The Indiana Supreme Court case involves the League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc., and the League of Women Voters of Indianapolis, Inc. as appellants against Todd Rokita, Indiana Secretary of State, as appellee. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment claiming the Indiana Voter ID Law violates the state constitution. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling the Voter ID Law compliant with constitutional provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, prompting the Indiana Supreme Court to grant transfer, vacating the appellate opinion and assuming jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, stating the case presents only facial challenges to the Voter ID Law's constitutionality. It clarified that the legislature holds the authority to mandate photo ID for voter identification at polling places, thus the plaintiffs' request for relief was denied. Importantly, no individual voter claimed the law hindered their voting rights, and the court noted that future as-applied challenges by voters affected by the law remain viable. Additionally, the court referenced a previous federal court ruling, which upheld the Voter ID Law against challenges citing violations of federal and state constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs seek a court declaration that the Indiana Photo ID Law violates Articles 2, Section 2 and 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. Their challenge, while distinct, draws parallels to past litigation involving Indiana Democrats’ claims against a legislative apportionment plan. The Voter ID Law mandates that voters presenting themselves in person on election day must provide government-issued photo identification, applicable for both primary and general elections, but not for absentee ballots. Exceptions exist for individuals in state-licensed facilities and provisions for indigent voters or those with religious objections to photographs, allowing them to cast provisional ballots under certain conditions. The law does not require photo ID for voter registration, and the state provides free ID to eligible voters.
The plaintiffs originally filed their state court action in June 2008, which was dismissed, prompting this appeal arguing constitutional violations. They seek a general nullification of the law but do not assert individual claims regarding its application. Their allegations include that the law has deterred voting, resulted in uncounted votes in specific elections due to lack of ID, and created barriers for individuals who lost or forgot their ID. The plaintiffs emphasize that the law imposes "extra-constitutional requirements" that discourage participation in elections.
The allegations presented do not warrant a declaration that the State is prohibited from requiring voters to identify themselves with photo ID at the polls. While some allegations could potentially provide specific voters with individualized relief, such claims have not been made in the plaintiffs' complaint, which focuses solely on the facial unconstitutionality of the Voter ID Law without seeking exemptions for particular individuals. The plaintiffs argue that the legislature lacks the authority to impose photo ID requirements for three main reasons:
1. The Voter ID Law constitutes an unlawful 'qualification for voting' that violates the Indiana Constitution, which limits qualifications to those specified in Article 2, Section 2.
2. The Law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by exempting absentee ballot voters from its requirements, thereby granting unequal privileges among citizens.
3. The Law similarly violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by exempting voters residing in state-licensed care facilities.
The plaintiffs assert that voting is a fundamental right for all eligible voters as outlined in Article 2, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution. They contend that the Voter ID Law creates an unauthorized substantive voting qualification, is not a registration law as permitted by Article 2, Section 14(c), and lacks uniform application to all voters. Relevant provisions of the Indiana Constitution emphasize the principles of free and equal elections and outline voter eligibility criteria.
The plaintiffs argue that the Indiana Voter ID Law imposes a new substantive voting qualification, which they claim is not authorized by the Indiana Constitution. This argument was previously addressed and rejected in federal litigation, where Judge Barker's ruling was upheld by the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. The court stated that preferring alternative voting procedures does not constitute a constitutional violation and emphasized the Indiana Legislature’s authority to set regulations for qualified voters, provided they are not excessively burdensome. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the Voter ID Law violates Article 2, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution.
While federal court interpretations of Indiana law do not bind state courts, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents parties from relitigating issues previously determined in federal court. However, as the current plaintiffs were not parties to the federal case, this doctrine does not apply. The plaintiffs argue that the legislature cannot alter constitutionally established voting qualifications, claiming the Voter ID Law imposes property qualifications and exclusionary conditions on eligible voters. They primarily reference the historical case of Morris v. Powell, which involved a statute requiring voter registration and property tax verification that effectively disenfranchised certain voters. The Morris Court questioned whether the legislature could impose additional obligations not mandated by the Constitution on specific voter classes.
The Court determined that the legislature did not have the authority to mandate property ownership for voter eligibility and deemed the statute requiring special registration for voters absent from Indiana for six months as "unreasonable and not impartial." It emphasized that registration laws must be fair, uniform, and reasonable, allowing all eligible voters a genuine opportunity to vote. The Court highlighted that while it supports measures to ensure election integrity, it cannot uphold laws that conflict with the state’s fundamental laws.
