Doe Ex Dem. Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson

Citations: 24 U.S. 332; 6 L. Ed. 488; 11 Wheat. 332; 1826 U.S. LEXIS 316

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 18, 1826; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Doe, ex dem. Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson and Others, the plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court of Kentucky, claiming title to lands based on a patent issued to Robertus S. Brantz, an alien, in 1784. They presented evidence of Brantz's naturalization in Maryland and a Kentucky legislative act from 1796 that confirmed his estate despite his alien status, specifically stating that the act would not affect the rights of others, only those of the Commonwealth. Upon Brantz's death in 1797, his son Johannes, also an alien, executed a power of attorney to sell the land to pay debts, transferring rights to Isaac and Nicholas Governeur.

The defendants claimed title through a grant to Duncan Rose from Virginia in 1785, asserting a clear chain of title. The plaintiffs requested jury instructions to rule in their favor if Brantz's grants covered the disputed lands and he left no capable heirs. Conversely, the defendants sought instructions asserting that Brantz's alien status rendered his patent void, and that upon his death, any title would revert to the Commonwealth if he had no citizen heirs. They argued that under the compact between Virginia and Kentucky, the Kentucky act could not supersede the Virginia grant to Rose, thus supporting their claim. The plaintiffs were challenged on their connection to Brantz's title, which they argued was insufficient to invalidate the Virginia grant.

The legal document addresses the interplay between two legislative acts from Kentucky (1796 and 1799) and a grant to Duncan Rose, asserting that the acts should be interpreted together, with the 1799 act clarifying the 1796 act. The plaintiff's title is deemed inferior to Rose's grant, which takes precedence if it encompasses the disputed land. The Circuit Court judges were split on jury instructions concerning the validity of the plaintiff’s claim. 

The plaintiff's counsel contends that Robertus S. Brantz, upon naturalization, acquired an indefeasible title to the lands under Virginia law, positing that Rose's junior grant is void and does not impede the title transfer to I. and N. Governeur by Kentucky's 1799 legislative act. Conversely, the defendants argue that Brantz, being an alien at the time of his grant, did not receive title, thus upholding Rose's prior legal claim. They maintain that Kentucky's acts cannot override Virginia's grant due to their compact from 1789. 

Sampson, representing the plaintiff, argues that established court precedents confirm that aliens can hold property until a legal finding proves otherwise. He states that once a title is granted, it cannot be revoked without due legal process, and the presumption of citizenship applies until proven otherwise. He refutes the notion that the grant to an alien is inherently void, citing case law that indicates the title remains valid unless the defect (alienage) is evident on the grant's face. Thus, Brantz's grant is not void, as the alien status does not appear in the document.

R. S. Brantz's naturalization had a retrospective effect that validated his title to land, previously vulnerable to being challenged through an inquest of office. Even without naturalization, the act of 1796 would have confirmed his title. Brantz's naturalization in Maryland granted him full citizenship rights in Kentucky, including the ability to hold land under the Articles of Confederation. Although his title might have been perceived as flawed under common law, the Virginia statute of 1779 remedied this by allowing foreigners to transfer land rights and requiring them to become citizens or transfer their certificates of survey within a specified timeframe.

The text explains the distinction between government grants and private conveyances. While a private grant to an alien is effective, government grants do not confer rights on aliens, as it would serve no lawful purpose to allow an alien to receive land only for it to revert to the government. An alien cannot inherit or acquire property through legal mechanisms because it would be an ineffective legal act. This principle is rooted in considerations of national policy rather than strict feudal law. In Virginia, the Commonwealth holds the title to public lands, and grants must adhere to established legal provisions. The compact of 1789 ensures that vested and potential land claims are honored according to Virginia law, indicating that any title Brantz may have held would revert to the Commonwealth upon his death without qualified heirs. Consequently, Rose’s interest in the land, under his patent, became legitimate and secure, protected from interference by Kentucky grants under the compact's provisions.

Political societies and governments are obligated to uphold justice, morality, and good faith in contracts with individuals. The 1785 grant to Rose constituted a contract between Virginia and the grantee. If an individual sells land without title but later acquires it, the title benefits the grantee. A vendor cannot claim an outstanding title against a vendee. Governments, like individuals, must adhere to just and equitable principles. The legal maxim that the king or commonwealth can do no wrong signifies moral responsibility, ensuring that government powers cannot harm citizens.

