US Dominion, Inc. v. Herring Networks, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2021-2130

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; November 6, 2022; Federal District Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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US Dominion, Inc. and affiliated entities have filed a defamation lawsuit against One America News Network (OAN) and four other associated defendants, alleging that they disseminated false statements regarding Dominion's role in the 2020 presidential election. The defendants have sought to dismiss or stay the case based on the Colorado River doctrine or, alternatively, to transfer it to the District of Colorado. If those motions are denied, OAN and its executives, Robert and Charles Herring, request dismissal due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The court has denied all of these motions.

Dominion, a Delaware corporation with its main office in Denver, Colorado, provides voting systems to various governmental bodies. OAN, a cable news network owned by Herring Networks, Inc., operates primarily from California but also has a significant presence in Washington, D.C., where it maintains a bureau and studio. The Herrings are reported to exercise considerable control over OAN’s editorial content, particularly for critical stories.

Dominion's claims include a range of allegedly defamatory statements categorized under 25 headings, all suggesting that the 2020 election was compromised and that Dominion's voting machines were implicated. Specific examples of these statements include OAN segments that falsely asserted Dominion deleted votes for Trump and that its systems had experienced glitches favoring Biden. Notably, claims were made by OAN's correspondents, including Chanel Rion and Christina Bobb, as well as accusations from an individual named Joe Oltmann regarding a former Dominion executive's alleged admissions of election manipulation.

Oltmann made allegations against Coomer during an OAN special titled "Dominion-izing the Vote," which was subsequently re-aired twice in December 2020. Rudy Giuliani, on OAN, claimed Dominion was financially incentivized to support Biden and alleged that Dominion's voting machines were programmed to favor Biden by 2-5%. Giuliani further asserted that these machines were designed to enable cheating. Mike Lindell, CEO of My Pillow, also featured prominently on OAN, presenting several documentaries that included claims of foreign interference in the election through Dominion and other voting systems. Lindell specifically alleged that China hacked Dominion’s machines. In a May 2021 broadcast, Bobb emphasized that Dominion had full control over election equipment and criticized local officials for not verifying the integrity of the systems. Dominion cites these statements as defamatory, though the court notes that the absence of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim means it need not evaluate the sufficiency of these allegations at this stage. 

Dominion initiated this lawsuit in August 2021, while the defendants sought to dismiss or stay it, citing a parallel state court case involving Eric Coomer, who had previously worked for Dominion. The state case, filed eight months earlier, does not include Dominion as a party. The defendants also requested to transfer the case to Colorado or dismiss it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The legal standards outlined indicate that abstention from federal jurisdiction under the Colorado River doctrine is an exceptional measure, allowing federal courts to defer to state cases when appropriate, aiming for efficient judicial resource use and thorough issue resolution.

A court may transfer a case to another district for the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice, based on a discretionary, case-by-case assessment of convenience and fairness. The party requesting the transfer bears the burden of demonstrating its appropriateness. To counter a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present a factual basis for exercising jurisdiction over the defendant, which can be established by a prima facie showing from the pleadings, with any discrepancies favoring the plaintiff.

The Colorado River doctrine aims to prevent duplicative litigation between state and federal courts. Generally, the existence of a state court action does not preclude federal court proceedings unless "exceptional circumstances" are present. Defendants argue for a dismissal or stay under this doctrine, claiming that the cases involve the same parties and defamatory statements, thus requiring deferral to avoid conflicting judgments. In contrast, Dominion argues that the federal abstention doctrines, including Colorado River, apply only to equitable relief and not to damage claims, asserting that the cases are not parallel due to differing parties and issues, and that exceptional circumstances do not exist.

Dominion’s position is supported by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Quackenbush, which limits dismissal based on abstention principles to suits seeking equitable relief. The Court can only stay litigation, not dismiss it, in damage cases. Defendants contend that Quackenbush's application to the Colorado River doctrine is uncertain, but they fail to clarify its relevance. The Court finds that Quackenbush prevents dismissal under Colorado River, although a stay may be considered if exceptional circumstances are met. Dominion argues the cases are not parallel, which undermines the basis for deferral, and this threshold argument is supported by other courts that have adopted similar tests.

