The “officially released” date on each opinion indicates its publication date in the Connecticut Law Journal or its release as a slip opinion, serving as the operative date for filing post-opinion motions and petitions for certification. All opinions are subject to modifications before their official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In case of discrepancies between advance release versions and later official versions, the latter is authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history are copyrighted and cannot be reproduced without permission from the Commission on Official Legal Publications.
In the case of DAVID TAYLOR v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 44665), the petitioner, a UK citizen convicted of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming violations of his procedural due process and equal protection rights due to his risk level assignment and classification as a public safety risk, which limited his access to rehabilitative programs. The habeas court dismissed the petition, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1. The dismissal of the procedural due process claim was upheld as the petitioner did not sufficiently allege a cognizable liberty interest under the stigma plus test; specifically, being labeled a public safety risk did not meet the stigma requirement, and the conviction itself likely caused any perceived stigma.
2. The court improperly dismissed the equal protection claim, where the petitioner adequately alleged differential treatment based on his alienage and citizenship. He claimed that U.S. citizen inmates had access to rehabilitative programs that he was denied, establishing a violation of his equal protection rights as alienage is a suspect classification.
3. The court also incorrectly dismissed the claim of cruel and unusual punishment related to COVID-19 management at the facility, as the petitioner sufficiently indicated that the conditions jeopardized his health due to preexisting conditions, and that the respondent was deliberately indifferent to the risks associated with inadequate social distancing and PPE enforcement.
The petitioner, David Taylor, appeals the dismissal of his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Superior Court in Tolland, which granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner claims violations of his constitutional rights, specifically regarding procedural due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the dismissal of the procedural due process claim but reversed the dismissals of the equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims, leading to a remand for further proceedings.
Taylor, a British citizen, is serving a 25-year sentence for murder at the Osborn Correctional Institution. He alleges he was incorrectly classified as a public safety risk, which has led to a false detainer score and has resulted in his denial of access to rehabilitative programs, injuring his reputation. He contends this classification violates his right to procedural due process.
In his equal protection claim, Taylor asserts he is unfairly restricted from accessing rehabilitative programs available to other inmates due to his nationality. His third claim under the Eighth Amendment argues that the respondent has shown deliberate indifference to his health risks associated with COVID-19, given his age and preexisting medical conditions, by not adhering to CDC guidelines for mask-wearing and social distancing.
The petitioner sought court relief to lower his detainer score to 1 and overall score to 2, enabling eligibility for community release and related programs. He argued for this adjustment based on his status as a low-risk offender, a future deportee with over 85% of his sentence served, and a positive institutional record. He emphasized his deteriorating health, age, and heightened COVID-19 risk. On September 14, 2020, the respondent moved to dismiss the petition, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of a protected liberty interest and the petition’s failure to state a valid claim for habeas relief. The petitioner opposed this, claiming jurisdiction was present due to alleged violations of his rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. A virtual hearing occurred on December 8, 2020, and on January 19, 2021, the court dismissed the petition. The petitioner subsequently filed for certification to appeal, granted on January 27, 2021, and later moved to reargue, which was denied. The appeal followed. It is noted that a habeas corpus writ serves to protect against unfair convictions, requiring the petitioner to allege illegal confinement or liberty deprivation to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Connecticut courts favor pro se litigants by liberally interpreting practice rules, yet petitions must conform to civil complaint standards. Claims not explicitly raised cannot be considered. The court’s interpretation of pleadings is reviewed plenarily, and Connecticut follows a modern trend to construe pleadings broadly.
The petition must be interpreted in full to fulfill its intended purpose and ensure fairness between parties. If the pleadings adequately inform the opposing party of the claims and issues without causing surprise or prejudice, the petition is not deemed insufficient for recovery. Practice Book 23-29, concerning motions to dismiss habeas petitions, parallels Practice Book 10-30 and 10-39 for civil actions. Courts must assess allegations in a habeas petition favorably towards the petitioner, considering all implicitly stated facts. The legal sufficiency of a habeas petition's allegations is a question of law subject to plenary review.
The petitioner argues that the court wrongfully dismissed his habeas corpus petition, asserting that his classification status allegations demonstrate a denial of due process regarding a protected liberty interest. The petitioner claims the allegations meet the "stigma plus" test, which would establish a cognizable liberty interest and invoke the court’s jurisdiction. However, to claim a denial of procedural due process, a prisoner must show a protected liberty interest was deprived without due process. The initial step involves determining if the petitioner has alleged such a liberty interest, which relates to the habeas court's subject matter jurisdiction. The "stigma plus" test, adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court, assesses whether a prisoner’s classification has stigmatizing effects and results in a punishment significantly different from typical criminal penalties.
An inmate raising a due process claim under the stigma plus test must allege both the falsehood of the stigmatizing classification and the negative consequences suffered due to that classification. In a relevant case, the court confirmed that the stigma plus test applied when the petitioner was wrongfully classified as a sex offender, leading to significant negative consequences. The court's analysis focused on whether the classification was wrongful and whether the consequences constituted a major change in confinement conditions. To successfully plead a stigma plus claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that the classification was wrongful, stigmatized them, and resulted in qualitatively different consequences from typical prison punishments.
