Spenser A. Krempetz appeals his life imprisonment without parole sentence following guilty pleas to murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and criminal confinement while armed. His appeal raises three issues: (1) whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court's two aggravators for the LWOP sentence; (2) whether the trial court properly weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances in imposing the sentence and enhancements; and (3) whether the sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The court affirms the sentence.
The facts reveal that Krempetz, his girlfriend Hannah Stone, and their friend Aaron McDonald devised a plan to rob and kill Stone's mother, Barbara Jo Keim, due to personal grievances. On August 4, 2005, they executed their plan: Krempetz and McDonald hid while Stone lured Keim to the door. Once inside, Krempetz tackled Keim, and McDonald, armed with a handgun, aided in binding her. They forced Keim to disclose her ATM details, then drove her to the credit union, where they attempted to withdraw cash. After obtaining $200, the trio took Keim to a cornfield, where Krempetz shot her in the head, subsequently splitting the stolen money with McDonald. All three were arrested shortly after and charged with multiple felonies.
The State sought life imprisonment without parole for Krempetz, citing three aggravating factors: intentional killing during a robbery, murder while lying in wait, and hiring someone to kill (Ind. Code. 35-50-2-9). Krempetz pleaded guilty without a plea agreement in March 2006. During sentencing, the trial court found that the State established two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt: the intentional killing in the course of a robbery and the murder committed while lying in wait. Krempetz argued the evidence was insufficient to support these aggravators, particularly claiming that the murder occurred after the robbery was completed. The trial court did not find sufficient evidence for the third alleged aggravator of hiring another person to kill. Krempetz received a life sentence without parole, a consecutive 45-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, and a 20-year sentence for criminal confinement. Krempetz is appealing the decision, and the court has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a). The standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence aligns with the standard for criminal convictions, focusing on whether substantial evidence supports the aggravators. The trial court's findings are compared to previous cases, such as Davis v. State, to contextualize the sufficiency of evidence regarding the aggravating factors.
The defendant fatally strangled the victim with wire after moving her away from a campsite, resulting in a death sentence for two counts of murder due to aggravating circumstances. On appeal, the defendant contended that the murders were not committed "while committing the underlying felony of child molesting," arguing that the molestations were completed before the murders. The court rejected this narrow interpretation of "while," asserting that the phrase indicates a continuous chain of events. It concluded that the murders and underlying felonies were closely linked in time, place, and continuity, treating them as one continuous transaction.
The defendant, Krempetz, argued that the time and place disparity in his case prevented a finding that the killing occurred during the robbery. He claimed that the robbery was complete when the money was taken from the victim's account at the ATM. However, legal precedents indicate that a robbery is not complete until the property is carried away, and asportation continues as the perpetrator leaves the scene. The court found that the robbery and homicide were part of a continuous transaction, as the money was not secured until after the victim was shot and Krempetz accessed her debit card for more funds.
Additionally, the trial court noted Krempetz’s actions after the murder, such as using the victim's debit card and taking her belongings, further establishing the continuity of the crime. Consequently, the court determined there was sufficient evidence to support that Krempetz intentionally killed the victim while committing robbery. Lastly, the aggravator of "lying in wait" was defined as involving elements of watching, waiting, and concealment with the intent to kill or inflict harm.
Krempetz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lying in wait aggravator with two claims: 1) the brief duration of hiding in the stairwell did not constitute 'waiting,' and 2) there was no connection between the murder and the lying in wait, as the time lapse diminished the nexus. The first claim is rejected; lying in wait does not require a specific duration if it demonstrates a state of mind akin to premeditation or deliberation. The court found Krempetz’s actions were premeditated, as he and his accomplices devised a plan knowing Mrs. Keim would not willingly open her door, necessitating Krempetz to hide and wait. The evidence supports this finding. For the second claim, Krempetz cites Ingle v. State, where the concealment did not contribute to the murder due to the substantial time lapse and the defendant’s departure from hiding before the crime. However, the court clarifies that Ingle does not imply that a time lapse alone negates a lying in wait charge. Other cases affirm that concealment must be used as a direct means to attack the victim, a standard met in Krempetz's situation despite the timing of his concealment.