The plaintiffs argued that the Voter ID Law, which requires a government-issued identification card with an expiration date and photograph, constitutes an unconstitutional qualification to vote, imposing unnecessary burdens on voters. In contrast, the defendant defended the Voter ID Law as a necessary regulation to ensure fair elections, citing that it does not change voter qualifications but reinforces them as per the Indiana Constitution's provisions for free and equal elections. He contended that the requirements are valid and reasonable means to uphold the qualifications in Article 2, Section 2, distinguishing it from a previous case, Morris, where invalidation stemmed from the imposition of extra-constitutional qualifications.
The defendant referenced Simmons v. Byrd to argue that Article 2, Section 2 does not exhaustively define voting impediments. He noted historical changes in voter qualifications and the legislative requirement for voter registration, asserting that the removal of the registration clause in the 1921 amendment does not invalidate registration requirements set forth by statutes. The Simmons case primarily addressed the legality of statutes mandating voter registration before participation in elections.
The Court in Simmons affirmed the voter registration provisions under the Indiana Constitution, which mandates that elections be "free and equal." It highlighted a precedent from the Illinois Supreme Court, underscoring the legislature's duty to ensure both the right to vote and the integrity of elections, as fraudulent votes undermine this principle. Despite the absence of a specific registration clause in Section 2, Simmons recognized an existing voter registration mandate in Section 14 of Article 2, which obligates the registration of eligible voters. The Court concluded that the legislature holds the authority to impose regulations on voter registration, provided they are reasonable and not excessively burdensome.
Simmons reiterated the General Assembly's responsibility to establish a uniform voter registration system, while also clarifying that its previous decision in Morris should be understood in context—specifically, that it arose from the legislature's failure to create a comprehensive voter registration law, leading to discriminatory practices. The key takeaway from both cases is the necessity for reasonableness and uniformity in election regulations.
The Court distinguished between regulatory measures and substantive voting qualifications, asserting that the Voter ID Law's requirement for in-person voters to present government-issued photo identification is a regulatory requirement rather than a new qualification. It noted that voter qualifications pertain to citizenship, age, and residency, whereas the ID requirement serves to verify identity without altering the fundamental right to vote. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its review of the Indiana Voter ID Law, acknowledged that photo identification is an effective method for confirming voter eligibility and enhancing election integrity.
Justice Stevens endorsed the findings of the Commission on Federal Election Reform, which highlighted the necessity of safeguards against fraud and the importance of confirming voter identity. The Indiana Voter ID Law mandates photo identification for voting, deemed as an election regulation that must meet standards of uniformity and reasonableness under state law. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the law constitutes unconstitutional voter qualifications, noting that while the law exempts mail-in absentee voters and those in state-licensed care facilities, these exceptions do not compromise the overall uniformity of in-person voting requirements. The plaintiffs argued that obtaining the necessary identification could impose significant fees and hardships, but the court found that the provisions for acquiring a voter ID card, including guidelines from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, are reasonable. The Bureau is tasked with issuing identification cards to residents who meet specified criteria and has implemented measures, including an online document list and customer service support, to facilitate the application process. Overall, the court determined that the photo ID requirements are not so unreasonable as to violate constitutional standards.
The Bureau may allow exceptions or accept alternative documentation for applicants unable to obtain required documents. An interim identification card can be issued to enable voting while the Bureau verifies applications for permanent cards. Justice Stevens' assessment is echoed, stating that the Indiana Voter ID statute does not impose excessively burdensome requirements on voters and serves important interests in modernizing and protecting the electoral process. The procedural burdens introduced by the Voter ID Law are deemed not unreasonable, and the plaintiffs' facial unconstitutionality claims under Article 2 of the Indiana Constitution are rejected.
An academic study highlighted that in the November 2008 election, 1,039 provisional ballots were cast due to a lack of photo ID, with only 137 subsequently counted. Of 4,514,759 registered voters, 62% participated in the election.
Regarding the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution, the plaintiffs argue that the Voter ID Law discriminates by requiring photo ID for in-person voters but not for mail-in absentee voters, and by exempting certain voters in care facilities. The court refers to Collins v. Day, establishing that unequal treatment must relate to inherent characteristics distinguishing the classes, and that preferential treatment should be equally available to all similarly situated. Significant deference is given to legislative discretion in assessing compliance with Section 23.