In the current case, the petitioner argues that being labeled a public safety risk and assigned a specific classification score fulfills the stigma requirement, as these labels could harm his reputation. He contends that these classifications will lead to long-term negative effects on him and his family. However, the court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that these classifications were uniquely stigmatizing or comparable to being labeled a sex offender. The court noted that the risk level assigned appeared to be influenced by the petitioner’s status as a British citizen facing deportation after serving his sentence, rather than constituting stigma on its own. Given the petitioner’s conviction for murder, the court reasoned that the stigma likely stemmed from the conviction itself rather than the risk assessment. Consequently, the petitioner did not adequately allege facts supporting a claim of stigma under the stigma plus test, leading to the conclusion that he lacked a cognizable liberty interest for the habeas court to exercise jurisdiction, and the court correctly dismissed his procedural due process claim.
The petitioner argues that the court incorrectly dismissed his equal protection claim, asserting he has been treated differently from similarly situated prisoners due to his alienage and national origin as a British citizen. He claims this differential treatment has resulted in his exclusion from rehabilitative programs, reentry services, discharge planning, and community release. The respondent interprets the claim as a "class of one" argument since the petitioner does not identify as part of a protected class, asserting that he has not shown sufficient similarity to any comparator group. However, the court disagrees with this narrow interpretation, recognizing the petition as alleging discrimination based on alienage and national origin, thus qualifying for protected class status under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court emphasizes that the equal protection clause mandates that similarly situated individuals must be treated alike, while dissimilar individuals may be treated differently. The initial inquiry in an equal protection claim is to determine who is similarly situated regarding the government's action in question. If the law discriminates against a fundamental right or a suspect class, strict scrutiny applies; otherwise, the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose to survive scrutiny.
The federal constitution does not explicitly define suspect classes; however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes race, alienage, and national origin as such classifications. To establish an equal protection claim due to unequal law application, a plaintiff must demonstrate intentional discrimination and prove that the state acted with a discriminatory motive and effect based on impermissible classifications. Specifically, the plaintiff must show selective treatment compared to similarly situated individuals and that this treatment was driven by discriminatory intent.
In the current case, the petitioner alleges that he has been unjustly denied access to rehabilitative programs available to U.S. citizens solely because he is a British citizen. He claims that the application of statutes 18-81w, 18-81x, and 18-81z violates his equal protection rights, as he is similarly situated to U.S. citizen inmates who have access to these programs. The petitioner argues that these statutes burden him as a member of a suspect class, specifically due to his alienage and national origin. He asserts that he has only completed six programs during his incarceration, despite requests for more, and has been told he does not require further programs. The petition is deemed to sufficiently allege that the respondent's actions amount to intentional and purposeful discrimination against him based on his citizenship status.
The petitioner alleges that the respondent is failing to provide necessary reentry and discharge planning, using a detainer to restrict access to rehabilitative programs, which undermines the petitioner's reintegration into the community after a long absence. This conduct is claimed to contradict the objectives of modern corrections and is viewed as a form of punishment upon the petitioner's return to England. The petition asserts a violation of the right to equal protection, and the court's dismissal of this claim based on Practice Book 23-29 (2) and (5) was deemed improper.
Additionally, the petitioner argues that the court wrongly dismissed his cruel and unusual punishment claim, emphasizing the serious health risks posed by COVID-19 and the respondent's deliberate indifference. It is stated that while comfortable prisons are not mandated, inhumane conditions are prohibited under the Eighth Amendment, which requires humane treatment and sufficient medical care for inmates. Referencing Estelle v. Gamble, the excerpt highlights the government's duty to ensure adequate care for incarcerated individuals, asserting that failure in this duty results in unnecessary suffering that does not serve any penological purpose. To succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim regarding inadequate medical care, a prisoner must demonstrate both subjective and objective components of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
To establish a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must demonstrate two critical elements: first, the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious in objective terms; second, the government official must possess a culpable state of mind, characterized by deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference is defined as an official being aware of an excessive risk to inmate health or safety and consciously disregarding that risk. A mere failure to perceive a significant risk does not constitute a violation. The standard for deliberate indifference necessitates proof of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness.
In this case, the petitioner has presented sufficient allegations to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioner argues that the pandemic poses a serious health risk, particularly in institutional settings where close quarters facilitate virus transmission. He highlights his specific vulnerabilities, including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and other preexisting medical conditions that elevate his risk of severe complications from COVID-19.
The court acknowledges the seriousness of the COVID-19 threat, especially for incarcerated individuals, and concludes that the petitioner has sufficiently pleaded that his conditions of confinement are serious. Furthermore, the petitioner has alleged that officials acted with deliberate indifference by failing to implement adequate preventive measures, as mandated by CDC guidelines, including insufficient enforcement of personal protective equipment usage and social distancing protocols among inmates and staff.
