The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment favoring the City of Lancaster in a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed the city council's practice of opening meetings with prayers led by various congregations constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The court analyzed the city's practice of inviting local religious leaders to lead invocations, noting that the policy was inclusive of all faiths and did not discriminate based on religious affiliation.
The court found that a single mention of Jesus in a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause. It referenced the precedent set in *Marsh v. Chambers* and *County of Allegheny v. ACLU*, concluding that legislative prayer can include sectarian references if it does not promote or denigrate any religion or align the government with a specific faith. The plaintiffs' argument that the predominantly Christian nature of invocations indicated a First Amendment violation was rejected, as the court emphasized the neutrality of the city’s policy and the principle of private choice in prayer selection. The court noted that the predominance of Christian invocations was a reflection of local demographics and volunteer choices, not city endorsement of Christianity.
The city had formalized its invocation policy in response to a cease-and-desist letter from the ACLU, outlining a procedure for soliciting prayer volunteers from the community.
The city clerk is responsible for compiling and maintaining a database of religious congregations in Lancaster, gathering information from sources such as the Yellow Pages, internet searches, and local commerce and media outlets. All congregations are eligible for inclusion in this list without any inquiry into their specific beliefs. The clerk invites these groups to offer invocations at city council meetings, emphasizing that participation is voluntary and should respect the diverse beliefs of the community. The policy explicitly states it does not favor any particular faith and allows each congregation three non-consecutive invocations per year. No requests to pray have been denied, and the selection process has remained unbiased.
In late 2009, the City sought public opinion on the prayer policy through Measure I, asking voters if the council should continue to allow invocations without content restrictions, including references to Jesus Christ. The city attorney confirmed the policy's legality, and both the mayor and vice-mayor supported the measure, which was approved by voters. On April 27, 2010, Bishop Henry Hearns delivered an invocation that included a reference to Jesus, which upset attendees Shelley Rubin and Maureen Feller, who expressed their intention not to return to future meetings if such references continued. Since the policy's adoption, the invocations given have predominantly been from Christian denominations, with many mentioning Jesus.
Rubin and Feller filed a lawsuit against the City of Lancaster in California state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City's policy allowing prayers that reference Jesus. They argued this policy amounted to an establishment of religion. The City removed the case to federal court, where the district court conducted a bench trial and dismissed their claims. The court concluded that legislative prayer does not violate the First Amendment unless it actively promotes or disparages a specific faith, and the mention of Jesus in the invocation did not breach this standard. The court noted that the City invited volunteers from various faiths to deliver invocations and maintained a non-discriminatory selection process to avoid Establishment Clause issues by not regulating prayer content beyond prohibiting proselytizing or disparaging remarks. The court also found Rubin and Feller's state constitutional claims unpersuasive for the same reasons. Rubin and Feller appealed, arguing the district court misapplied First Amendment standards regarding the invocation and the prayer policy. They based their appeal on two Supreme Court cases, asserting that any specific mention of a sectarian figure in legislative prayer constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause. The case is informed by the precedent set in Marsh v. Chambers, where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of legislative prayers based on historical practices, indicating that such traditions have been long accepted and did not violate the First Amendment.
The Marsh Court upheld the constitutionality of legislative prayer in Nebraska despite three objections raised by Chambers: the selection of a representative from one denomination for sixteen years, the chaplain being state-paid, and the prayers being in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The Court found that selecting a clergyman from one denomination did not promote that sect's beliefs, nor did the chaplain's salary. The content of the prayers was not a concern as long as there was no indication of proselytization or favoritism towards any faith. Although the prayers were often explicitly Christian, the chaplain ceased all references to Christ following a complaint, indicating a shift towards nonsectarianism. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court reiterated that legislative prayers should not affiliate the government with a specific faith. The longstanding practice in Nebraska, aligned with national historical practices, was deemed to pose no real threat, and the Court concluded that there was no evidence of the prayer opportunity being exploited for religious advantage. The use of the present perfect tense in the Court's language suggested that past sectarian prayers did not advance Christianity, countering interpretations that restricted Marsh’s application to nonsectarian invocations only.
