The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's judgment against Gary Fung and isoHunt Web Technologies, Inc., who were found liable for contributory copyright infringement. The court determined that the defendants' services and websites induced third parties to download infringing copies of copyrighted films. The decision was based on the criteria established in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., which included the distribution of a product, acts of infringement, intent to promote infringement, and causation linked to the use of the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol.
The panel ruled that the defendants did not qualify for safe harbor protections under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically sections 512(a), (c), and (d). However, it clarified that inducement liability could coexist with DMCA safe harbor protections. Additionally, the court found certain provisions of the district court's permanent injunction to be vague and overly burdensome, necessitating a modification of the injunction. The case exemplifies the ongoing challenge of applying intellectual property laws to new technologies.
The district court permanently enjoined Fung from engaging in activities that facilitate copyright infringement of Plaintiffs' works. Fung disputes the court’s findings of copyright violation and his lack of eligibility for safe harbor protection under the DMCA. He claims the injunction is both punitive and vague, infringes on his free speech rights, and oversteps the court's jurisdiction by mandating communication filtering outside the U.S. The court affirmed the liability rulings but partially reversed the injunctive relief.
The case involves the BitTorrent peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing protocol. Traditional client-server networks, where central servers store and distribute information, are contrasted with P2P networks, where each participant acts as both a supplier and consumer of resources. P2P networks are less secure but more reliable and efficient, making them suitable for sharing large files, often leading to the distribution of pirated media. However, P2P technology also supports many non-infringing uses, underscoring that copyright infringement is not inherent to the technology.
In client-server networks, clients can easily access files stored in a central location, while P2P networks lack such a repository, complicating the identification of available content among peers.
In "pure" P2P networks, content searches are conducted through a process called "flooding," where a user queries neighboring peers, who respond and further propagate the query. This method can lead to inefficiencies and excessive signaling traffic, particularly in large networks, prompting limitations on query propagation based on time or hop count. Gnutella, a prominent pure P2P protocol, exemplifies this model, with Streamcast utilizing it for the Morpheus application.
Conversely, "centralized" P2P networks rely on a central indexing server that indexes content across peers. Users query this server to identify which peers possess the desired files, streamlining the search process and reducing traffic. However, this setup introduces a single point of failure: if the indexing server fails, the network collapses. Napster is a notable example of a centralized P2P network, as is eDonkey.
Lastly, "hybrid" P2P networks integrate elements of both models, often utilizing "supernodes." In these systems, each peer connects to a supernode, which indexes the content of its connected peers. When a search query is initiated, it is directed to the supernode, which provides results based on its indexed knowledge, potentially forwarding queries to other supernodes as needed.
Supernodes expand the search capabilities in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks while minimizing redundancy, functioning similarly to centralized P2P systems by merely processing search queries and directing users to nodes with the desired content, without participating in file transfers. Grokster’s software utilized the FastTrack protocol, which employs supernodes.
The BitTorrent protocol, introduced in 2001, represents an evolution in P2P technology with distinct features that enhance file transfer efficiency. Instead of downloading entire files from a single peer, BitTorrent divides files into smaller segments (typically around 256 kilobytes), allowing users to download multiple pieces simultaneously from various peers. This method accelerates the download process and enables users to share completed pieces with others even before finishing their own downloads, creating a dynamic exchange known as a “swarm.”
To illustrate BitTorrent's architecture, consider a scenario where a publisher shares a movie file. The publisher uses a BitTorrent client to create a small torrent file (.torrent) that includes essential information such as the file size, the number of pieces, a cryptographic hash for validation, and the addresses of trackers. Trackers function similarly to indexing servers and are typically independent from one another.
The publisher uploads torrent files to various torrent sites that collect and index these files for users, relying on these sites for search functionality as standard BitTorrent clients lack this feature. Torrent sites, while not centralized, aim to maintain extensive collections, often overlapping due to shared methods of acquiring files, such as user submissions and automated processes like bots. As of April 2008, there were over 400 torrent sites. The publisher's computer remains online with the BitTorrent program running to facilitate sharing the movie file upon user requests. Users search for the movie on the relevant torrent site and download the associated torrent file, which connects them to a tracker that directs them to publishers, known as seeders, who have the movie. Users, referred to as leechers, can also become seeders once they have downloaded parts of the movie. Trackers manage traffic for torrents without storing content and may provide multiple addresses to ensure availability. Fung operates three torrent sites, including isoHunt, which not only organizes torrent files but also enhances their reliability by adding backup trackers to each file upon upload, improving users' chances of successful downloads.
