Jerry K. Thompson v. State of Indiana

Citation: Not availableDocket: 49S00-9507-DP-869

Court: Indiana Supreme Court; December 22, 1998; Indiana; State Supreme Court

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Jerry K. Thompson was convicted of two counts of murder, two counts of robbery, and one count of carrying a handgun without a license, with the trial court sentencing him to death for the murders. The State's evidence included Thompson's prior possession of the murder weapon, which had been stolen during an earlier murder. This evidence was deemed inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rules 402, 403, and 404(b) as it prejudiced Thompson's right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed Thompson's convictions and ordered a new trial due to the extensive and improper evidence regarding the prior murder.

The factual background highlights that on March 14, 1991, two men were shot at Hillis Auto Sales. A handgun recovered from a vehicle driven by Thompson and an accomplice was linked to the murders. An accomplice testified that Thompson shot the victims and they robbed them, but this testimony was influenced by a prior felony charge against him that was dismissed in exchange for his testimony. 

Additionally, the trial court erred by informing prospective jurors about the death penalty information and Thompson's prior murder conviction during the voir dire process, which could lead to prejudice during the guilt phase of the trial. This was against established legal precedent, emphasizing the need for jurors to remain unaware of a defendant's criminal history until the sentencing phase.

The jury is considered impermissibly tainted if informed of certain aggravating circumstances, such as prior murder convictions or life sentences, before the penalty phase. It was deemed erroneous to inform jurors of Thompson’s prior murder conviction before this phase. Previous cases illustrate that jurors' exposure to prior convictions can lead to reversible errors. Evidence of prior uncharged misconduct, specifically the murder of Wesley Crandall Jr., was introduced to establish that Thompson had access to the murder weapon used in subsequent killings. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) generally prohibits the use of other crimes to prove character but allows such evidence for purposes like motive, intent, or identity. Thompson argued that excessive evidence about Crandall's murder led the jury to an improper inference about his character, while the State contended that the evidence was relevant to establishing Thompson's identity. The admissibility of this evidence was disputed from the beginning, with Thompson seeking to exclude any mention of Crandall's death, arguing that it was prejudicial and irrelevant, although the State maintained it was necessary for proving identity.

Thompson's second motion in limine argued against the admissibility of evidence under the identity exception, asserting that the Indianapolis killings and Crandall murder were not signature crimes. However, he acknowledged that the State could present evidence showing his access to the murder weapon used in the Hillis and Beeler murders, specifically that the weapon was found during a police stop of Thompson and Percy three months post-crimes. The trial court denied Thompson's motion, permitting the State to introduce evidence of how the weapon was obtained, concluding that Thompson's access was relevant to proving his involvement as the killer. 

In opening arguments, the State detailed the Crandall murder, recounting Thompson's prior conviction for killing Wesley Crandall in 1991, which established his history of violence and theft. The prosecution highlighted Percy’s testimony regarding Thompson’s involvement in the murders, emphasizing Percy’s credibility as a critical element of the case. The defense challenged Percy’s reliability, urging jurors to consider his potential motivations for testifying. During Percy’s testimony about the Crandall murder, the defense objected, reiterating that this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 404(b).

Thompson challenged Percy’s credibility, prompting the State to argue the necessity of contextual details for the jury regarding Percy’s testimony on Thompson's acquisition of the gun used in the Hillis and Beeler murders. The defense countered that the State was restricted by Rule 404(b) and could not introduce prejudicial evidence or retry Thompson for the Crandall murder. The trial court permitted a brief explanation of Thompson's presence at the Crandall residence.

Percy testified that on February 14, 1991, he and Thompson went to Crandall's house to buy marijuana, during which Percy brought a sawed-off shotgun. After a prearranged signal, Thompson attacked Crandall, who was knocked down, and attempted to fire the gun, which malfunctioned. Thompson then covered Crandall's head with a pillow and shot him. Percy asserted that Thompson shot Crandall, although he did not witness the precise moment of the shooting. They later returned to Indianapolis, each carrying bags containing evidence from the crime scene.

In the following weeks, Thompson altered the firearms' serial numbers taken from Crandall's home, though he retained a handgun connected to the Hillis and Beeler murders. During their detention by Illinois police in June 1991, they were found with two of the guns. Under cross-examination, Percy revealed he faced no charges related to the Crandall murder but had received a deal for his cooperation. Despite the defense's lack of direct challenge to Percy’s testimony about Crandall’s murder, the State provided additional evidence, including a forensic pathologist's findings and testimonies from witnesses that further supported Percy’s account.

An evidentiary dispute arose regarding whether the pretrial ruling allowed the State to present evidence of Thompson's Crandall murder conviction. The State argued this evidence was relevant for establishing identity and addressing Percy’s credibility, claiming it relied on the pretrial ruling during opening arguments.

The defense contended that the admission of Percy's conviction was inappropriate, arguing it did not help establish the events at Hillis Auto Sales on the day of the murders and was overly prejudicial. They maintained that the court's pretrial ruling allowed only evidence related to the gun used in the murders, which had been taken from Crandall at the time of his death. Despite these objections, the trial court permitted testimony from a New Castle Police officer about Thompson’s prior trial for Crandall's murder, including the admission of various related documents.

During closing arguments, the State praised Percy for his role in solving the murders of Crandall and the two victims connected to Hillis Auto Sales, suggesting Percy helped prevent wrongful convictions. The State acknowledged Percy's partial culpability but differentiated his actions from Thompson’s, asserting that Percy did not commit the murders. They emphasized the relevance of the Crandall case to Thompson's identity, linking him to the weapon involved.