The plaintiffs argue that the Voter ID Law breaches Section 23 based on three main points: (a) the photo ID requirement lacks a reasonable relationship to the inherent differences between in-person and absentee voters; (b) variations in photo ID requirements among in-person voters do not adequately reflect the distinctions among them; and (c) preferential treatment is not uniformly accessible to all voters. They contend that the law's requirement for photo ID for in-person voters, while not required for absentee voters, fails to justify the additional ID burden on in-person voters, as absentee ballots entail greater security measures. The plaintiffs assert that the distinctions between these voter classifications do not rationally justify the disparate treatment, emphasizing that the law's purpose is not critical under the Collins analysis. Instead, the focus should be on whether the different treatments are reasonably related to the inherent characteristics of the classes involved. They highlight that in-person voters can be verified by election officials, a factor that is not applicable to mail-in absentee ballots, where identification cannot be checked in person. This lack of personal verification for absentee voters further complicates the rationale for imposing stricter ID requirements on in-person voters.
In *Horseman v. Keller*, the court addresses the constitutionality of the Indiana Voter ID Law, specifically regarding mail-in absentee voters and residents of state-licensed care facilities. The plaintiffs argue that the absence of a photo identification requirement for mail-in absentee voters is unconstitutional, but the court finds that this exemption is justifiable given the distinct circumstances of these voters compared to those voting in person. The court rules that the law does not violate the Indiana Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The plaintiffs also contest the law’s provisions for voters in state-licensed care facilities, claiming it violates Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution by allowing these residents to vote without photo identification while imposing such a requirement on other seniors. They argue that the distinctions made by the law are not reasonably related to the different treatment of in-person senior voters and that the preferential treatment for care facility residents is unjustified.
The court notes that the plaintiffs seek to declare the entire Voter ID Law unconstitutional rather than just the exemption for care facility residents. However, the court deems the number of voters affected by this exception as minor and insubstantial, ruling it permissible under Section 23. It cites precedent that acknowledges the impracticality of achieving exact equality in legislation and supports the notion that legislation can be valid even with minor disparities.
Granting a special privilege for residents of state-licensed care facilities to vote at their residence without photo identification is deemed a minor variation that does not constitute sufficient disparate treatment to invalidate the law under Section 23. Judicial review must show considerable deference to legislative discretion, particularly when assessing the Voter ID Law's aim to enhance electoral integrity across diverse circumstances. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief, as the legislature has the authority to mandate photo ID for voters. This conclusion contrasts with the Missouri case, Weinschenk v. State, where the Missouri Supreme Court found a photo ID requirement unconstitutional due to its disproportionate impact on low-income, disabled, or elderly voters who faced financial and logistical barriers to obtaining ID. Indiana's Voter ID Law differs as it allows for free photo ID acquisition from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, suggesting that the challenges faced by Missouri plaintiffs may not apply in Indiana. The specific difficulties encountered by the Missouri plaintiffs included issues related to obtaining necessary documents and financial constraints.
Lack of a birth certificate hindered the ability of a plaintiff, born in Ohio, to obtain a necessary photo ID for voting, which was also an issue for another plaintiff from Mississippi who was unable to procure any birth record. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that requiring photo ID for voting is unconstitutional but were denied relief. The trial court's dismissal of their claims regarding the Indiana Voter ID Law was affirmed, but without prejudice to future specific as-applied claims. Chief Justice Shepard and Justices Sullivan and Rucker concurred, while Justice Boehm dissented, arguing that the primary issue was the severity of the voting burdens imposed by the law, as opposed to its perceived benefits. Boehm highlighted that the Indiana Constitution requires certain issues, such as voting qualifications, to be addressed through a constitutional amendment process rather than simple legislative action. He contended that the current law could not be imposed by a single session of the legislature without subsequent approval from both houses and the voters, emphasizing the need for a more deliberative approach in changing foundational voting rights.
The voter ID requirement is deemed an unauthorized qualification for voting under both precedent and the Indiana Constitution. The Constitution specifies only three qualifications for voting: U.S. citizenship, being at least eighteen years old, and residency in the precinct for thirty days prior to an election. This framework contrasts with the earlier 1851 Constitution, which imposed more stringent voting restrictions. Although voter registration is now constitutional, it does not provide a basis for implementing a voter ID requirement, as there is no constitutional provision that allows denying voting rights based on a lack of ID.
Historically, the voting qualifications have been amended multiple times, generally relaxing eligibility criteria and expanding voting rights. Notably, Amendment 3, adopted in 1881, granted the General Assembly the authority to require voter registration, a change necessitated by the need for explicit constitutional support due to earlier invalidations of amendments. The Indiana Constitution alone governs voter eligibility requirements and prohibits the legislature from adding qualifications beyond those specified in the Constitution. The courts have consistently upheld this interpretation, emphasizing that legislative qualifications cannot exceed those established in the Constitution. The majority opinion, however, views the voter ID requirement as a reasonable extension of the registration process.