Torrentbox and Podtropolis operate torrent sites with associated trackers, but their collections of torrent files are relatively small. Each torrent file on these sites is tracked by their respective trackers, which show significantly higher download numbers than the sites themselves. For instance, the torrent for "Casino Royale" was downloaded 50,000 times from Torrentbox.com, while the tracker recorded 1.5 million downloads, indicating users accessed these files from other torrent sites. Both Torrentbox and Podtropolis maintain updated rankings of popular content based on seeder and leecher counts, whereas IsoHunt lacks a tracker and instead lists "Top Searches" and hosts a forum for user interaction. Fung, who moderates the IsoHunt forum, is named in a lawsuit originally filed in the Southern District of New York and then transferred to the Central District of California. Columbia Pictures alleges Fung is liable for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106. The district court held Fung liable for contributory infringement due to his role in inducing others to infringe copyrights. Fung's attempts to claim protection under the DMCA safe harbors were rejected by the court. A permanent injunction was issued against Fung, prohibiting activities that foster infringement of Columbia's copyrighted works, requiring compliance with a specified list of titles within 14 days and allowing Columbia to supplement this list at any time. Fung must comply with updates within 24 hours, and the injunction applies to both Isohunt Web Technologies, Inc. and Fung personally, enforceable in any location, including Canada.
Columbia served Fung with an initial list of over 23,000 copyrighted titles shortly after a permanent injunction was issued. Many titles contained generic terms or were similar to public domain works, prompting Fung to argue that the injunction was overly broad. The district court modified the injunction, requiring Columbia to provide further details about the copyrights, while suggesting that Fung's concerns were exaggerated and that minor violations wouldn’t lead to contempt if reasonable compliance efforts were made. Fung appealed the liability ruling and the injunction's scope.
On appeal, the review of the district court's summary judgment is de novo, allowing affirmation on any supported ground. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the decision regarding the permanent injunction and its scope for abuse of discretion. The appellate court examines if the trial court applied the correct legal rule and if its factual resolution was logical and supported by the record.
The liability determination is based on the "inducement" theory from Grokster III, which addresses secondary liability in the context of P2P file sharing. This principle traces back to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, which ruled that mere distribution of a product capable of copyright infringement does not automatically incur liability unless there is evidence of intent to encourage such infringement.
The Court found no precedent for vicarious liability in copyright law and instead applied the staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law. This doctrine allows for the distribution of a component part of a patented device if it has substantial non-infringing uses. The Court emphasized that selling copying equipment does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate purposes. In the case of the Betamax, it was deemed capable of substantial non-infringing uses, leading to Sony's exoneration from contributory copyright infringement.
In contrast, Grokster III involved defendants providing software for mass copying of copyrighted materials, who argued that, like Sony, they should not be liable since their products also had substantial non-infringing uses. They claimed liability would only apply if they had actual knowledge of specific infringements they could prevent. The district court agreed, granting summary judgment to Grokster, a decision later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
However, the Supreme Court in Grokster III clarified that while Sony restricts liability based solely on product characteristics, it does not eliminate the possibility of liability based on intent. If evidence shows intent to promote infringement, liability may ensue. Grokster III introduced the "inducement rule," which holds that distributing a device with the intent to foster copyright infringement can lead to liability, outlining four essential elements: distribution of the device, acts of infringement, intent to promote infringement, and causation.
