Paul McManus, convicted of murdering his wife and two daughters and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief after completing his direct appeal. The post-conviction court mostly rejected his claims but accepted his assertion of mental retardation, leading to the vacating of his death sentence in favor of life without parole. McManus had previously appealed his conviction, arguing his competency, but the Indiana Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Following his petition for post-conviction relief, the State sought summary judgment on most of McManus’ claims, which was partially granted, but later reversed before evidentiary hearings began. McManus filed an amended witness and exhibit list shortly after the discovery period closed, leading to a dispute over the admissibility of expert testimonies regarding his mental state.
Testimony revealed McManus' IQ scores varied over time—81 at age 11, 72 at age 14, 70 at age 30, and 78 at age 34. Despite scoring in the mentally retarded range in some areas, assessments using the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System II (ABAS II) indicated he did not meet the mental retardation criteria across key domains. The Vineland-II Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS II) showed mixed results, with scores indicating mental retardation in 'Communication' but varying results in 'Socialization.' The court ultimately directed judgment in favor of the State, upholding the vacated death sentence.
Dr. Olvera determined that McManus exhibited significant impairments in adaptive behavior, supported by co-worker testimonies indicating his ability to work extensively across three jobs, often 18-20 hours daily. He completed forklift training and passed a written test, allowing him to operate a forklift. Despite having learning disabilities, poor reading skills, and ADHD, which required special education, McManus graduated high school. Judge Brune recognized McManus' claim of mental retardation, leading to the vacating of his death sentence in favor of life without parole. McManus scored 2 in 'Functional Academics' and 5 in 'Community Use' on the ABAS II, with lower scores indicating mental retardation. His VABS II scores in 'Communication' were 21 and 21, while in 'Socialization,' he scored 71 and 54, with scores below 70 also indicating mental retardation.
The state appealed the decision, and McManus cross-appealed, presenting five claims, including one regarding mental retardation. Indiana law has allowed mentally retarded defendants to avoid the death penalty since 1994, but McManus raised his claim during post-conviction proceedings in 2005. The post-conviction court reviewed this claim under the precedent set by Atkins v. Virginia, which established a constitutional ban on executing mentally retarded individuals. The court needed to assess whether McManus preserved his claim despite not following the statutory procedures and determine if he met the criteria for mental retardation. Indiana statutes from 1994 required defendants to file a petition for mental retardation at least twenty days before trial and mandated evaluations to determine mental retardation status. Failure to adhere to these procedures resulted in waiver of the claim. The Atkins decision highlighted a legislative consensus against executing mentally retarded individuals without defining mental retardation or specifying compliance procedures, leaving those decisions to individual states.
Following the Atkins decision, states like Indiana faced challenges regarding the application of existing laws concerning the execution of mentally retarded defendants. Key questions included who could assert an Atkins claim, whether a defendant could raise such a claim after waiving state procedures, and if Atkins necessitated changes to state laws. The Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that its statutory scheme was consistent with Atkins, affirming that the ruling did not expand existing protections for mentally retarded defendants. Consequently, it ruled that defendants who failed to follow pre-Atkins procedures waived their right to challenge their mental retardation status post-Atkins.
In contrast, Indiana's statutory framework was found inadequate to meet constitutional standards, particularly the requirement that defendants prove their mental retardation by "clear and convincing evidence." This standard was deemed unconstitutional following Atkins, prompting a revision to Indiana's laws. McManus, who previously waived review under the original statutes, could then bring forth his mental retardation claim after the legal adjustments made in Pruitt, which aligned with Atkins.
The post-conviction court subsequently assessed McManus's claim, concluding he met Indiana's definition of a "mentally retarded individual," which necessitates proving both significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and substantial impairment of adaptive behavior before age twenty-two. The court's findings regarding McManus's intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior were factual and subject to a "clearly erroneous" review standard. For intellectual functioning, Indiana references standards from the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association, defining significantly subaverage functioning as an IQ score two standard deviations below the mean (typically an IQ of 70 or lower). While IQ tests are critical, they are not definitive; courts may consider additional evidence of mental capacity, though a low IQ score may still lead to a determination that a defendant does not meet the criteria for mental retardation.
Courts must evaluate whether a defendant is exerting full effort during IQ testing, as demonstrated in Pruitt, where a low IQ score was deemed inaccurate due to the defendant’s lack of effort. The trial court in Pruitt assessed the defendant’s work and school history, ultimately concluding he did not meet the intellectual functioning standard. In contrast, the post-conviction court's finding regarding McManus's intellectual functioning is unsupported and erroneous. McManus underwent five IQ tests, with three scores above the 70-75 cutoff, and the lower scores of 70 and 72 were influenced by factors such as lack of effort and mental health issues. Expert testimonies indicated that McManus does not fall below the threshold for mental retardation, with assessments suggesting his IQ is likely in the low 80s. Notably, behaviors consistent with ADHD were considered in evaluating his test performance. Despite the lowest score of 70 at age 30, experts agreed this score was likely suppressed due to anxiety related to his murder trial. Overall, the evidence supports that McManus’s intellectual functioning is above the classification of mental retardation.