In contrast, the defense warned the jury against allowing the events of the Crandall murder to influence their judgment on Thompson's case, arguing that Percy was not credible and had a motive to lie to avoid his own prosecution. The defense suggested that Percy could have been responsible for the murders himself. In rebuttal, the State argued that the connection between Thompson and the gun used in the Crandall murder was critical evidence of his guilt, contending that the jury should regard the previous conviction as supportive of their case against Thompson.

The State framed the exoneration of two wrongfully convicted men as an opportunity to complete a cycle of justice, contingent on the jury's conviction in the current case. Under Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of past crimes is generally inadmissible to prevent jurors from inferring a defendant's criminal tendency. However, evidence may be admitted for other purposes not specified in the rule, unless it introduces undue prejudice. The court must assess the relevance of such evidence to issues other than the defendant's propensity and weigh its probative value against its prejudicial impact according to Rule 403.

In this case, Thompson's alleged theft of the murder weapon was relevant, as it connected him to the crime and supported circumstantial proof of his involvement. Thompson, while acknowledging his presence in the car with the weapon, did not stipulate to prior access or the theft itself, instead challenging the credibility of a witness, Percy. The trial court's choice to admit evidence related to Thompson's access to the gun, bolstered by additional testimony, fell within its discretion.

However, the admission of excessive evidence regarding the murder of Crandall—specifically details from witnesses about the nature of Crandall's death—was deemed unnecessary and potentially prejudicial. This included testimony from a forensic pathologist and another witness recounting an execution-style shooting, which was irrelevant to the theft charge and violated the standards of admissibility, warranting a reversal of the decision based on abuse of discretion.

Thompson's conviction for murdering Crandall was deemed irrelevant to proving his access to the murder weapon. The State's argument that details from the Crandall murder aided in establishing identity was rejected, as the identity exception to the ban on propensity evidence applies primarily to signature crimes with distinctive similarities. In this instance, the only commonality between the Crandall murder and the Indianapolis killings was the use of firearms, which involved different weapons. The State's broader interpretation of the identity exception was dismissed, as prior cases only supported the need to show access to the murder weapon with appropriate factual context. The State's alternative claim that the evidence was necessary for attacking witness Percy’s credibility was also inadequate. Corroborative evidence must meet specific criteria, including relevance and materiality, and the evidence presented regarding Crandall's murder lacked relevance to Percy’s credibility, as Percy did not testify about either the murder or Thompson's conviction. The prosecutor's assertion that the conviction validated Percy’s testimony was deemed unfounded, as the jury lacked knowledge of the Crandall trial's complexities. Moreover, under Rule 403, the highly prejudicial nature of evidence regarding Thompson's prior conviction did not outweigh any potential probative value, reinforcing the principle that one crime cannot be used to establish another distinct crime.

In Loveless v. State, the court ruled that the erroneous admission of a defendant’s prior alleged involvement in burglaries necessitated a new trial, emphasizing the fundamental principle in criminal evidence law against using prior misconduct to establish criminal charges. Numerous cases illustrate this, such as Swain v. State and Pirnat v. State, where the admission of prior convictions was deemed prejudicial and resulted in reversals. Even indirect references to prior convictions are impermissible; for instance, in United States v. Cox, the admission of a rap sheet was reversible error. Detailed accounts of prior offenses, especially violent ones, pose significant risks of unfair prejudice. In United States v. Ostrowsky, while the fact of a prior killing was admissible to establish the stolen status of a vehicle, the graphic details of the killing were ruled as unfairly prejudicial. Applying this reasoning, the court found that evidence related to a prior murder in Thompson's case was similarly prejudicial, as the details could improperly influence the jury's perception, potentially leading to wrongful inferences about Thompson’s guilt in separate crimes. The prosecution's framing of Thompson's actions as a continuous criminal pattern further heightened the risk of prejudice, reinforcing the decision to reverse the conviction due to the improper admission of evidence that failed to meet the requirements of Evidence Rule 403.

Thompson's challenge to Percy’s credibility did not permit the introduction of all evidence related to the Crandall murder. The State cannot present excessive and prejudicial details of prior crimes simply because some evidence is relevant. Rule 404(b) establishes that evidence of prior misconduct is generally prejudicial, and its admission must be limited to what is necessary to prove relevant facts. In this case, evidence regarding Thompson’s prior conviction and the nature of the shooting was excessive and likely influenced the jury's decision, undermining Thompson’s right to a fair trial.

The errors in admitting this evidence were not harmless, as Percy’s credibility was pivotal to the case. His testimony linked Thompson to the crime scenes, and the jury's belief in him may have been swayed by the improperly admitted evidence, which the State highlighted throughout the trial. This sustained emphasis on prior misconduct further compounded the prejudice against Thompson.

Consequently, the convictions must be reversed to uphold the right to a fair trial. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial in this scenario, as the reversal is based on evidentiary errors. However, if the reviewing court finds the evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction, double jeopardy would prevent retrial. Evidence is considered sufficient if it allows a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The review clarifies that evidence is not reweighed nor witness credibility assessed. Percy’s testimony implicates him as either an accomplice or a direct observer of Thompson’s criminal actions, sufficient for a conviction on its own, as a capital conviction can rely solely on an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony (Lowery v. State). The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a retrial. The previous convictions and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. Chief Justice Shepard concurs but notes that while evidence improperly admitted during the State's case led to reversal, some may be admissible as rebuttal, depending on the case's presentation. 

Thompson's challenges regarding the testimonies of gun dealers related to the murder weapon are addressed. The court finds the admission of Velma Brown's testimony relevant to establishing Thompson's theft of the murder weapon. However, the testimony of Jeff Vaughn concerning a different gun was deemed irrelevant, with no indication of prejudice to Thompson. The court concludes that the impact of Vaughn’s testimony was negligible amidst more significant evidence. The document reiterates the principle that a jury should understand the context of a criminal charge to make an informed decision.