Inducement liability under copyright law, as articulated in Grokster III, applies to parties distributing a "device" or "product," referring specifically to software like Grokster's FastTrack and StreamCast's Morpheus. The case at hand concerns Fung, who did not develop or provide the software used for downloading, nor did he create the BitTorrent protocol, which is managed by a separate entity. Fung argues that his lack of involvement in developing or distributing any "device" absolves him from liability under the inducement standard set out in Grokster III. However, the court disagrees, stating that copyright law protects expression rather than specific products or devices. Inducement liability can arise from actions that lead to the unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material, regardless of whether those actions involve the distribution of a physical device or the provision of a service. For instance, a copying service could be liable for infringement even if it does not manufacture the copying machines, emphasizing that culpability is tied to purposeful engagement in infringing activities. The Grokster III decision emphasized the need for secondary infringement liability due to the challenges of enforcing rights against direct infringers. Previous cases, such as Perfect 10, have reaffirmed that the inducement doctrine applies equally to services as it does to products, indicating that Fung's provision of services could still fall under this liability framework.
Columbia has successfully met its burden for summary judgment regarding the first element of the Grokster III test for inducement liability. To establish copyright infringement under this theory, Columbia needed to demonstrate actual infringement by users of Fung's services, which it accomplished. Both uploading and downloading copyrighted materials constitute infringement, violating distribution and reproduction rights, respectively. Columbia's expert reported that 90-96% of content linked to torrent files on Fung's websites is likely infringing. Despite Fung's challenges to the expert's methodology, he did not dispute the factual claim that his services facilitated widespread copyright infringement. Even accounting for potential errors in the expert's analysis, the evidence remains compelling enough that a reasonable jury would conclude Fung's services were predominantly used for infringement.
Additionally, the third requirement for inducement liability under Grokster III is that the service must be distributed with the intent to promote infringement, supported by clear expression or affirmative actions. Fung contends this factor involves two elements, but the court clarifies that "clear expression" is a means of demonstrating the improper intent, not a separate requirement. The standard necessitates a high degree of proof regarding this intent, which must be evident through affirmative communication. The Grokster III decision emphasizes that mere knowledge of potential infringement does not suffice for liability; rather, purposeful conduct aimed at promoting infringement is necessary. Advertisements and solicitations that encourage copyright violations are classic examples of inducement. In Grokster III, evidence of such solicitation was pivotal, particularly as the defendants advertised their software as a replacement for Napster, which had been facilitating significant copyright infringement before its shutdown.
Grokster III established that a defendant's infringing purpose can be demonstrated through various forms of evidence, including communications that infer support for infringing uses, such as an electronic newsletter linking to articles about accessing copyrighted music. The case highlighted explicit internal communications, such as proposed advertising designs from one defendant, Streamcast, which indicated an unlawful purpose. The Court clarified that the relevant aspect is not whether these messages reached customers, but rather that they reflect the defendant's unlawful intent, which disqualifies any claims for protection.
Grokster III also noted that circumstantial evidence, like the lack of filtering mechanisms to reduce infringement and the defendants’ profit derived from advertising tied to high-volume use of their software, could suggest intent but was insufficient on its own without additional evidence. Applying these principles, the conclusion reached is that Fung actively promoted the infringement of copyrighted material, notably through isoHunt's encouragement for users to upload torrent files of popular movies. This direct solicitation for uploads demonstrates a clear intent to facilitate infringing activities.
Fung engaged in activities that indicated inducement of copyright infringement by posting requests on the isoHunt forum for users to upload and download torrents of specific copyrighted films. His communications were deemed crucial for establishing inducement liability, as they were explicitly designed to encourage users to commit copyright violations, aligning with precedent set in Grokster. The court found that Fung's posts, along with his affirmative responses to user inquiries about accessing copyrighted material, demonstrated unlawful intent. While the district court also considered statements from forum moderators as evidence of an agency relationship with Fung, the primary basis for liability rested on Fung's own actions.
Fung did not implement effective filtering tools or mechanisms to curb infringing activities on his websites, which further supported the conclusion of his intent to facilitate copyright violations. Although he attempted to remove certain types of torrents, these actions were insufficient to diminish infringing activities and were not directed at preventing copyright violations. Fung’s revenue model relied heavily on advertising income generated from high user traffic, which was primarily driven by infringing use of his services. Overall, the combination of his explicit inducement efforts and the commercial incentives tied to infringement led to the conclusion that his unlawful intent was evident.