Virginia could not breach its contract with Rose by using Brantz's interest, which lapsed in 1797 due to his death without heirs. A Virginia legislative act in 1799 attempting to grant land to Governeur, disregarding Rose's vested interest, would violate the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against impairing contracts. Such a law from Kentucky is similarly prohibited by its treaty with Virginia. The acts of 1796 and 1799 must be read together; the 1796 act confirmed Brantz's title while preserving rights of others, and the 1799 act transferred the estate to Governeur, maintaining the original terms.

The construction of these acts aligns with good faith and the principles of justice. It recognized vested interests that could be transferred legally, distinguishing them from mere equitable interests. The court referenced several local decisions and clarified that Brantz's title remained intact during the war due to a 1779 Virginia act validating certain surveys. The distinction between grants from private individuals and those from the crown is well established in legal authority.

The case originates from the Circuit Court of Kentucky, concerning a dispute over land grants from Virginia. Brantz received two grants totaling ten thousand acres in Kentucky on October 11, 1784, while Rose received a similar grant on December 2, 1785. Brantz was initially an alien but became naturalized shortly after his patent was issued, prior to Rose's grant.

Doubts regarding the validity of Brantz's patent arose early on, leading the Kentucky legislature in 1796 to affirm his estate against the Commonwealth while allowing the act to operate as if it had not been enacted concerning other parties. Brantz, an alien when the patent was issued, died in 1797, leaving his son, J. B., also an alien and unable to inherit. J. B. executed a letter of attorney to sell the land, unaware of his alien status, which the purchasers, the Governeurs, later discovered. They secured another act from the state affirming their estate, thus establishing the plaintiffs' title.

The defendant’s title is traced through a patent to Duncan Rose. The case record includes a general instruction from the plaintiffs regarding their right to recover, which is uncontested aside from the defendant's arguments concerning the implications of the alien status of both Brantz and J. B., as well as the compact between Virginia and Kentucky regarding property rights.

Key issues include whether R. S. B.’s alien status rendered the patent void and if subsequent naturalization could retroactively validate the patent. The authorities support the relevance of naturalization, particularly regarding its equivalency between Maryland and Kentucky as per the Articles of Confederation, which the defendant has not disputed. 

The central legal question posed is whether a patent granted to an alien is entirely void. The defendant argues that common law supports this view, a position that the court finds unsustainable. Although Blackstone's writings are referenced, the court suggests that a broader interpretation of his context indicates that a grant to an alien does not confer the right to hold land, reinforcing that the defendant's position lacks legal foundation.

Brooke's Abr. Patent and Finch's Law are cited regarding the legal status of aliens in relation to land grants. The discussion highlights a misconception that an alien must be made a denizen to accept a grant. It clarifies that becoming a denizen allows an alien to hold land against the king, but does not inherently grant rights to acquire land. Historical cases, notably Bagot's case, illustrate that a grant to an alien does not imply a dual purpose of granting rights and making the alien a denizen. The courts have consistently ruled that a king’s grant cannot operate with an implied intention that is not explicitly stated. Further, while Finch's Law indicates that aliens cannot maintain certain actions, it does not directly support the argument against grants to aliens. The excerpt indicates that the prevailing legal principle permits the king to grant lands to various parties, including aliens, unless a specific exception is established.

Arguments are presented regarding the legal status of aliens in relation to property grants. It is posited that the situation of an alien is analogous to that of an heir, widow, or husband, where the king can reclaim property without formal office found. While an alien can acquire property through purchase, this interest is defeasible upon the king's claim. The reasoning for distinguishing between these cases is critiqued, particularly the principle of "Nil frustra agit lex," which suggests that the law should not act in vain. This principle is challenged as it presupposes the validity of the grant and contradicts established legal principles that differentiate between acquisitions by deed and by operation of law.