A court must first assess whether federal and state actions are parallel under the Colorado River doctrine, which requires that the same parties litigate substantially the same issues. The district court's decision to abstain from federal proceedings hinges on this determination. In evaluating the current case, it is concluded that deferral is inappropriate because the actions are not parallel; there is minimal overlap between the parties involved. The plaintiff in the Colorado case, Eric Coomer, is a former employee of Dominion and is not a party in the federal action. Only two out of fourteen defendants in the Colorado case are present in the federal case. Defendants argue that Coomer and Dominion are effectively the same entity due to statements made by Coomer, but the court finds this assertion unconvincing, noting Coomer's lack of affiliation with Dominion at present and that his lawsuit addresses personal grievances against OAN and others, rather than Dominion's interests. Additionally, even if Coomer and Dominion share identical interests, significant differences in the issues presented in each case exist. The Colorado case primarily focuses on allegations against Coomer related to the 2020 election, which do not encompass the broader issues raised in the federal action. Thus, the court concludes that deferral would unnecessarily delay the resolution of Dominion's claims. While the Court of Appeals has not explicitly defined a threshold test for parallelism in Colorado River cases, it typically evaluates various factors to determine whether exceptional circumstances warrant abstention.

Key factors for determining whether to defer jurisdiction to a state court include the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation, the order of jurisdiction between concurrent forums, the governing law, and the adequacy of the state forum in protecting party interests. Deferral requires that factors favoring it be exceptional, not merely more numerous than opposing factors.

1. **Inconvenience of the Federal Forum**: This factor does not favor deferral, as two defendants reside in Washington, D.C., and OAN operates there. Defendants fail to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying deferral based on inconvenience.

2. **Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation**: Mere duplication of efforts and potential inconsistencies do not justify deferral. The case here does not present exceptional risks of "abnormally excessive or deleterious" piecemeal litigation, as it is a standard scenario of concurrent lawsuits with overlapping issues and parties.

3. **Order of Jurisdiction**: Although the state action was filed first, it does not exhibit exceptional progress or circumstances that would favor deferral, as little significant development has occurred in the state case.

4. **Governing Law**: Defendants argue for Colorado law but do not establish that this factor supports deferral. The absence of federal law alone does not warrant abstention, especially when no complex or novel state law issues have been identified.

5. **Adequacy of State Court**: While the Colorado court is presumed to adequately protect interests, this fact alone does not justify deferring jurisdiction.

In summary, the analysis concludes that none of the factors demonstrate the exceptional circumstances necessary for deferral under Colorado River principles.

A state court's ability to hear a case does not suffice to override a federal court's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction. Defendants have failed to demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" necessary to justify deferral under the Colorado River doctrine. The Court concludes that federal deferral is inappropriate, as the factors favor exercising jurisdiction.

Regarding the motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the Court conducts a two-step analysis. First, it assesses whether the case could have initially been filed in Colorado. Defendants did not establish that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over them there, merely offering to stipulate to it, which does not satisfy the legal standard. Additionally, venue is not appropriate in Colorado since none of the Defendants reside there, and the events central to the claims did not occur in that state.

Second, the Court evaluates private and public interest factors for transfer. While the plaintiff's choice of forum usually holds weight, it is diminished when the plaintiff selects a "foreign" forum. However, in this case, there is a connection between the forum and the events at issue, as the claims arise from content produced in Washington, D.C. Defendants argue for deference to their choice of Colorado because of Dominion's headquarters and a related lawsuit there, but a defendant's choice is generally not prioritized in this context.

Ultimately, Defendants have not met their burden to justify the transfer, and both private and public interest factors do not favor moving the case. Hence, the motion to transfer is denied.

Defendants seeking to transfer the case bear the burden of proving that the convenience of their chosen forum outweighs the deference typically granted to Plaintiff's choice. They failed to meet this burden. Plaintiff Rion is a D.C. resident, and OAN conducts significant business in the District. The claims arose in the District of Columbia, where allegedly defamatory content was filmed and produced, with no conduct identified in Colorado that relates to the claims. Factors such as party and witness convenience also do not favor transfer, as key individuals and business activities are based in D.C. Although potential witnesses are dispersed nationally, neither forum has a clear advantage in terms of witness convenience. Evidence relevant to the case is primarily located in D.C., despite some evidence regarding Dominion's voting machines being based in Colorado. 