Dr. Haskins assessed McManus, linking his learning disability and ADHD to executive functioning issues and two suppressed IQ scores. Dr. Dennis Olvera, who testified for McManus, stated he could not classify McManus as mentally retarded due to higher IQ scores from Dr. Haskins. Dr. Martin Groff, a state psychologist, reviewed McManus' IQ scores and also concluded he did not meet the criteria for mental retardation, noting that two scores were close to the cutoff but potentially underestimated due to factors like lack of effort and anxiety during testing. McManus' educational and work history indicated he was not significantly subaverage intellectually; he graduated high school, held multiple jobs, and was described as an excellent employee and father, effectively caring for his daughter with severe disabilities. The post-conviction court's finding of McManus' significantly subaverage intellectual functioning was deemed erroneous. Regarding adaptive behavior, the court found substantial impairment based on Dr. Olvera's testimony, but this conclusion was contested. Dr. Olvera performed one adaptive behavior assessment, and his employee conducted another, but the record suggests insufficient evidence to support the finding of substantial impairment in adaptive behavior.
The ABAS II test aligns with the AAMR definition by evaluating three domains: Conceptual, Social, and Practical. The scores from the ABAS II, which are prioritized due to Indiana's adherence to the AAMR definition, were derived from interviews with McManus' mother and three former employers, resulting in scores of Conceptual 82, Social 90, Practical 93, and a General Adaptive Composite (GAC) score of 88. None of these scores fell below one standard deviation from the mean, indicating no significant impairment consistent with mental retardation, as confirmed by Dr. Olvera. A defendant must demonstrate substantial impairment in at least one domain, which McManus failed to do according to Dr. Olvera's testimony.
Dr. Olvera also analyzed ten individual scores from the ABAS II, noting that only Community Use and Functional Academics were notably low, with the latter being two standard deviations below the mean. These lower scores were attributed to McManus’ learning disabilities and ADHD rather than mental retardation.
In addition, a second assessment, the VABS II, yielded lower scores from McManus' family members, which Dr. Olvera suggested might be influenced by their desire to portray him as less competent to assist him in avoiding the death penalty. The VABS II scores, particularly in communication, were significantly low, suggesting severe mental retardation, which contradicted other evidence of McManus' capabilities. His work history and the positive feedback from employers further indicated no significant adaptive impairment, ultimately leading to the conclusion that the ABAS II scores did not reflect substantial impairment in any of the assessed domains.
McManus demonstrated the ability to care for Shelby through feeding tubes and daily activities, indicating no significant adaptive behavior impairments. As a result, he does not meet the criteria for intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior under the Atkins standard, allowing the death penalty to remain applicable. The State challenged the post-conviction court's decision to permit testimonies from Dr. Olvera and Dr. Haskins, arguing procedural errors due to McManus’ late disclosure of Dr. Haskins as a witness. However, courts have broad discretion in discovery matters and the State did not show specific prejudice from this delay. The admission of the doctors’ testimonies was not deemed harmful to the State’s case, and the court's ruling on this matter was unlikely to warrant reversal.
McManus claimed incompetence at trial, impacting jury proceedings, but the post-conviction court deemed these claims barred by res judicata due to prior adjudication in his direct appeal, where the competency determination was not found to be clearly erroneous. Additionally, McManus asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately pursue his incompetence and investigate mitigating factors during sentencing. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, with courts generally presuming adequate representation. McManus incorrectly alleged that his counsel did not seek a competency hearing; the record shows that trial counsel made multiple motions for a mistrial based on competency, which the court ultimately denied, affirming McManus' competence to assist in his defense.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on McManus' motion for a mistrial, ultimately finding him competent to stand trial and denying the motion. McManus' trial counsel was deemed to have adequately represented him, as their actions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. McManus argued that counsel failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, specifically claiming a lack of investigation into his education, personal relationships, and mental impairments. However, the bulk of mitigating evidence had already been presented during the guilt phase, including testimony from mental health professionals and family members regarding McManus' background and challenges. Counsel believed the jury would retain this information for the penalty phase. The court noted that failing to duplicate previously presented evidence does not constitute deficient performance. McManus suggested that additional evidence concerning his educational history and issues such as ADHD should have been presented, but the record indicated that this information was already included in the trial. The presentation of mitigating evidence by trial counsel was substantial, and the post-conviction court found that the performance met Sixth Amendment standards. Additionally, McManus claimed his counsel faced a conflict of interest due to his father's diminishing financial support, which allegedly hindered the pursuit of a thorough mitigation investigation or change of venue.
McManus contends that Rothman breached his duty of loyalty by informing the trial court he would not return if a mistrial motion was granted. To prove a Sixth Amendment violation due to a conflict, a defendant must show that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest that adversely impacted their performance, as established in Woods v. State and Cuyler v. Sullivan. McManus fails to demonstrate that his trial counsel had such a conflict. While financial constraints are common among defense attorneys, McManus’ counsel adequately managed the case without compromising representation quality. Although funding sources can create conflicts, McManus has not evidenced such a situation in this instance. Rothman's alleged disclosure does not indicate a conflict, as he communicated transparently with the court, a standard expected from legal professionals. McManus' claims of conflict appear to be rehashed allegations without merit.
The court reverses the post-conviction ruling on mental retardation but affirms the remaining judgment for the State. Justice Boehm dissents, arguing that the majority fails to respect the trial court’s finding on mental retardation, which should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. He highlights evidence of conflicting testimony regarding McManus’ intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, noting that McManus’ IQ scores fall within the range qualifying for mental retardation. Despite explanations for low scores, the trial court must determine their validity. Boehm asserts that the evidence presented supports the trial court's determination on mental retardation, advocating for deference to the trial court’s findings as indicated by precedent. Justice Rucker concurs with Boehm's dissent.
