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Hopkins v. Frazier (In re Tews)
Citation: 502 B.R. 566Docket: Bankruptcy No. 12-41300-JDP; Adversary No. 13-08017-JDP
Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho; November 25, 2013; Us Bankruptcy; United States Bankruptcy Court
Plaintiff R. Sam Hopkins, as Chapter 7 trustee, initiated an adversary proceeding against Defendant Joshua Frazier to avoid a postpetition transfer of a 2007 Puma Travel Trailer from Debtors Oney and Kirstyn Tews to Frazier. On June 15, 2012, the Debtors signed a handwritten bill of sale, transferring ownership of the Trailer to Frazier for $10,500. However, on September 12, 2012, Debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and at that time, they were still the registered owners according to the Idaho title certificate. The title was mailed to Frazier on September 26, 2013, after the Debtors obtained a lien release, but Frazier was unaware of the bankruptcy filing. He subsequently registered the title in Utah, listing himself as the owner. Frazier claimed to have made repairs to the Trailer but failed to file an affidavit itemizing those repairs by the agreed deadline. The Trustee argues that since the Debtors remained listed as owners on the title at the bankruptcy filing, the Trailer became part of the bankruptcy estate, allowing him to avoid the later transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) and recover the Trailer under § 550(a). Frazier counters with two defenses: he asserts that the equitable defense of recoupment should apply and contends that a lien on the Trailer at the time of the Debtors’ bankruptcy, which allegedly exceeded its value, precludes the Trustee from recovering the transfer or the Trailer’s value under § 550. A bankruptcy estate is established upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, encompassing all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the case's commencement, as outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). This estate includes both tangible and intangible assets, with the determination of property interests relying on state law, as per Butner v. United States. In Idaho, vehicle ownership is governed by Title 49 of the Idaho Code, specifically § 49-503, which mandates that no rights to a vehicle are acquired without a certificate of title issued in the buyer's name, emphasizing that ownership is determined exclusively by the name on the title. Regarding postpetition transactions, Section 549(a) allows a trustee to avoid property transfers that occur after the bankruptcy case begins and are not court-authorized. The burden of proof for validating such transfers lies with the transferee, while the trustee must demonstrate that a postpetition transfer took place. The purpose of § 549 is to enable the trustee to reverse specific transfers that, regardless of their impact on the estate, can be deemed avoidable. Moreover, § 550(a) allows the trustee to recover the property or its value from the initial transferee if a transfer is avoided under § 549. Recoupment is an equitable doctrine allowing for the "netting out" of debt from a single transaction, functioning as a defense linked to the transaction underpinning a plaintiff's claim. The court clarified that recoupment involves establishing a demand related to the same transaction solely to reduce the plaintiff's claim. In this context, it was agreed that the Idaho certificate of title for the Trailer was in the Debtors’ name when they filed for bankruptcy on September 12, 2012. Under Idaho law, vehicle ownership is determined by the name on the certificate of title, which means the Trailer became part of the Debtors' bankruptcy estate at that time. Frazier, who claimed to have purchased the Trailer for $10,500 prior to the bankruptcy filing, did not have enforceable rights to it since he had not received a certificate of title listing him as the owner. The transfer was legally ineffective until the new title was issued. Since Frazier did not demonstrate that the title transfer was authorized by the court or applicable code, the Trustee established that an avoidable postpetition transfer of estate property occurred. Frazier's assertion of recoupment was rejected because the transaction, completed postpetition with the title transfer, resulted in no mutual claims remaining between the parties, thus eliminating the basis for recoupment. Frazier contends that the Trustee cannot recover the Trailer under 550(a) due to a lien on the vehicle that allegedly exceeded its value at the time of transfer, arguing there was no equity for the bankruptcy estate. This defense is rejected as there was no evidence presented regarding the lien amount at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. Under sections 549 and 550, the Trustee is permitted to recover postpetition transfers regardless of whether they deplete the bankruptcy estate. The Court concludes that an unauthorized postpetition transfer occurred, and Frazier did not validate the transaction. Therefore, the Trustee is entitled to recover the Trailer for the estate's benefit, with counsel for the Trustee instructed to submit a judgment form, which Frazier's counsel will approve. Frazier also claimed the Court lacked constitutional authority to adjudicate the case and raised a venue challenge since he resides in Utah. However, he waived the venue defense during the pretrial conference and subsequently withdrew the objection to the Court's authority after reviewing past decisions. The Court confirms it has the constitutional authority to adjudicate this action and that the parties consented to this authority. Frazier's late introduction of a recoupment argument just before trial is noted as problematic, and there remains ambiguity in legal interpretations regarding whether recoupment is an affirmative defense or a counterclaim. The Court highlights the absence of evidence regarding a payment related to the case, as the relevant check is not in the record. Recoupment must be pleaded in a defendant’s answer to avoid waiver, as per Civil Rule 8(c)(1) and Rule 7008(a). Affirmative defenses must be explicitly stated in response to a pleading according to Civil Rule 13(a)(1) and Rule 7013. A compulsory counterclaim must be included if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim. Notably, failures to plead recoupment in the answer result in waiver, as seen in case law, including In re Wade Cook Fin. Corp. and In re Nat. Lumber Supply, Inc. Although Frazier's late recoupment defense was waived, the Trustee responded to it, and the court chose to consider it for resolving the Trustee’s claim. The court is guided by Idaho law, as both parties assert its relevance; however, it notes a lack of clarity in Utah law regarding ownership presumption based on a vehicle title certificate. Idaho law will be applied due to insufficient evidence of Frazier's expenditures for repairs after possession, preventing him from benefiting from the lien for good faith transferees under 550(e)(1) related to property improvements.