Plaintiffs argue that certain eligible citizens face barriers in obtaining voter IDs due to recent restrictions aimed at national security, which may infringe on their voting rights. The Indiana Constitution emphasizes the importance of suffrage and the need for careful judicial consideration of voting-related legislation. While the legislature typically has discretion in creating classifications, any restrictions on voting are critically examined. The voter ID law is challenged as it allegedly imposes conditions on voting that exceed those permitted for voter registration, requiring strict scrutiny under state law. The court references a historical case, Simmons v. Byrd, suggesting that prior rulings on registration requirements may have set a precedent for more lenient standards, which should not apply in this context. The current voter ID law, enacted long after the state's constitutional provisions on voter registration, lacks a solid constitutional basis beyond the general authority to register voters. The plaintiffs assert that the law's provisions exceed the requirements necessary for registration. If proven, this could constitute a violation of the Indiana Constitution, granting plaintiffs the opportunity to present their case in court.
The case involves a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to state a claim, with the court accepting the allegations in the complaint as true. Plaintiffs argue that not all registered voters have valid photo IDs, which has resulted in some voters being discouraged or unable to cast valid votes. They provide examples of voters who, despite being allowed to cast provisional ballots without a photo ID, cannot complete the necessary steps to ensure their votes are counted. Additionally, some voters have been turned away due to lack of ID.
The plaintiffs assert that the process for obtaining a photo ID is complex and burdensome, particularly for individuals who have undergone name changes or were not born in hospitals. This complexity may disqualify eligible voters, violating the Indiana Constitution.
The court notes that the photo ID law cannot be justified as merely a registration requirement since aspects of the ID acquisition process do not effectively address voter fraud concerns. The requirements for obtaining a photo ID stem from regulations aimed at motor vehicle operators and have been extended for security purposes, rather than for electoral integrity. The law does not require a photo ID for voter registration, nor is one provided upon registration, and it is available to non-citizens and those under eighteen who are ineligible to vote.
Furthermore, the photo ID requirement is criticized as overinclusive and underinclusive: it imposes unnecessary burdens for voter registration while failing to tackle the significant potential for absentee ballot fraud, which is where instances of voter fraud have been observed in Indiana, rather than in-person voter impersonation. The record shows no evidence of in-person voter impersonation occurring in the state, and the court suggests that alternative measures could be implemented to verify residency for registered voters.
Utility bills and bank statements can be provided to verify voter identity, as some states do, or an affidavit from the voter can be used, as is the practice in Indiana. The majority's analysis of the plaintiffs' claim regarding the voter ID statute's violation of the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution is problematic. This Clause prohibits granting privileges to certain classes of citizens that are not available to all. The voter ID law allows some citizens to vote without a photo ID while excluding others, which raises constitutional concerns. The majority dismisses the plaintiffs' arguments as insubstantial due to the small number of affected voters, but even a few disenfranchised voters can influence election outcomes, as seen in the 2000 Florida presidential election. The record lacks sufficient data on how many voters are impacted by the law.
The importance of a fair electoral process necessitates equal access to voting for all citizens. A law that unjustly denies any group the right to vote can be challenged as invalid in its entirety, not just for those directly affected. The majority overlooks the claim that the voter ID requirement imposes greater burdens on certain citizens. A statute can be constitutional in general but unconstitutional in its application to specific individuals, which is relevant to claims under Section 23. An example illustrates that reasonable exclusions in a voting law can disproportionately affect those living far from polling places.
Finally, because the majority finds the law constitutional, it does not address the state's argument regarding the plaintiffs' standing to challenge the law. The author asserts that all citizens have standing to contest any statute that unconstitutionally restricts a voter's rights, emphasizing the collective interest in ensuring lawful elections where all eligible voters can participate.
The right to vote is characterized as a fundamental public right, enforceable under the public standing doctrine, as reaffirmed by the court in Cittadine v. Department of Transportation. The plaintiffs have presented sufficient allegations regarding significant barriers to exercising their voting rights, which allows their complaint to proceed past a motion to dismiss. The case should be remanded to enable the plaintiffs to substantiate their claims. Multiple legal briefs from various organizations, including the League of Women Voters, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, and others, support the appellants in this matter, emphasizing the importance of upholding voting rights.