The opinion implies that Palmer's controversial prayers, when considered collectively, do not violate constitutional boundaries. Dissenting Justices Brennan and Stevens interpret the majority's stance as overlooking the sectarian nature of Palmer's prayers, suggesting that a deeper examination would reveal their clearly Christian content. Brennan highlights concerns about state entanglement with religion, while Stevens critiques the majority's reluctance to analyze individual prayers' content. Historical context reveals a longstanding tradition of sectarian legislative prayers, dating back to the Continental Congress, where invocations explicitly referenced Jesus Christ. This pattern continued with numerous prayers in modern congressional practice, further complicating the interpretation of Marsh as prohibiting sectarian prayers. The evidence suggests that both sectarian and nonsectarian prayers are equally integrated into legislative practice, challenging the notion that only nonsectarian prayers are constitutionally permissible.
Rubin and Feller argue that the case of Allegheny dislodged the precedent set by Marsh regarding legislative prayer; however, the court disagrees. Allegheny, while mentioning Marsh, did not replace or limit its application, as it pertained to religious holiday displays rather than legislative prayer. The court clarifies that Allegheny does not assert that legislative prayers must be nonsectarian. Instead, it emphasizes that as long as legislative prayers do not promote or disparage a particular religion or affiliate the government with a specific faith, they are permissible.
The plaintiffs’ challenge focuses solely on a specific prayer by Hearns that mentioned Jesus, which they contend violates the Establishment Clause. The district court found that the only issue raised by plaintiffs was this reference to Jesus, and there was no evidence suggesting that the prayer advanced or disparaged any faith. Therefore, the challenge is deemed insufficient as Marsh does not categorically prohibit sectarian references in legislative prayer.
Additionally, Rubin and Feller argue that the context of Hearns’s prayer, along with the city’s unwritten policy favoring Christian invocations, constitutes a First Amendment issue. The court notes that it must evaluate the overall prayer practice of the City of Lancaster, similar to the approach taken in Marsh. This assessment will consider whether the predominant sectarian nature of invocations constitutes an endorsement of a particular religion, based on the frequency of such prayers from a listener's perspective.
Attendees primarily perceive prayers rather than policies, prompting the Fourth Circuit to emphasize the practical effects of legislative invocations (Joyner, 653 F.3d at 354). The Second Circuit similarly assesses whether a government's practice, particularly when one sect's prayers dominate, suggests favoritism or discrimination towards certain religious beliefs (Galloway, 681 F.3d at 29). The Marsh decision mandates an inquiry into whether the government has intentionally or implicitly endorsed a particular faith. The Marsh Court referenced the First Amendment's ratification history, noting that concerns about legislative prayer's impact on listeners with diverse beliefs were countered by Samuel Adams' perspective, which indicated a broader acceptance of such practices without implying governmental endorsement of any single religious view (Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791–92). The Marsh Court concluded that while a state could affiliate with a specific sect, the constitutionality of such practices should not hinge on their effect on disapproving listeners, as adults are less vulnerable to religious coercion. Instead, the analysis focuses on historical context and governmental actions. The Court found no evidence that the selection of a clergyman from one denomination advanced his church's beliefs, interpreting the reappointment of a Presbyterian chaplain based on personal qualities, rather than sectarian preference (Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793). The Court dismissed concerns regarding the chaplain's remuneration and sectarian references, concluding that Nebraska's practice did not constitute an advancement of Christianity, despite potential perceptions to the contrary.
Marsh's application of the Lemon test would have required an assessment of the effects of prayers and the reasonable observer's perceptions regarding Nebraska's endorsement of Christianity. The Lemon test's effect prong, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, prohibits government actions that convey a message of endorsement to reasonable observers. The Eighth Circuit previously suggested that Nebraska's legislature exhibited an official religious stance, but the Supreme Court upheld Nebraska's practices based on original intent, tradition, and a lack of evidence of state-led religious promotion.
The central issue now is whether the City has aligned itself with Christianity through its prayer practices. Rubin and Feller argue that the City expresses endorsement of Christianity through its invocations. However, the City has implemented numerous safeguards to maintain neutrality. Attendance at prayers is voluntary, no individuals are compensated for offering prayers, and the City does not vet prayer content. Furthermore, all religious leaders are treated equally, with no exclusions from participation.