The petitioner alleges that prison staff display a clear disregard for his health and safety by implementing a policy characterized by continual delay, denial, and deceit, exacerbating his already precarious health situation. The inquiry into claims of deliberate indifference focuses on the reasonableness of the commissioner’s response to the health risks presented. Courts assess this reasonableness based on measures taken in response to COVID-19, such as social distancing, mask usage, symptom screening, staff and inmate education, visitation cancellation, quarantining new inmates, and maintaining cleanliness. Previous case law is cited, demonstrating that courts examine whether prison staff adhered to health protocols to determine if there was deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates.
The determination of reasonable responses and recklessness is framed as a factual question for the trier of fact. While it remains possible that the petitioner may not produce sufficient evidence for his claims of cruel and unusual punishment, such uncertainty does not warrant a motion to dismiss. At the pleading stage, allegations must be interpreted favorably to the petitioner. The court finds that the petitioner has made sufficient allegations to support a valid claim for cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, the judgment regarding equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, while the judgment is affirmed on all other grounds. The petitioner, who represented himself initially, now has counsel for the appeal.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is subject to dismissal on several grounds: (1) it fails to state a claim for relief; (2) it presents previously denied grounds without new facts or evidence; (3) the claims are moot or premature; and (4) other sufficient legal grounds for dismissal exist. The petitioner filed an initial petition on July 15, 2020, followed by an amended petition on September 17, 2020, and a second amended petition on December 11, 2020, which is the operative petition under review for subject matter jurisdiction. The court assumes the facts alleged in the petition are true for jurisdictional purposes.
The respondent assigns each inmate a classification score from one (lowest risk) to five (highest risk), assessing risks and needs based on seven factors, one of which includes the presence of a detainer. The highest score from these factors determines the overall risk rating. The petitioner has a civil immigration detainer affecting his score. The detainer indicates the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's request for notification prior to the release of an alien for custody purposes. Additionally, the court did not address the petitioner’s equal protection claim, and typically, issues not considered in the habeas proceeding are not reviewed by the court.
A reviewing court may consider jurisdictional claims not previously raised or addressed by the trial court. The petitioner included an equal protection claim in his operative petition, but the court did not respond to it. After filing a motion to reargue, claiming the court’s oversight, the motion was denied. Despite this, the court addresses the equal protection claim due to comprehensive briefing on the jurisdictional issue and because it is based on undisputed procedural facts, thus not requiring factual review.
General Statutes § 18-81w(a) mandates the Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division to create a comprehensive reentry strategy for offenders supervised in the community, especially those released from the Department of Correction. The strategy aims to support victims' rights, protect the public, and facilitate offenders' successful transition by maximizing community supervision, addressing transition barriers, ensuring adequate criminal justice resources, identifying effective community-based services to reduce recidivism, and establishing employment initiatives through reinvestment of savings from reduced prison populations.
General Statutes § 18-81x requires a $350,000 annual transfer from the Department of Administrative Services' revenue for inmate pay telephone services to the Department of Correction for expanding educational and reentry programs.
General Statutes § 18-81z directs the Department of Correction, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Court Support Services Division to develop a risk assessment strategy for offenders. This strategy will involve a risk assessment tool for evaluating recidivism likelihood and identifying supportive programs for successful community reentry. It will utilize both static and dynamic factors and adopt a gender-responsive approach, particularly addressing female offenders' unique needs, potentially collaborating with educational institutions specializing in criminal justice and psychiatry for tool evaluation and customization.
On or before January 1, 2009, and annually thereafter, designated departments must report to the Governor and the judiciary committee regarding the strategy's development, implementation, and effectiveness. The respondent's appellate brief only addresses the due process and equal protection claims of the petitioner, omitting the cruel and unusual punishment claim. The petitioner amended his petition after the respondent's motion to dismiss, but the respondent did not object or amend their motion. The respondent claimed the petitioner’s COVID-19 claim was released due to a settlement in McPherson v. Lamont, but the court ruled it was not barred as the settlement was approved after the habeas petition was filed. The court acknowledged it had jurisdiction over the cruel and unusual punishment claim yet dismissed the entire petition without a specific rationale for that claim. The reviewing court found no justification for this dismissal without a merits hearing. The habeas court later confirmed it had considered the second amended petition when ruling on the motion to dismiss. Both parties analyzed the due process claim under the stigma plus test, which has not been extended beyond cases involving sex offender classification. The stigma plus test is conjunctive, so further consideration of the remaining elements is unnecessary. The petitioner’s claim regarding rehabilitative programs, which do not limit access to U.S. citizens, is framed as an equal protection violation specific to his situation. The respondent's argument that the petitioner is treated similarly to other inmates pertains to the proof of the claim rather than its sufficiency in alleging an equal protection violation.
A civil immigration detainer does not render the petitioner ineligible for rehabilitative programs such as reentry, discharge planning, and community release; rather, limitations stem from the respondent’s inmate classification system. The respondent's appellate brief does not address the petitioner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment related to COVID-19. Despite the absence of prior habeas corpus petitions granted on similar grounds in this jurisdiction, this does not negate the Superior Court's subject matter jurisdiction to consider such claims. The petitioner argues that the failure to enforce personal protective equipment protocols violated state orders and agreements related to public health. The court may grant relief on the petitioner’s equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims if substantiated, and has the discretion to provide remedies commensurate with constitutional violations identified.
