Matter of Clark v. Boyle

Citation: 2022 NY Slip Op 06316Docket: Index No. 70324/22 Appeal No. 16310-M-2177 Case No. 2022-02281

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; November 9, 2022; New York; State Appellate Court

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In the Matter of Clark v Boyle, the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously denied a petition filed by Darcel D. Clark, the Bronx District Attorney, seeking to prohibit the enforcement of two orders from the Supreme Court of Bronx County. The first order, issued by Judge Denis J. Boyle on January 28, 2022, allowed the prosecution of an adolescent offender, identified as respondent B.G., to proceed under CPL 722.23(1). The second order, from Judge Naita A. Semaj on March 21, 2022, denied the petitioner’s motion to prevent the transfer of the prosecution to Family Court under the same statute and sought a declaratory judgment interpreting CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i). 

The 'Raise the Age Law,' enacted in 2017, designates individuals aged 16 or 17 charged with certain felonies as 'adolescent offenders' and established a specialized youth part in Supreme Court to determine the appropriate forum for such cases. Specifically, if an adolescent offender is charged with a class A or violent felony, the presiding justice must hold a hearing shortly after arraignment to assess whether the prosecution has demonstrated significant physical injury or the use of a deadly weapon during the offense. If the court does not make this determination, the case must be transferred to Family Court unless the People can prove extraordinary circumstances to prevent such transfer.

The case involved a violent incident shortly after the New Year in 2022, where B.G., then 17, participated in an assault on a man at a subway station. The altercation began over noise from a party horn, escalating when B.G. and associates attempted to take the man's fanny pack, which contained valuables. Despite claims of the victim brandishing a firearm, he was unarmed. B.G. and others assaulted the man, captured on surveillance, resulting in severe physical harm. The proceedings were dismissed without costs, affirming the lower court's decisions.

A video captured BG searching a man's pockets and subsequently throwing him onto subway tracks. BG then jumped down to move the unconscious man away from the tracks. Bystander Ronald Hueston attempted to help the man and urged BG's group to leave, which they did. Shortly after, a southbound D train approached. Hueston waved his arms to signal the train but failed to return to the platform in time, resulting in him being struck and killed by the train. An autopsy confirmed Hueston died from being crushed between the train and the platform. The man BG attacked regained consciousness after the train stopped and was hospitalized for an arm fracture.

Judge Denis J. Boyle, during a retention hearing, determined that BG was not to be tried in the youth part and transferred the case to Family Court. He examined the undefined term "significant physical injury" in the statute by referring to its legislative history, concluding that it refers to an injury that is more than a bruise but less serious than disfigurement. Considering Hueston's death and the surviving victim's fractured arm, Boyle found the significant injury prong satisfied, while noting that minor injuries like swelling and bruising were not significant.

The judge then analyzed whether BG "caused" the significant injuries, emphasizing the distinction in the Raise the Age statute between accomplice liability and causation. He cited two Nassau County Court cases: People v J.H., where the court found the adolescent offender did not directly cause the victim's injuries, and People v E.B.M., where the court retained the case in Youth Part because each co-defendant was personally responsible for the victim's injuries. Boyle referenced legislative discussions indicating that prosecution was intended for those who directly caused significant injury, not merely those present during the assault.

Justice Boyle determined that BG did not cause Hueston’s death or the surviving victim's arm fracture under the Raise the Age Act. Hueston's death was deemed an 'intervening event' linked to his own actions and the train's appearance. The arm injury could not be conclusively attributed to BG, as multiple assailants inflicted various blows, making it impossible to pinpoint who caused the injury. Justice Boyle differentiated this case from People v J.H. by noting the nature of the injuries resulted from discrete actions by different participants rather than a collective effort.

Respondent Justice Naita A. Semaj denied the People’s motion under CPL 722.23(1)(d) to prevent the case from being moved to Family Court. Semaj concluded that no 'extraordinary circumstances' existed to warrant such a move, defining the term as applicable only in rare cases involving truly violent felonies. The court emphasized that BG’s actions, in the context of prevalent gun violence and confined spaces, did not meet this high threshold.

The court also dismissed claims that BG's conduct was heinous, noting video evidence showing the surviving victim was conscious when pushed onto the tracks and that BG attempted to assist him afterward. Hueston’s decision to jump onto the tracks was also considered. The Bronx County District Attorney seeks a writ of prohibition against these rulings, arguing that the findings on causation exceeded the court's authority and misapplied legal standards. A writ of prohibition is only applicable when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its powers, not merely for correcting legal errors.

The Court of Appeals emphasizes that a writ should only be issued in criminal proceedings when a court exceeds its jurisdiction in a manner that affects the legality of the entire proceeding, such as prosecuting a crime outside the geographic limits of the court's authority. Distinguishing between legal errors and abuses of power can be challenging, but abuses of power are identified by their overall impact rather than isolated errors. The petitioner asserts that the retention hearing court's interpretation of the Raise the Age Act deviates significantly from statutory text and precedent, particularly by improperly adding the word "direct" to the causation requirement, which led to the erroneous conclusion that another person's assistance insulated BG from liability. Additionally, the petitioner claims the decision to deny her motion to block removal to Family Court was based on unsupported factual findings, constituting an improper use of judicial authority.

However, the court finds that the petitioner’s objections reflect a disagreement with the legal interpretations and applications made by the two courts, which do not rise to the level of an excess of authority necessary for issuing a writ. The petitioner has not shown that the decisions in question compromised the legality of the proceedings. Furthermore, the court notes that the legislature intentionally did not allow for direct appeals from such decisions, and allowing collateral reviews based on nonreviewability would hinder the swift administration of justice. The People’s request for a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of "cause" in the statute and the claim of judicial abuse of discretion regarding "extraordinary circumstances" is also addressed. The court refrains from issuing the writ not because it agrees with the interpretations made, but rather due to the lack of legal basis for such an action, despite the potential merit in questioning the initial judge’s conclusions regarding causation. The term "cause" in the relevant statute remains unqualified by "direct," and no justification is provided for applying a different meaning in jurisdictional contexts than in criminal liability contexts.

A statement addressed whether defendants could be disqualified from removal to Family Court if they were merely present during the alleged offense. In the case of BG, he was not just a bystander but was significantly involved in the assault against the surviving victim. It was also suggested that someone who throws a person onto subway tracks should anticipate that a good Samaritan might risk their safety to help. Regarding the concept of 'extraordinary circumstances,' the excerpt questions what facts would qualify as such, particularly given the severity of the gang assault and the deliberate act of placing someone on the tracks. Ultimately, the request for a declaratory judgment was denied, as granting it would only provide an advisory opinion without immediate practical implications for the parties involved. The decision and order were entered by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, on November 10, 2022.