. Such an interpretation would undermine the Cherokees' political existence and contradict the rights established in previous treaties, which affirm their ability to engage in war and maintain autonomy. The treaty of Hopewell failed to establish lasting peace, leading to the negotiation of the treaty of Holston in 1791 to resolve ongoing conflicts between Georgia and the Cherokee nation. This treaty explicitly states a commitment to perpetual peace and friendship between the United States and the Cherokee nation, affirming the latter's protection under U.S. sovereignty, and acknowledging that the Cherokees are not subject to any other authority.
The excerpt outlines the historical relationship between the Cherokee nation and the United States, emphasizing the transition from British protection to American oversight. The Cherokee nation declared itself under the protection of the United States following the end of British power in the region, maintaining its national character rather than submitting to U.S. authority as subjects. Key treaty articles are highlighted:
1. **Mutual Protection and Boundaries**: The treaty establishes a mutually agreed boundary between the United States and the Cherokee nation, marking it with the aid of appointed commissioners. The Cherokee nation acknowledges its ability to negotiate this boundary.
2. **Surrender of Land**: The Cherokee nation relinquishes claims to ceded lands in exchange for additional compensation, confirming their right to negotiate land cessions.
3. **Trade Regulation**: The United States is granted exclusive rights to regulate trade within Cherokee territory, which the Cherokees can accept or reject, indicating their autonomy.
4. **Land Guarantees**: The United States guarantees the Cherokee nation's remaining lands, forbidding U.S. citizens from settling or hunting in Cherokee territory without permission.
5. **Recognition of Sovereignty**: The treaty recognizes the Cherokee nation as a self-governing entity, affirming its political status and territorial rights, which are further supported by U.S. congressional acts aimed at regulating trade and protecting Indian nations.
Overall, the document underscores the formal acknowledgment of Cherokee sovereignty and the U.S. commitment to uphold their rights and protection, as well as the distinction of Indian nations as separate political communities.
The excerpt outlines the authority granted to the President of the United States to enhance the conditions of neighboring Indian tribes through civilizing efforts, specifically by promoting agriculture and education. The act emphasizes the aim of preserving Indian nations by transitioning them from a hunting lifestyle to an agricultural one, recognizing the progress made by tribes like the Cherokees while still encompassing them within the act's provisions. It suggests a commitment to securing Indian territories and maintains that interactions with these tribes should be exclusively managed by the federal government, separate from state influences. The text also reflects on the historical context of power during the colonial era and the Revolutionary War, detailing how Congress, initially acting on behalf of the colonies, assumed responsibilities regarding Indian affairs, including diplomacy and conflict resolution. This authority continued under the Confederation, mirroring the powers exercised in international relations.
The document outlines the powers conferred to Congress regarding war, peace, and trade with Indian nations, explicitly prohibiting states from engaging in such matters unless invaded. Congress is granted exclusive rights to regulate trade and affairs with non-state Indian tribes, provided state legislative powers are not infringed. Conflicts arose from differing interpretations by North Carolina and Georgia, leading to a 1787 report recommending territorial cessions or acknowledgment of Congress's powers. The current constitution solidifies Congress's authority over war, treaties, and commerce, affirming the status of Indian nations as distinct political communities with inherent rights to their lands unless ceded to the U.S. The term “nation” is used to recognize Indian tribes' status, and treaties made with them are deemed supreme law. Georgia's earlier legislative actions supported the understanding that Indian nations held rights to their territory until willingly surrendered to the U.S. However, changes in Georgia’s legislative stance began in December 1828, indicating a shift from this previous recognition.
The excerpt addresses the legal standing of the Cherokee Nation in relation to the state of Georgia and the federal government. It asserts that the original rights of the Cherokee, as undisputed occupants of their territory, are undermined by charters granted by a distant monarch who lacked the authority to remove the Cherokee from their land. Historical context and treaties indicate that the king of Great Britain could only cede what belonged to him, and the claims made in Indian treaties do not negate the Cherokee's self-governance rights. The law of nations supports that weaker powers do not relinquish their independence and right to self-governance by seeking protection from stronger powers. The Cherokee Nation is characterized as a distinct community with defined boundaries, where Georgia's laws lack jurisdiction unless consented to by the Cherokees or authorized by treaties and congressional acts. Consequently, any actions by Georgia regarding the Cherokee Nation are deemed void, as they conflict with the U.S. Constitution, laws, and treaties that govern relations with the Cherokee. The Georgia legislation not only violates the constitutional framework but also disrupts the established boundaries and protections afforded to the Cherokee, reaffirming their sovereignty and right to self-governance.
The forcible seizure and abduction of the plaintiff, who was legally residing in the nation with the permission of the U.S. president, constitutes a violation of relevant statutes authorizing presidential authority. The plaintiff was seized while under the protection of treaties that guaranteed his safety in the U.S. and while performing duties endorsed by Congress's humane policies. The legal proceedings against him were conducted under a law deemed unconstitutional, violating the Constitution, U.S. laws, and treaties. The court emphasizes that the infringement on personal liberty is as significant as an infringement on property rights, asserting the plaintiff's entitlement to constitutional protection. The court references the decision in Cohens v. The Commonwealth of Virginia, affirming that the judgment condemning Samuel A. Worcester to hard labor in Georgia's penitentiary was based on an invalid law and should be reversed and annulled.
