Atlantic Coast Airlines v. Cook

Citations: 857 N.E.2d 989; 2006 Ind. LEXIS 1079; 2006 WL 3501260Docket: 49S02-0505-CV-253

Court: Indiana Supreme Court; December 6, 2006; Indiana; State Supreme Court

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In an interlocutory appeal before the Indiana Supreme Court, the case involves appellants Atlantic Coast Airlines, Delta Airlines, and Globe Security Services, Inc. against appellees Bryan L. Cook and Jennifer L. Cook, regarding a claim for damages due to negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court, led by Justice Rucker, emphasizes that under Indiana’s modified impact rule, claimants must prove direct physical impact from negligence to recover for emotional distress. If the physical impact is minimal or the evidence weak, the court will scrutinize the emotional distress claims to ensure they are not speculative or exaggerated.

The incident occurred on February 8, 2002, when the Cooks were at the Indianapolis International Airport for a flight to New York City. During boarding, they observed a passenger, Frederic Girard, whose erratic behavior raised security concerns. Girard had been detained by security prior to boarding and exhibited alarming conduct, such as attempting to sit near the cockpit and smoking on the plane despite being instructed not to. Mr. Cook reported his concerns to the flight attendant and sought assistance from other passengers to manage the situation, but ultimately, Girard was allowed to remain on the flight. The court concluded that the emotional distress claimed by the Cooks was speculative, leading to the dismissal of their claim for damages.

Girard was instructed multiple times by a flight attendant to extinguish his cigarette but responded aggressively, shouting "Get back! Get back." Passengers, including Mr. Cook, intervened, prompting Girard to stomp and shout in French, mentioning terms like “World Trade Center,” “Americans,” and “New York City.” A Delta Airlines employee eventually persuaded him to sit, remaining with him for the flight's duration. The pilot diverted the flight to Cleveland, Ohio, where Girard was arrested, and the flight subsequently continued to New York City. The Cooks, recalling their fear from the incident and previous terrorist actions, filed a complaint in the Perry Township Small Claims Court against Delta Airlines, Atlantic Coast Airlines, and Globe Security Services, citing negligence and breach of contract, along with claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The small claims court ruled against them, leading to an appeal in the Marion County Superior Court. After discovery, the defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that federal law preempted the Cooks' claims, that their appeal was untimely, and that they were not entitled to damages under Indiana’s modified impact rule. The trial court partially granted and denied the motions, ruling that the Cooks' appeal was timely, their negligence claims were not federally preempted, and the claims were not barred under Indiana's modified impact rule. However, it found no breach of contract by Delta Airlines or Atlantic Coast. The defendants appealed, and the Cooks cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed some rulings and reversed others, concluding that the appeal was timely, the negligence claims were not preempted, the emotional distress claims were valid, and that there were material factual issues regarding potential contract breaches by Delta Airlines and Atlantic Coast. The Cooks waived review of the summary judgment on their negligence claims against Delta Airlines.

In Delta Airlines v. Cook, 816 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), Atlantic Coast sought interlocutory review of a trial court order, which was accepted by the Court of Appeals. Atlantic Coast complained that the court's opinion undermined the modified impact rule, leading to a rehearing that reaffirmed the original opinion. The court later affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment.

Atlantic Coast made three claims in its transfer petition: (1) the Cooks’ emotional distress damages claim is barred by Indiana’s modified impact rule; (2) the Court of Appeals incorrectly reversed summary judgment on the Cooks’ breach of contract claim due to lack of evidence regarding the contract and its breach; and (3) the Cooks’ negligence claim is preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals addressed the preemption issue, concluding that allowing an apparent security risk to board does not relate to an airline's services under the Airline Deregulation Act, thus affirming that federal law does not preempt the Cooks’ tort claims.

The court agreed with the Court of Appeals on the contract claim resolution but disagreed regarding the denial of Atlantic Coast’s summary judgment motion on the emotional distress damages claim. It reiterated the standard of review for summary judgment motions, emphasizing that the moving party must demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists, while the court accepts the nonmoving party's facts as true and resolves doubts against the moving party. Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress remain complex and contentious in legal discourse.

