Title Max v. Hurst (In re Northington)

Docket: Case Number: 15-40877-JTL

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia; April 29, 2016; Us Bankruptcy; United States Bankruptcy Court

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A Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay was filed by Title Max on January 8, 2016, seeking to pursue state rights against a 2006 Toyota Avalon. A hearing took place on February 2, 2016, where the parties stipulated to facts, and the Court established a briefing schedule. The primary legal issue is whether res judicata prevents Title Max from contesting a confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

Key findings include that the Debtor entered into a pawn transaction with Title Max on August 27, 2015, where the Debtor exchanged the vehicle's title for a cash advance of $5,253, with no obligation to repay or redeem the vehicle. The pawn matured on September 26, 2015, and the Debtor had until October 26, 2015, to redeem it, which he did not do. The Debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on October 2, 2015, which extended his redemption period to December 1, 2015, but he still failed to redeem the vehicle and remains in possession of it.

The Court confirmed the Debtor's Chapter 13 plan on December 21, 2015, proposing to pay Title Max as fully secured with a 5% interest rate and monthly payments of $160 on a debt of $5,825, while the vehicle’s value is listed at $7,000. Title Max filed a secured claim on February 8, 2015, for $5,846.95 with a 5% interest rate, secured by the vehicle.

Under Georgia law, a pawn transaction is a loan secured by pledged goods, allowing redemption within a specified period. The borrower has a thirty-day redemption window post-maturity, which the Bankruptcy Code extends by sixty days from the petition date.

Title Max contends that the Debtor’s right to redemption was not part of the bankruptcy estate when the plan was confirmed, arguing that this right had expired beforehand. Conversely, the Debtor asserts that he possessed a legal right of redemption at the time of filing his petition, which did not lapse prior to the plan's confirmation. Under 11 U.S.C. § 541, the bankruptcy estate includes all legal or equitable interests of the debtor as of case commencement. The court in In re Howard determined that a right of redemption becomes property of the estate if a debtor files for bankruptcy while still holding that right. However, in that case, the right had expired prepetition, leading to the conclusion that it was not part of the estate.

When the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 petition on October 2, 2015, the grace period had not yet expired. Title Max acknowledged the Debtor retained both a possessory interest and a statutory right of redemption at the case commencement, which constituted property of the estate. Title Max argues that the right to redeem the vehicle lapsed when the Debtor did not make a lump sum payment by December 1. Some Georgia courts have held that a debtor must exercise the right of redemption by paying the full price within sixty days under 11 U.S.C. § 108(b). If a debtor fails to do so, any interest in the vehicle is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate. 

In cases like In re Paul and In re Oglesby, debtors were not in possession of their vehicles at case commencement, resulting in no interests being part of their bankruptcy estates. However, the Debtor in this case was in possession of the vehicle at the time of filing and remains so. Consequently, the vehicles were considered property of the bankruptcy estate at the time of the order of relief. Additionally, the courts in Paul and Oglesby did not address the res judicata implications of a confirmed plan, nor did they issue a confirmation order.

Creditors had the opportunity to object to the debtor's plan. Title Max cited *Moore v. Complete Cash Holdings, LLC* to support its stance, where debtors failed to notify the correct party in interest regarding their Chapter 13 confirmation, leading to complications. Unlike in *Moore*, Title Max was properly listed in the Debtor’s Schedule D and received notice of the plan and confirmation hearing. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), debtors may modify secured claims through their plan, but 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) imposes a time limit on state law redemption rights. The courts are divided on reconciling these provisions, but many agree that § 108(b) expands, rather than limits, debtor rights under the Bankruptcy Code. Courts have affirmed that as long as the redemption period hasn't expired prior to the bankruptcy filing, a Chapter 13 plan can address claims. The Bankruptcy Code encourages Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 by allowing modifications of secured creditor rights. The relationship between state redemption rights and the Bankruptcy Code is not about supremacy but rather about establishing the debtor's rights at the time of the bankruptcy petition. The filing of a Chapter 13 plan is effective against a creditor only if their rights can be classified as a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101. Title Max contends it had no modification rights under § 1322 because it was no longer the secured claim holder as of December 1.

A "claim" is defined under Section 101(5) as the right to payment or the right to an equitable remedy for breach or performance related to a payment right, regardless of its status (e.g., disputed or undisputed). In Georgia, pawn transactions are considered non-recourse loans where the borrower is expected to repay the amount advanced, making the pawnbroker a holder of a contingent claim. Title Max, as a holder of such a claim, can have its claim modified under the Debtor's Chapter 13 plan. 

The Bankruptcy Code requires a hearing for confirmation of plans, with creditors having the right to object (11 U.S.C. 1324(a)). Objections must be filed before the confirmation hearing, and if no objections are timely filed, the court may assume the plan was proposed in good faith without needing further evidence (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3015(f)). An order confirming a plan binds the debtor and creditors, regardless of their acceptance or objection to the plan (11 U.S.C. 1327(a)). 

The doctrine of res judicata prevents relitigation of already adjudicated issues, requiring four criteria: (1) a final judgment from a competent court, (2) a judgment on the merits, (3) the same parties, and (4) the same cause of action. In the case of In re Young, the court recognized the confirmation order as a final judgment, with both creditor and debtor being parties to the confirmation process. The debtor had listed the creditor as secured, and the creditor did not participate in the confirmation hearing despite being notified. The court determined that the subsequent action regarding the enforcement of the automatic stay was related to the creditor's claim, reinforcing that the confirmation order binds any party who could have objected but did not.

Title Max is bound by the Debtor’s confirmed Chapter 13 plan, which lists a debt of $5,825. Title Max received notice of the confirmation hearing scheduled for December 21, 2015, yet failed to timely object, effectively forfeiting its rights to contest the plan. The Court's confirmation order precludes Title Max from later disputing the treatment of its claim, which is categorized as a secured claim under the confirmed plan at a rate of $5,825 with 5% interest, to be repaid through monthly payments of $160. 

The Debtor maintains both a right of redemption and a possessory interest in the vehicle in question, as he was in possession at the start of the case, and these rights were not extinguished after the sixty-day period outlined in 11 U.S.C. 108(b). Title Max claimed that the redemption price was $5,846.95 as of the maturity date and $6,425.91 as of December 1, which the Debtor does not dispute. However, the amounts listed in the Debtor’s Schedule D and the confirmed plan are lower than Title Max's claims. The Court references In re Young, indicating that the doctrine of res judicata prevents Title Max from objecting to the confirmed plan. Finally, the document discusses the nature of contingent claims, which depend on future events that may not occur, and compares relevant Alabama and Georgia laws regarding pawn transactions, noting similarities in statutory interpretation.