Defendants contend that Colorado law should apply, but since the case was filed in D.C., local choice-of-law rules apply, which would consider the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the dispute. Factors such as the location of injury and conduct causing the injury favor D.C., as the defamatory broadcasts originated there, while Defendants have no connection to Colorado. Both parties agree that the relationship factor is neutral. Consequently, it is equally plausible that D.C. law could apply. The public interest factors, including court congestion, offer mixed insights; while Colorado has a shorter median trial time, D.C. has a quicker disposition time.

Defendants have not demonstrated a local interest in Colorado that would outweigh the District of Columbia’s interest in adjudicating Dominion's claims, particularly as some relevant conduct occurred in D.C. Consequently, transfer is not justified for two reasons: Defendants failed to show that the District of Colorado is a proper venue for the action, and neither private nor public interest factors support transfer. 

OAN and the Herrings seek to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Federal courts have jurisdiction over defendants subject to the general jurisdiction of the local state court. If a D.C. court can assert jurisdiction over the Defendants, this court can as well. Dominion claims only specific jurisdiction, which requires an analysis of D.C.’s long-arm statute and constitutional due process requirements. Under D.C. law, personal jurisdiction is warranted if a defendant transacts business, contracts to supply services, or causes tortious injury in D.C. The statute has a broad interpretation aligning with the Due Process Clause, necessitating minimum contacts with the forum state. 

Dominion bears the burden to establish jurisdiction, with any factual discrepancies resolved in its favor. In a precedent case, the court found specific personal jurisdiction over OAN in a defamation claim due to its operations within D.C., including partnerships, office leases, and broadcasting activities. Dominion argues similarly, asserting that OAN's allegedly defamatory statements stem from its business activities in the District.

Dominion asserts that OAN operates a news bureau in the District of Columbia, where it produces and broadcasts programming, including the allegedly defamatory content. This establishes personal jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), which encompasses business transactions such as advertising and contract performance. Furthermore, personal jurisdiction aligns with Due Process standards, as the "transacting any business" clause is interpreted to meet constitutional requirements. Dominion claims that OAN caused tortious injury in the District through numerous defamatory statements, which, while causing nationwide harm, also impacted Dominion’s reputation locally, particularly among influential policymakers.

OAN argues that specific jurisdiction is lacking since Dominion's claims arise from broadcasts made in California, not from business activities in the District. However, Dominion counters that OAN conducted significant production activities related to the defamatory programming within the District, making its D.C. bureau the central hub for the content in question. OAN introduced a "newsgathering exception" argument during oral arguments, suggesting that its activities in the District were limited to news collection, thus avoiding personal jurisdiction. However, this argument is challenged by Dominion’s claims that OAN was actively involved in producing the defamatory content in the District, contrasting with cases where news gathering alone did not establish jurisdiction. OAN's actions were directed at residents within the District, further supporting the claim for personal jurisdiction.

SPLC's newsgathering efforts target a national audience, including residents of D.C. The court assumes, without making a definitive ruling, that the newsgathering exception applies to D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) and (3). The Herrings are subject to personal jurisdiction in the District due to their complete control over Dominion-related content at OAN’s D.C. bureau. Dominion claims that the Herrings personally approved and required the airing of false stories, referred to as ‘H stories,’ without fact-checking from the California editorial team. Charles Herring allegedly reviewed and approved final drafts of these stories and frequently visited the D.C. bureau to oversee operations. Robert Herring is identified as the "de facto news director," wielding significant influence over the newscast. Dominion's allegations suggest that the Herrings conducted business in the District, satisfying the requirements for personal jurisdiction under the District’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. Even if the Herrings did not directly make the allegedly defamatory statements, liability arises from their direction of third-party publications. The court denies the defendants' motions entirely, noting that the Herrings cannot invoke the corporate shield doctrine, as individual contacts made in corporate roles are still counted as relevant for jurisdiction. An order will follow this memorandum opinion, issued by Judge Carl J. Nichols on November 7, 2022.