Jabari Bruton-Barrett filed a civil action against Gilead Sciences, Inc., alleging discrimination based on race and sexual orientation under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The case is currently before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where Gilead has moved to partially dismiss Bruton-Barrett's DCHRA and Title VII claims. The court has reviewed the motions and related documents, including the defendant's memorandum, the plaintiff's opposition, and the defendant's reply.
Bruton-Barrett, an African American and openly gay employee since December 2013, sought a promotion to a director position that was not publicly posted. He learned in January 2019 that the position was filled by a white heterosexual candidate, Patrick McGovern, without a fair application process. Following his complaint to Human Resources regarding racial discrimination, Bruton-Barrett discovered that McGovern held prejudiced views about him, stating he wanted a "non-black, non-gay" individual for the role. This revelation led Bruton-Barrett to assert that his qualifications were ignored due to discriminatory factors, resulting in unfair treatment regarding his job promotion, compensation, and employment conditions. He filed a charge of discrimination with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights in February 2020, which included an investigation and formal charge based on his claims.
On August 5, 2020, the DCOHR mandated mediation for the parties on September 24, 2020. However, on September 4, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the discrimination charge, claiming it was untimely. The plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint on July 12, 2021, asserting discriminatory non-selection for the Director of Corporate Contributions position in January 2019 under the DCHRA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The defendant moved to partially dismiss the DCHRA and Title VII claims on September 30, 2021. The plaintiff opposed the motion on December 20, 2021, and the defendant replied on January 10, 2022.
The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss requires that the complaint must state a plausible claim for relief, supported by sufficient factual matter. The court must interpret the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assume the truth of well-pleaded factual allegations, while not accepting conclusory statements or unsupported legal conclusions. The court may only consider the facts in the complaint, attached documents, and judicially noticeable matters. Additionally, if the plaintiff fails to address arguments in the defendant’s motion, those arguments may be deemed conceded. The defendant contends that the plaintiff's DCHRA and Title VII claims should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The plaintiff asserts that his claim of sexual orientation discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) is timely, having alleged that he only became aware of the sexual preference basis for the selection decision on March 28, 2019, while he had previously suspected racial animus on January 29, 2019. The defendant argues that both the race and sexual orientation discrimination claims are untimely, as the plaintiff did not file his administrative complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (DCOHR) within one year of discovering the alleged discriminatory act, specifically his non-selection for a position.
Before ruling on the dismissal of the DCHRA claims, the Court must establish its jurisdiction. The DCHRA necessitates an election of remedies, restricting individuals to either court or DCOHR complaints but not both. A plaintiff may only file a court suit after a DCOHR complaint if the DCOHR dismissed it on administrative convenience grounds or if the plaintiff withdrew the complaint before a probable-cause determination. The plaintiff has indicated that he filed a charge with the DCOHR, and the Court can only assert jurisdiction if either of the two exceptions applies. The plaintiff's complaint details two updates regarding the DCOHR charge: a mediation notice issued on August 5, 2020, and a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant on September 4, 2020, arguing the charge's untimeliness. The Court's ability to determine jurisdiction hinges on these developments.
The Complaint lacks information regarding the status of the plaintiff’s case with the DCOHR, failing to indicate whether the case was dismissed for administrative convenience or if the plaintiff withdrew the complaint prior to a probable-cause determination. Consequently, the Court requires supplemental briefing on the plaintiff’s election of remedies to assess its jurisdiction over the DCHRA claims, and temporarily denies the defendant's motion for partial dismissal concerning these claims.
Regarding the Title VII claim, the defendant argues the plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies with the EEOC, as there are no allegations of filing an EEOC charge or receiving a right-to-sue notice. The plaintiff has not countered this argument, leading the Court to conclude the plaintiff has conceded the point. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for filing a Title VII suit, and the defendant must prove the failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. If the defendant meets this burden, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate why dismissal should not occur. Failure to show proof of exhaustion by the plaintiff can result in dismissal of the Title VII claim.
The plaintiff's opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss does not address the Title VII claim or the argument regarding the lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies with the EEOC. As a result, the court determines that the plaintiff has effectively conceded this argument, given that the plaintiff is represented by counsel and failed to counter the defendant's claims. Citing precedent, the court notes that failure to respond to certain arguments allows those arguments to be treated as conceded. Consequently, the court grants the defendant's motion concerning the Title VII claim in Count II of the plaintiff’s Complaint. The court concludes by stating it will grant the motion in part and deny it without prejudice in part, with an order to follow.
