Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 12, 1825; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves an action of ejectment where the plaintiff's title derives from a patent issued to John Rice. The defendant claimed ownership through a statute of limitations defense, asserting that he possessed the land covered by Rice's patent. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's evidence, arguing that it pertained to a different tract of land than that covered by the patent. The Court noted that a survey, which was not conducted, would have clarified the land's identity but was not necessary for the decision at hand.
Both parties acknowledged that the land in the defendant's possession was the same as that in dispute, but the patents indicated differing descriptions. The defendant’s title depended on establishing a connection to the patent through the sale of Rice's inchoate interest to Solomon Kitts. The defendant produced a certified copy of Kitts' will to show he devised the land to trustees from whom the defendant derived his title. The plaintiff objected to this evidence, but the Court allowed it to go to the jury, ultimately addressing the legal sufficiency of this evidence regarding the devise of land. The Court recognized that the ordinary's probate is not typically considered evidence of a will's execution in ejectment cases.
The necessity to produce an original will in court is emphasized, except when the will is lost or unavailable, in which case secondary evidence is permissible based on the case's nature. Proof must be presented before the court handling the case, contrasting with ex parte proceedings where an heir lacks cross-examination opportunities. Initially, a dispute existed between common law and ecclesiastical courts regarding the probate of wills that included land devises. Common law required the original will's production, while probate consigned it to court archives. A compromise allowed the original will to be returned under security.
Laws governing land in Tennessee dictate that all devises must adhere to Tennessee law. The state's authority over this is absolute, and wills of realty executed elsewhere must comply with Tennessee laws. The Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause could potentially influence the recognition of wills recorded in other states, but this case is distinguished due to Maryland's laws not acknowledging the offered probate as evidence in land disputes.
The legal precedent from Smith's lessee v. Steele illustrates that, while a copy of the will and its probate may be presented as evidence of the original, the jury retains discretion in their findings. Maryland's probate law of 1798 may have established that probates serve as evidence in local courts, but without proof of established construction and practice under that law, this court is inclined to maintain its interpretation.
The legal interpretation focuses on the 4th section of chapter 2, article 3 of the relevant act, which states that an attested copy of any will, testament, or codicil recorded in an authorized office may be admitted as evidence in court, contingent on the original's execution being contestable until probate is obtained. The clause's broad language could suggest applicability to land wills; however, previous sections clarify that validity for real estate devises requires specific formalities and mandates the delivery of all wills to the Register of the Court of Probates after the testator's death. Importantly, the act does not permit registering wills without probate and only addresses probates for wills concerning goods and chattels. The Orphan's Court can probate wills affecting land if they also concern personal property, yet such probates only establish validity for the personalty. Thus, the construction of the clause must align with existing state laws regarding real estate wills. The court concludes that Maryland law does not allow the offered document to serve as evidence in a land dispute, nor does Tennessee law recognize it as valid evidence. Consequently, since the court's instructions favored the defendants generally and the impact of individual evidence on the jury could not be differentiated, the judgment was reversed, and a new trial was ordered, while other significant questions in the case were not addressed at this time.