Causation in the context of copyright infringement liability is interpreted differently by the parties involved. Fung and Google argue that infringement must result directly from the distributor's improper intent, specifically from the inducing messages. In contrast, Columbia asserts that it only needs to demonstrate that third-party infringement was caused by the product or service provided. The court favors Columbia's interpretation, suggesting that liability arises when a service is offered with the intent that it be used to infringe copyrights. Grokster III establishes that distributing a device to promote infringement, evidenced by affirmative steps, incurs liability for resultant infringement. The court cautions against a broad application of causation, which could significantly expand liability, especially in the digital realm. Copyright law seeks to balance the rights of creators, the freedoms of innovators, and public access to creative works. Therefore, it is crucial that liability is based on clear intent to promote infringement, rather than mere awareness of potential misuse. In corporate contexts, liability must be tied to the entity's intent as defined by agency law, excluding unauthorized statements from individuals.
StreamCast and Grokster, as corporate entities, communicated inducement messages to their users, establishing that proving unlawful intent at a specific time does not automatically expand liability for earlier infringing actions. If an entity starts providing a service with infringing potential but only realizes this later, it is not liable for infringements occurring before that realization. An entity's unlawful intent at a later time does not retroactively taint all prior actions, as companies must have opportunities to reform and discourage infringement to continue providing their products or services.
The case distinguishes itself from Grokster III and Sony, where causation was clear due to the singularity of the producers involved in those cases. Fung argues that many infringements attributed to his websites may not be connected to them, citing that most torrents tracked by Torrentbox do not originate from his site. He posits that if users acquire torrents from other sources, he should not be liable for the resulting infringements. This argument is supported by precedents such as Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, which highlighted insufficient causal connections in similar copyright infringement claims. However, Fung's services also include managing traffic for torrents from multiple sources, which complicates the liability assessment regarding the download of copyrighted content.
Plaintiffs may establish Fung's liability for inducing copyright infringement if they demonstrate a sufficient causal link between users’ infringing actions and his trackers, despite torrent files being sourced from elsewhere. The court does not decide on the extent of Fung's liability at this stage but focuses on the issue of a permanent injunction, which does not require an exact assessment of infringing use for damage claims. The district court's finding that Columbia has proven Fung's liability is affirmed.
Fung claims defenses under three DMCA safe harbor provisions (17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c), and (d)), bearing the burden to prove compliance with statutory requirements. Columbia argues, supported by the district court, that inducement liability contradicts DMCA safe harbor protections. However, precedent indicates that DMCA protections are not universally inapplicable to contributory liability, and legislative history confirms some protections for vicarious and contributory infringement exist.
The court acknowledges that inducement liability does not inherently conflict with DMCA safe harbor criteria. For instance, a service provider's obligation to remove repeat infringers (17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)) may coexist with findings of inducement. Thus, it is possible for a service provider found liable for inducement to still qualify for DMCA safe harbor protections. The court suggests that inquiries into inducement liability and DMCA safe harbor eligibility should be conducted independently, despite overlaps between the criteria. The first DMCA safe harbor addressed pertains to transitory digital network communications, which Fung claims only regarding his trackers.
A service provider is not liable for monetary or injunctive relief due to copyright infringement related to the transmission, routing, or provision of connections for material, provided certain conditions are met. These conditions include that the transmission is initiated by someone other than the provider, the process is automated without the provider's selection of material, the provider does not choose the recipients except as an automatic response, no copies of the material are stored in an accessible manner longer than necessary, and the content is transmitted without modification.
The term "service provider" refers to an entity facilitating digital communication without altering the material. The district court dismissed the application of this safe harbor for Fung, stating it did not apply since infringing materials did not pass through Fung’s system. This dismissal was deemed incorrect, as previous rulings clarify that the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. 512(a) does not necessitate the transmission of infringing material. The court noted that service providers are protected for all digital communications, not solely those that infringe.
The district court appeared to hold Fung liable for inducement based on the indexing of dot-torrent files rather than the routing services of Fung’s trackers. It remains unclear whether the liability sought was directly linked to the tracking functions. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the safe harbor is unavailable for Fung’s trackers on other grounds, without determining the impact of their information-generating use on the safe harbor's applicability.
