Tarek Al-Birekdar v. Chrysler Group, LLC

Docket: 08-3780

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 11, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Chrysler Group, LLC (Chrysler) appeals a jury verdict favoring Tarek Al-Birekdar on a retaliation claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Al-Birekdar cross-appeals, asserting that the district court wrongly granted a directed verdict on his punitive damages claim and improperly reduced his attorney’s fees. The appellate court affirms the district court's judgment but remands for consideration of Al-Birekdar's request for additional attorney fees related to the defense of his verdict.

Al-Birekdar, a Muslim, began working as a skilled-trades electrician for Chrysler in 2000 and was terminated in 2005 for taking an unapproved vacation. He alleged discrimination and retaliation, claiming a hostile work environment fostered by supervisors Shorna Coffey and Ed Schoonover. His retaliation claim hinged on his termination being a response to a discrimination charge he filed with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) after an incident involving a racially offensive remark made by a co-worker, Ken Frankenberg, in 2003.

Following the incident, Al-Birekdar was placed on indefinite suspension, leading him to complain to human resources. His subsequent charge of discrimination outlined ongoing mistreatment. An investigation revealed Frankenberg's discriminatory behavior, resulting in his suspension and a change to Al-Birekdar's suspension duration. However, the MCHR concluded that Chrysler had adequately addressed the situation, finding no disparate treatment.

Chrysler's vacation request policy, governed by a collective-bargaining agreement, requires written requests but allows for informal verbal requests. Supervisors may also retroactively approve vacation days.

In March 2005, Al-Birekdar submitted a vacation request form where he mistakenly indicated July 11–17 instead of his intended June 11–17 dates. This request was approved for July 11–17. Al-Birekdar did not realize his error until after his termination. He informed his then-supervisor, Schoonover, of his planned vacation starting June 11 and sought permission to work a half-day on June 10, which was granted by his new supervisor, Coffey. However, upon further inquiry, Coffey and Schoonover found no record of approval for the June vacation dates, leading to Al-Birekdar being marked absent without leave (AWOL) as he was not coded as on vacation in the company system. According to company policy, being AWOL for five days without proper notice could lead to termination. Consequently, Al-Birekdar received a termination notice on June 18, shortly after returning from what he believed was an approved vacation.

Al-Birekdar filed a grievance against his termination, with the union steward, Jim Baines, noting that attempts to negotiate a lesser penalty were unsuccessful as management aimed to "teach [Al-Birekdar] a lesson." Testimony revealed no previous skilled-trades employee had been terminated under similar circumstances. Al-Birekdar sought $191,000 in damages, primarily for lost wages totaling $168,791.30, calculated based on his average income from prior years. He also presented evidence of penalties incurred from early withdrawals from his pension and 401(k) accounts.

Al-Birekdar borrowed approximately $65,000 from his wife's family and friends at 5% annual interest for over two years and incurred $1,244 in out-of-pocket medical expenses after losing insurance upon termination. He also took credit card cash advances totaling $5,748.70 at an interest rate of 6.572%, without providing evidence of accrued interest. Before the jury deliberated, Chrysler filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) against Al-Birekdar's claims of discrimination, retaliation, and punitive damages, which the district court granted for the punitive damages claim only. The jury ruled in favor of Chrysler on the discrimination claim but awarded Al-Birekdar $197,000 in economic damages and $3,000 for emotional distress on the retaliation claim. Chrysler's renewed JMOL and motion for a new trial were denied. Al-Birekdar's attorney requested $174,570.50 in fees at a rate of $365 per hour for 478.3 hours, which the district court reduced to $250 per hour based on local precedents. The court also excluded 33.1 hours for administrative tasks and applied a 50% global cut due to limited overall success, resulting in a fee award of $55,650.00.

On appeal, Chrysler raised three arguments: the jury instruction on the retaliation claim was improper, the district court erred in denying JMOL and the new trial motion, and the jury's damages award lacked evidentiary support. The appellate court reviewed the jury instructions for abuse of discretion and upheld the use of the "contributing factor" standard for MHRA retaliation claims, affirming the district court's decisions on all points raised by Chrysler.

The district court did not err in denying Chrysler's request to use the phrase "decision to discharge," as the language used adequately conveyed the law regarding discrimination claims. The difference between the phrases "in such decision to discharge" and "in such discharge" was deemed inconsequential. Chrysler's motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and for a new trial, both challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, were also denied. The review for JMOL is de novo, affirming the jury's verdict unless no reasonable jury could find for the prevailing party, while the denial of a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Al-Birekdar presented sufficient evidence under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), including testimony suggesting retaliation by a human-resources manager during his termination. Although Chrysler offered an alternative rationale for the termination, the jury's rejection of this rationale stands.

Chrysler contested the sufficiency of the economic damages awarded by the jury. The review of damages is similar; the verdict will not be overturned unless no reasonable juror could have reached the conclusion. Testimony regarding damages does not need to be exact, as damages can be determined through reasonable inference. Al-Birekdar provided specific testimony on financial losses related to early retirement fund withdrawals and submitted supporting financial documents. Although some evidence was unclear, it was deemed sufficient as damages need only be approximate.

On cross-appeal, Al-Birekdar argued that the district court improperly denied punitive damages and unreasonably reduced attorney's fees. The court affirmed the refusal to submit punitive damages to the jury but reversed the reduction of attorney's fees.

Al-Birekdar contends that the district court incorrectly granted Chrysler's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) regarding his punitive damages claim. Under Missouri law, punitive damages require proof of the defendant's "outrageous" conduct, characterized by evil motive or reckless indifference, with clear and convincing evidence. Although the trial evidence supported the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim, it was insufficient to demonstrate Chrysler's actions met the criteria for punitive damages, justifying the district court's decision not to present this issue to the jury.

Additionally, Al-Birekdar challenges the district court's reduction of his attorney's fee award. In diversity actions, state law applies to attorney fees unless overridden by federal statutes or rules. Missouri law permits recovery of attorney fees only if authorized by contract or statute, allowing the district court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). The district court's discretion in awarding fees is respected unless there is a clear abuse, which is tied to its unique familiarity with the case.

Al-Birekdar disputes the court's assessment of reasonable hourly rates and services, relying on the lodestar method to evaluate attorney fees. The court's decision to reduce hours for administrative tasks and lower the hourly rate was deemed appropriate, as it carefully analyzed relevant case law. Furthermore, the district court's global reduction of fees by 50% was justified due to Al-Birekdar's limited success. The U.S. Supreme Court's Hensley decision outlines that fees for unrelated unsuccessful claims cannot be awarded, while fees for related claims may be compensated. The court found no sufficient relation between Al-Birekdar's claims, particularly in light of his failure to secure punitive damages. 

The district court's judgment is affirmed, but the request for attorney's fees related to post-trial motions and appellate work is remanded for the district court's discretion.