Concealment as a method of attack creates a direct connection between the act of waiting and the subsequent violence against a victim, as established in Ingle and supported by case law. The evidence suggests that Krempetz concealed himself to ambush Keim, demonstrating intent to kill, which justifies the conclusion that he was lying in wait during the act of murder. Krempetz’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence are therefore unsubstantiated.
Regarding sentencing, life without parole adheres to the same statutory standards as the death penalty. The state must prove at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing such sentences. The trial court must also establish that any mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravators. Krempetz claims the trial court erred in weighing these factors, particularly for his enhanced sentences for conspiracy and confinement, but recent legal amendments indicate that trial courts are not required to explicitly weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances under Indiana's sentencing statutes. As a result, claims of improper weighing of these factors are not subject to review.
Krempetz’s arguments regarding his non-capital convictions are rejected, as Indiana’s capital sentencing scheme imposes stricter requirements. For a life without parole sentence, the trial court must detail each mitigating and aggravating circumstance, including the factual basis for these findings, and demonstrate that these factors were weighed in determining the sentence. The court must also conclude that the sentence is suitable for the offender and the crime. In this case, the trial court found multiple mitigating factors but assigned them minimal weight, concluding they did not outweigh two significant aggravators. The court emphasized the brutality and premeditation of the murder. Although Krempetz had no prior criminal history, this was discounted due to his admitted drug use, which the court viewed as a disregard for the law, and because he committed additional crimes after the murder, including theft. The trial court's decisions regarding the weight of mitigating factors are afforded great deference and are only overturned if there is a manifest abuse of discretion, which was not found in this instance.
The trial court determined that Krempetz had an impaired mental condition, citing mitigating factors such as extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the murder and substantial impairment in appreciating the criminality of his actions due to mental illness or intoxication, as defined by I.C. 35-50-2-9(c)(2), (c)(6). Testimony from Dr. Paul Yoder, a clinical psychologist, diagnosed Krempetz with multiple disorders, including Bipolar I disorder and Schizoaffective Disorder, and indicated he experienced severe mood swings and possible hallucinations.
In assessing mitigating circumstances, the trial court considered various factors: the extent of Krempetz’s inability to control his behavior, his overall functioning limitations, the duration of his mental illness, and the connection between his mental condition and the crime. Ultimately, the court assigned minimal weight to the impaired mental condition, noting the lack of credible testimony linking his mental state to the murder, Krempetz's ability to function daily, his acceptance of full responsibility by pleading guilty, potential self-induced mental conditions due to substance use, and evidence indicating he was in control of his faculties during the crime.
Krempetz also presented additional mitigating factors, including his age at the time of the crime, experiences of childhood sexual abuse, exposure to domestic violence, and external facilitation by others. The trial court acknowledged these factors but again assigned them minimal weight, reasoning that Krempetz was an adult at sentencing, did not use his past as an excuse, found no connection between substance use and the murder, and determined that facilitation by others did not mitigate his actions in the crime. The trial court's findings were upheld without error.
Krempetz had the opportunity to prevent a crime but chose not to intervene. The trial court evaluated the mitigating factors he presented, determining that they were outweighed by aggravating factors, specifically intentional killing during a robbery and murder while lying in wait. Krempetz's request to revise his life without parole (LWOP) sentence, along with a forty-five-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder and a twenty-year sentence for armed criminal confinement, was based on the claim of inappropriateness under Indiana law. He argued that his girlfriend was the primary instigator of the crime and emphasized his youth, lack of prior offenses, remorse, mental health issues, and history of domestic violence.
However, the court found that Krempetz's arguments did not significantly impact the nature of the offense, which was a planned and brutal execution of a defenseless victim. The court also noted that Krempetz's statements showed personal accountability and indicated manipulative behavior on his part. Consequently, the court concluded that neither the nature of his crimes nor his character warranted a revision of his sentences, affirming the trial court's judgment.