Fung's trackers operate differently from traditional P2P networks like Napster by managing a "swarm" of connections that allow users to download file fragments from multiple sources, rather than selecting specific users. This mechanism means that the tracker, rather than the user, determines which computers will provide the file parts. Consequently, Fung’s trackers do not qualify as “service providers” under the safe harbor provision of 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which requires a provider to merely facilitate connections specified by users. The definition of “service provider” emphasizes the role of merely acting as conduits for information transmission without selecting or linking to copyrighted material. Fung argues that the functions of the tracker are automatic and do not involve material selection, but this does not meet the requisite definition for the safe harbor. If a tracker’s functions exceed the conduit-only definition, it cannot be deemed a service provider, regardless of whether the processes are automatic or manual. Additionally, the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) provides limited liability for service providers regarding user-directed storage of material, but this broader definition of “service provider” does not apply to the limitations established under § 512(a). Therefore, Fung's trackers are not eligible for the protections provided by the safe harbor provisions of copyright law.
Fung is deemed ineligible for the safe harbor provision under 17 U.S.C. 512(c) due to the presence of "red flag" knowledge regarding infringing activities, independent of any notifications from Columbia. The court clarified that the safe harbor is only available if the service provider lacks actual knowledge of infringing material or is unaware of facts indicating infringing activity. While Fung argued that Columbia's notification did not meet statutory requirements, the court noted that Fung's awareness of infringing activities—specifically, the peer-to-peer transfer of pirated content involving torrents on Fung's websites—constituted sufficient grounds for ineligibility. The court emphasized that the statute covers not just storage of infringing content but also activities utilizing such material. The district court's determination that the infringing material did not reside on Fung's servers was incorrect, as the safe harbor requirements should not be read to impose additional conditions not found in the statute. The court also recognized the distinction between actual knowledge of specific infringement and "red flag" knowledge of broader infringing activities, affirming that Fung had the latter.
Fung actively encouraged copyright infringement by prompting users to upload and download copyrighted works, assisting them in accessing copyrighted films, and aiding in burning copyrighted content onto DVDs. The material involved was widely known, making it clear to a reasonable person that the solicited content was copyrighted and not publicly licensed, thus constituting infringement. Fung admitted to using the isoHunt website for downloading infringing material. His actions, while not per se disqualifying him from protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), indicated he had "red flag" knowledge of infringement. Fung's defense, claiming a robust copyright compliance system, was deemed insufficient as mere conclusory statements do not contest material facts needed to avoid summary judgment. Consequently, Columbia Pictures is entitled to summary judgment regarding Fung's eligibility for the 512(c) safe harbor.
Additionally, under § 512(c)(1)(B), a service provider loses safe harbor protection if it receives a financial benefit from infringing activities and has the right and ability to control such activities. Fung met both criteria, rendering him ineligible for the safe harbor. The court emphasized that a direct financial benefit is established by a causal relationship between infringing activities and any financial gain, regardless of the benefit's relative size compared to overall profits.
The inquiry centers on whether the infringing activity serves as a draw for subscribers, rather than merely an additional benefit. The interpretation of the “financial benefit” prong under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) largely arises from previous cases addressing “direct financial benefits” in relation to vicarious liability for copyright infringement, particularly referencing the landmark case Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. The courts have consistently maintained that the financial benefit standard is critical and not merely ancillary. In Ellison, it was determined that the standard was unmet due to insufficient evidence linking customer subscriptions to the availability of infringing material. Similarly, CCBill ruled that hosting infringing content for a fee did not establish requisite financial benefit, citing DMCA legislative history. This history emphasizes that a direct financial benefit cannot simply arise from receiving flat fees for services from individuals engaged in infringing activities. The structure of § 512(c)(1)(B) indicates that the absence of a direct financial benefit is fundamental, while the “right and ability to control” serves as a limiting condition. Courts have found that operators can gain substantial financial benefits from activities that enhance the appeal of their venues to customers seeking infringing content. Importantly, it has not been defined what constitutes “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,” particularly in contexts where a service provider’s revenue is primarily generated from advertising rather than user payments. In this case, Fung's revenue was derived from selling advertising space on his websites, dependent on user engagement with the ads, highlighting an essential distinction in revenue sources related to infringing activities.
