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Richard Ringer v. Joseph F. John
Citations: 230 W. Va. 687; 742 S.E.2d 103; 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 288Docket: 11-1325
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; April 2, 2013; West Virginia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed an appeal by Richard Ringer from the Circuit Court of Preston County regarding a final order dated August 18, 2011, which denied his motion to amend a judgment in a civil action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The court applied the appropriate standards of review, noting that for motions under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), the same standard as the underlying judgment applies. The court also mentioned that legal questions or statutory interpretations are reviewed de novo. In the underlying case, a verbal agreement from 2007 between Ringer and Joseph F. John involved constructing a subdivision. John purchased the property and financed the project, while Ringer, as the contractor, was responsible for road construction and excavation. Disputes led to the project’s failure. In 2010, John sued Ringer for failing to make payments on an endloader bought for the project, claiming Ringer agreed to pay for it through monthly payments. Ringer counterclaimed for unjust enrichment based on his excavation work. The court ultimately reversed the Circuit Court's order regarding the accrual date for pre-judgment interest and the interest rate applied, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its findings. In June 2011, a jury trial concluded with a verdict favoring Mr. John concerning the endloader, while Mr. Ringer prevailed on his counterclaim, receiving a total of $42,100 in damages. This amount included $20,000 for stone, $5,000 for excavation services, $100 for a percolation test, $500 for earnest money, and $16,500 for topsoil storage. The court classified these as special damages under West Virginia Code § 56-6-31 (2012), awarding Mr. Ringer prejudgment interest at a rate of 7% starting from August 2, 2010, the date he filed his counterclaim. Subsequently, on July 18, 2011, Mr. Ringer moved to amend the judgment, arguing that prejudgment interest should accrue from July 19, 2007, when he last worked on Mr. John's property, and that the interest rate should be 9.75%, the applicable rate for 2007. The circuit court denied this motion on August 18, 2011, leading to an appeal. The appeal focuses on whether the trial court correctly awarded prejudgment interest, where the standard of review is de novo for questions of law regarding prejudgment interest calculation, as established in relevant case law. The trial court found that Mr. Ringer was entitled to prejudgment interest on his unjust enrichment claim, as per West Virginia Code § 56-6-31(a), which mandates that judgments for special damages accrue interest at the rate effective when the right to claim those damages accrued. Mr. Ringer contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that prejudgment interest began accruing when he filed his counterclaim against Mr. John and misapplied the prejudgment interest rate. The court found that prejudgment interest should be governed by West Virginia Code, 56-6-31, but it was determined that the case is fundamentally a breach of contract action, and thus, West Virginia Code, 56-6-27 is applicable. Although Mr. Ringer's counterclaim is framed as unjust enrichment, it is considered a contract-related action, as established in Realmark Developments, Inc. v. Ranson. West Virginia Code, 56-6-27 allows a jury to award interest on the principal in contract cases, while Code, 56-6-31's provisions apply only when no other law governs interest. The precedent set in Thompson v. Stuckey clarifies that in contract actions, the jury should be instructed on the possibility of awarding prejudgment interest. The court found that the trial court erred by using Code, 56-6-31 for prejudgment interest, and therefore reversed the circuit court's order denying Mr. Ringer's motion to amend the judgment. The case is remanded for the circuit court to reassess the prejudgment interest owed to Mr. Ringer under Code, 56-6-27. The decision negates the need to address Mr. Ringer's secondary claim regarding the applicable interest rate under Code, 56-6-31.