It is established that aliens can hold property obtained through deeds until a formal claim is made. This legal stance is rooted in societal stability and protection against arbitrary actions. A significant rationale is presented from Bacon, asserting that every resident is presumed a natural-born subject owing allegiance to the king, which is reinforced when an alien secures a grant from the sovereign.

Virginia law permits aliens to purchase land warrants and complete necessary steps for obtaining patents, allowing them to exercise rights over their interests like citizens. These provisions do not inherently prohibit grants to aliens. The law acknowledges that acquiring a warrant grants a beneficial interest in land, which is devisable and assignable, although concerns remain regarding the potential for that interest to be subject to escheat.

The law aimed to encourage aliens to buy property and settle in the country by expanding their rights rather than limiting them. Although aliens could not be immediately naturalized, they could initiate arrangements for establishing themselves in anticipation of naturalization. The Virginia law intended to protect their rights concerning land acquired before a grant, while rights acquired through patents left them subject to typical alien restrictions. The Virginia act does not affect the parties' rights in this case.

The defendant's arguments focus on the Kentucky act of 1799, which affirmed the interests of purchasers under a letter of attorney after the father's death without a direct heir. The argument suggests that the land reverted to the State upon the father's death, allowing the junior patent to attach in the usual manner when prior grants are nullified. It posits that the 1799 act constituted a junior grant that the State could not make detrimental to the prior grantee, in line with general principles and the compact between Kentucky and Virginia.

In evaluating this argument, the Court cannot favor the defendant by replacing Kentucky with Virginia, granting him rights against Virginia. Furthermore, for a junior patent to attach to escheated land, it must be established that escheated land is subject to patent, yet the act only allows patents for waste and unappropriated lands. This principle has been upheld in both Kentucky and Virginia.

The defendant's claims based on moral rights and estoppel assume the State could not override his patent rights, except in cases of fraud or contract, which typically do not apply to government actions. If fraud were relevant, it would pertain to the patentee if the land wasn't vacant, as the State does not intend to grant someone else's property. The principle of "caveat emptor" applies strongly here. The suggestion that a junior grant could be contingent on the occurrence of escheat challenges both principle and policy, as such a situation could remain unresolved for extended periods, rendering it untenable.

The decision on the initial grounds undermines the defendant's claims based on a junior patent, as the validity of the junior patent hinges solely on the invalidity of the original patent granted to Brantz. If the Brantz patent is nullified, the land would remain unclaimed, and the junior patent would not retroactively validate the defendant's title, which is based on a void grant from the State of Virginia. The court finds that Virginia had already relinquished all rights to Brantz, who was eligible to hold the title until an official finding. Thus, the junior grant to Rose is deemed completely void since the State had no title to confer. Furthermore, the court emphasizes that any potential title reverting to the Commonwealth upon Brantz's death without heirs would not benefit the defendant, as his patent only permitted surveying unclaimed lands. The defendant's argument that Brantz’s status as an alien rendered the original grant invalid is refuted, as common law principles allow aliens to hold title until official findings. However, Virginia's laws explicitly indicate that aliens are not entitled to take land by grant, affirming that Brantz's original grant was intended to exclude such rights.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius dictates that the privileges enumerated for aliens, which derogate from common law, exclude the ability to obtain a grant while remaining an alien. Brantz's grant, acquired during his alien status, was unauthorized and void due to violations of common and statute law, as well as land office regulations. Essential requirements for a valid grant were absent. Under the compact of 1789, legislative acts of Kentucky from 1796 and 1799 cannot invalidate Virginia's prior grant to Rose. Even if Rose's title were not the legal priority due to Brantz's alienage, Rose had a vested interest in the land from Virginia law predating Brantz's grant. The compact ensures that all private land rights derived from Virginia law prior to its operation remain valid and are governed by existing state laws. It also states that no new grants from the proposed state shall interfere with prior Virginia warrants. Although it was argued that royal grants are only void if alienage is apparent on the grant, the concept of a void grant means it is ineffective if invalidating facts are proven in court. The case of Elmendorf v. Carmichael does not hold authority in this context as it did not address the compact's construction, which is a matter of federal jurisdiction. The cited case of Craig v. Radford is distinguishable because the claimant, Sutherland, was not an alien at the time he received his bounty warrant.