Fung's websites contained a significant amount of infringing material, estimated at 90-96%, indicating that his revenue relied heavily on this availability to attract advertisers. He actively induced infringing activities on his sites, directly linking his income from advertising to this content. The revenue generated was contingent upon the number of visitors, primarily those seeking infringing material, which Fung encouraged.
Regarding the "financial benefit" prong of 512(c)(1)(B), Fung's income was directly tied to the infringing activities on his websites. For the second prong, concerning the "right and ability to control," it was established that merely locating infringing material isn't sufficient; substantial influence over user activities is necessary. Fung not only located infringing content but also organized it and assisted users in finding specific materials, demonstrating significant control over the infringing activities on his sites. His actions were comparable to those in Grokster, showing he exerted substantial influence over user conduct.
Due to his involvement in inducing infringing activity and his ability to control it, Fung does not qualify for the 512(c) safe harbor protections. Therefore, he loses any protection against liability for infringing activities on his service.
The court clarifies that the "right and ability to control" under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) entails more than just the capacity to remove infringing material; it requires substantial influence over the users engaging in infringing activities, emphasizing the overall relationship between the service provider and users rather than isolated instances of infringement. This principle aligns with concepts of vicarious liability, which focus on the broader relationship between defendants and infringers. As such, Fung does not qualify for the safe harbor provisions of § 512(c) concerning all infringement activities on the relevant sites.
Regarding the § 512(d) safe harbor for information location tools, a service provider is protected from liability if it does not have actual knowledge of infringing material, is not aware of facts indicating infringement, does not receive a direct financial benefit from the infringement while having the ability to control it, and responds promptly to notifications of claimed infringement. The court affirms summary judgment for Columbia, determining that Fung was aware of circumstances indicating infringement and received financial benefit from it while having the ability to control the infringing activities.
A district court can issue a permanent injunction under 17 U.S.C. 502(a) to prevent copyright infringement. Fung does not dispute the general issuance of such relief but contests the injunction's scope, claiming it is vague and overly burdensome. The court evaluates these claims, beginning with vagueness. Rule 65(d) mandates that injunctions must clearly state their terms and specify the acts they restrain without referring to other documents. Fung argues that the injunction is extraterritorial; however, it explicitly applies only to infringements occurring in the U.S.
Fung's criticisms include the lack of clarity in the injunction's definition of "Infringement-Related Terms," which lists terms associated with copyright infringement but fails to provide a clear standard for what constitutes such terms. This ambiguity could lead to confusion and potential contempt citations. The court notes that the injunction should enable an ordinary person to understand the prohibited conduct. Consequently, the definition of "Infringement-Related Terms" should be revised to include only clearly specified terms, allowing for future modifications based on competent proof to address additional terms. Other provisions of the injunction are similarly vague, such as prohibiting solicitation of users presumed to engage in copyright infringement, indicating a need for clearer language throughout.
The legal document critiques the imprecision of the language in specific paragraphs of an injunction related to copyright infringement, particularly in connection with a situation akin to Grokster targeting former Napster users. The terms “generally understood” and “user base” lack clarity, raising questions about the criteria for determining general understanding and the extent of the user base. Additionally, the phrase “in substantial part” is ambiguous regarding its reference point. Paragraph 3(j) fails to meet Rule 65(d) requirements for specificity and must be removed.
Paragraph 3(l) similarly lacks clarity in prohibiting access to files from "well-known infringing source sites" and must be amended to specify particular sites. The injunction also mandates Fung to have a mechanism to prevent infringement of titles provided by Plaintiffs, but Fung argues the lists contain errors, which he is compelled to correct. The court clarifies that Fung is not obligated to rectify Plaintiffs' errors.
Furthermore, the injunction's provisions may unduly burden Fung by potentially barring him from future legitimate employment in technology companies, which could be misinterpreted as infringing copyright. The court agrees this restriction is excessive and should be amended to avoid hindering Fung's employment opportunities.
Ultimately, the court affirms the summary judgment for Plaintiffs regarding liability and Fung's claims to safe harbors under 17 U.S.C. 512(a), (c), and (d), while modifying the permanent injunction and awarding costs to Plaintiffs. The court leaves the final wording of the amended injunction to the district court.