Jurisdictions generally apply various common law tests to evaluate claims for emotional distress. The 'physical injury' rule requires that emotional distress be accompanied by a physical injury. The 'zone of danger' rule allows recovery for plaintiffs who were not physically injured but were at immediate risk due to the defendant's negligence harming another. The 'bystander' or 'foreseeable bystander' test permits recovery for individuals who witness the injury of a close relative caused by the defendant's negligence. These tests aim to limit claims of emotional distress to prevent frivolous lawsuits. Indiana historically required a physical injury for emotional distress claims but modified this approach in 1991. The court ruled in Shuamber v. Henderson that a plaintiff experiencing serious emotional trauma from direct impact due to another's negligence could recover damages without needing a physical injury. This 'modified impact rule' was further clarified in Conder v. Wood, emphasizing that 'direct impact' relates to involvement in the negligent incident, and in Ross v. Cheema, where the court maintained that the impact must be 'physical' in nature, rejecting claims based solely on auditory distress.

The modified impact rule in Indiana requires a direct physical impact for emotional distress claims, but this impact does not need to cause physical injury to the plaintiff. Emotional trauma can arise independently of any physical injury resulting from the impact. Courts assess the sufficiency of the impact by determining if the alleged mental anguish is not speculative or exaggerated. Relevant cases include Bader v. Johnson, where a mother's physical changes during pregnancy met the impact requirement, and Alexander v. Scheid, where the destruction of lung tissue due to a physician's negligence was deemed sufficient for a claim. Additionally, Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms recognized ingestion of contaminated food as a direct impact, while Dollar Inn, Inc. v. Slone found that a hotel guest's injury from a hidden needle satisfied the emotional distress claim criteria. Some legal scholars advocate for abolishing the impact rule entirely, arguing it may unjustly deny recovery for genuine emotional injuries without physical impact. However, courts maintain that limiting recovery for negligently caused emotional distress is necessary to avoid excessive liability and ensure clear guidelines for litigation. Thus, Indiana's impact rule remains in effect, requiring proof of a direct physical impact from another's negligence.

An exception to the physical impact requirement for negligent infliction of emotional distress has been recognized, allowing claims where a plaintiff is sufficiently involved in an incident despite lacking direct impact. This is encapsulated in the bystander rule, which permits recovery if the plaintiff witnesses or arrives soon after the death or severe injury of a close relative due to the defendant's negligence. The Cooks do not claim the bystander rule applies, asserting instead that they experienced direct physical impact from the negligence of Atlantic Coast. They argue that inhaling smoke from a cigarette and feeling vibrations from stomping feet constituted actual physical impact, while they also propose the concept of "constructive impact," which has not been previously acknowledged in Indiana law. The Court declined to recognize "constructive impact" and noted that prior cases allowed emotional distress claims without physical impact under specific circumstances. The Cooks' claim is rooted in the duty of care owed by common carriers, which requires a high degree of care for passenger safety, and the airline could be liable for any failure in that duty if the Cooks were without fault.

Common carriers have a heightened duty of care, akin to a bailor's obligation to safeguard entrusted goods. This duty extends to ensuring the safety of passengers who depend on the carrier for their well-being. In the case of Alexander, the plaintiff sued her physician for not diagnosing lung cancer and sought damages for emotional distress. The defendants contended that the plaintiff did not meet the impact rule since a failure to diagnose does not constitute a physical impact. However, the court found that the actual impact stemmed from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to negligence, distinguishing this from mere stress responses experienced during turbulence, which lack the necessary physical change criteria.

The court evaluated whether the Cooks’ experiences—smelling cigarette smoke and feeling vibrations—met the direct physical impact requirement. It expressed skepticism about these sensations qualifying as physical impacts, describing them as minimal and tenuous. The court then assessed the Cooks’ claims of mental anguish, noting that neither sought mental health treatment. Mr. Cook recounted feeling anxious and upset during and after the flight, expressing ongoing concern about future flights. Mrs. Cook, who was pregnant, experienced abdominal pains attributed to stress but felt better upon returning home to her routine. Overall, the court considered the Cooks' emotional responses and their potential implications under the impact rule.

Mrs. Cook testified about her emotional state during and after a flight on February 8, 2002, describing feelings of extreme fear, stating, "I feared for my life. I thought I was going to die," which subsided once the flight landed. Despite having traveled four times since the incident, she reported persistent feelings of nervousness and being "bothered" by the experience. The court noted that the emotional distress experienced by the Cooks was transient and typical of many individuals in a post-September 11 environment. Citing legal standards, the court emphasized that emotional distress claims must involve severe distress that a reasonable person could not endure, considering both intensity and duration. The court found insufficient evidence to support that the Cooks' feelings of anxiety were anything but temporary and deemed further claims of emotional distress speculative. Consequently, the trial court's denial of Atlantic Coast's motion for summary judgment regarding emotional distress damages was reversed. However, the court affirmed the denial of Atlantic Coast’s motion concerning federal preemption and reversed the summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Coast on the breach of contract claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.