To promote inclusivity, the City requires that a variety of speakers be scheduled, ensuring that no individual prays at consecutive meetings or more than three times a year. The scheduling process remains uncoerced by city officials. The City emphasizes its nonsectarian policy, aimed at respecting Lancaster’s religious diversity and solemnizing council proceedings, explicitly stating it does not endorse or favor any particular faith or denomination.
The invitation for invocations emphasizes that participation is voluntary and should align with personal conscience, urging volunteers to respect the forum's sensitivity. The City Council requests that invocations not be used to convert others or disparage differing beliefs, aiming to uphold respect and ecumenism. Despite a neutral policy, critics Rubin and Feller argue that the City effectively promotes Christianity due to a predominance of Christian volunteers. However, the inquiry's focus should be on the City’s lack of control over the choice of prayer content and the demographics of participants. They further allege that Mayor Rex Parris is attempting to establish a Christian community, citing a 2010 speech, but the district court notes his statements reflect personal beliefs rather than official policy. Parris has since invited leaders from diverse faiths to participate in invocations, showing no attempt to manipulate religious representation. The court reinforces that the policy's authors are the citizens who voluntarily respond to invitations, aligning with precedents that affirm the constitutionality of neutral government policies that allow private religious expression without state endorsement.
The excerpt addresses constitutional issues surrounding government involvement with religious practices, particularly focusing on the neutrality of government programs in relation to the Establishment Clause. The Court has upheld various programs, such as state tax deductions for education expenses at religious schools and vocational scholarships, emphasizing that any benefits received by religious institutions stem from private choices made by individuals, not from governmental endorsement. The neutrality principle is key, as demonstrated in cases like Good News Club v. Milford Central School, where taxpayer-funded services did not imply government support for any religion. Rubin and Feller argue against a prayer policy that appears to favor Christianity, proposing a ban on specific religious references. However, such a ban could infringe upon First Amendment rights by requiring government oversight of prayer content, a practice deemed unconstitutional in prior rulings like Lee v. Weisman. The inconsistency in Rubin and Feller’s requests—initially targeting prayers invoking Jesus Christ but later seeking a broader prohibition—has been noted by the district court, which determined that the challenge primarily concerns the specific reference to Jesus.
Plaintiffs appeal for an injunction to prevent prayers that mention Christ or any religious figure, arguing for nondenominational legislative prayers. The court highlights concerns that enforcing such neutrality risks establishing a vague civic religion, which could lead to a societal devotion to secularism and hostility towards religious expressions. The Second Circuit emphasized that a government cannot endorse a vague theism as a state religion, similar to how it cannot support a specific creed.
The excerpt discusses the complications of defining who constitutes a "religious figure" and what constitutes a "sectarian reference," noting that such determinations could entangle judges in religious controversies that the Constitution seeks to avoid. It points out that the request to exclude figures like Jesus and Allah may inadvertently exclude other religious leaders who may not wish to conform to government standards for prayer. Additionally, the difficulty of creating a truly nondenominational prayer is noted, as even seemingly neutral terms can be contentious among different faiths.
The document cites various religious titles, showing that terms often considered ecumenical, like "Heavenly Father" or references to "Lord," can be problematic and may offend adherents of other religions. The court argues that requiring a nonpreferential approach invites judicial engagement in comparative theology, a task deemed unsuitable for federal courts.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Pelphrey, expressed difficulty in distinguishing between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions, noting that even individual taxpayers could not reach consensus on what constitutes "sectarian." Taxpayers Rubin and Feller argued that Hearns's invocation and the City's prayer practices violated Article 1, Section 4 of the California Constitution, which parallels the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. However, it was established that the California provision does not offer greater protections than the First Amendment. As a result, the failure of their First Amendment claim also led to the failure of their state claim. Testimonies revealed inconsistencies in the definition of sectarian expressions, with various terms being deemed permissible or impermissible based on individual interpretation. Ultimately, the district court concluded that neither the invocation nor the City's prayer policy violated the establishment of religion principle, and this decision was affirmed.
