Doe v. St. Stephen's Episcopal School

Citation: 382 F. App'x 386Docket: No. 09-41108

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; June 18, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

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John Doe, John Doe II, and John Doe III (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal a district court’s summary judgment favoring St. Stephen’s Episcopal School and associated parties, which dismissed their claims of breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, fraud, negligence, and vicarious liability on the grounds that these claims were time-barred. The Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by not applying Texas's discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel to extend the statute of limitations. St. Stephen’s cross-appeals the denial of its motion to respond to the Plaintiffs’ summary judgment response.

The appellate court affirms the district court’s decision, reviewing the summary judgment under de novo standards, which is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists. The record shows that James Lydell Tucker sexually abused the Plaintiffs from 1964 to 1968 while serving as the school's chaplain. In 1968, the Plaintiffs reported the abuse to the headmaster, who instructed them to remain silent. An investigation by the Diocese began in 2006 after the abuse was mentioned at a reunion, leading to the Plaintiffs filing the lawsuit in 2008. Although the Plaintiffs experienced various psychological issues related to the abuse, they were not diagnosed with PTSD until 2007 or later.

Texas law stipulates a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begins when a wrongful act results in legal injury. For minors, the statute is tolled until they reach eighteen. Since all Plaintiffs had turned eighteen by 1969, their claims would normally be barred by 1974 unless a tolling exception applies. The Plaintiffs assert that the discovery rule should apply because they were unaware of the psychological impact of the abuse. This rule tolls the statute of limitations when the wrongful act and resulting injury are inherently undiscoverable. While the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the discoverability of all sexual abuse cases, lower courts have indicated that the discovery rule does not uniformly apply in these instances.

In Doe v. Linam, the court determined that the discovery rule was inapplicable because the plaintiff was aware of both the abuse and his resultant emotional issues. Likewise, in Marshall v. First Baptist Church, the court held that reporting the abuse indicated the victim had "discovered the wrongful acts," negating the application of the discovery rule. It is established that to initiate a lawsuit, a victim does not need to link the abuse to subsequent psychological injuries or fully grasp the extent of their injuries, as affirmed in Adams v. YMCA. The nature of sexual assault as an intentional invasion qualifies it as an independent injury, separate from mental suffering, according to Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co.

In the current case, all Plaintiffs acknowledged discussing their molestation with others at least five years before filing the lawsuit and were aware of the abuse since turning eighteen. Texas law dictates that such knowledge and reporting preclude claims of the abuse being inherently undiscoverable. Although Plaintiffs argue that psychological suppression hindered their understanding of the abuse's ramifications, Texas courts have differentiated between cases of partial awareness and complete repression of abuse memories. The comparison of Placette v. M.G.S.L. and S.V. highlights this distinction. While Plaintiffs provided psychiatric affidavits on their psychological coping, the evidence did not substantiate that the abuse was inherently undiscoverable; they retained sufficient awareness to communicate about the abuse and function in daily life, including completing college and pursuing careers.

Consequently, the district court correctly ruled that the discovery rule did not extend the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claims. Additionally, Plaintiffs contended that fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel should toll the statute of limitations due to inaction on their abuse allegations by St. Stephen’s and Headmaster Becker. For fraudulent concealment to apply, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant knew of the wrongdoing, intended to conceal it, and actively did so. Equitable estoppel similarly requires proof of false representation or concealment of material facts, with the affected party lacking knowledge of the true circumstances.

Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations were rejected because they had knowledge of their abuse, as evidenced by their statements to others, indicating they were not deceived about their situation. The district court's decision to deny tolling under the doctrines of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel was upheld, resulting in the affirmation of summary judgment for St. Stephen’s based on the untimeliness of the claims. The court did not address the merits of St. Stephen’s cross-appeal. Plaintiffs waived issues related to their civil conspiracy claim due to failure to provide arguments in their briefing. The statute of limitations for civil conspiracy, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation is two years, while it is four years for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. These limitations are subsumed by the personal injury statute of limitations. Plaintiffs primarily relied on a case concerning latent occupational injuries, which is not applicable to sexual abuse claims. Testimonies indicated that the abuse was disclosed by Doe in 1969 and subsequently to various individuals, while Doe II and Doe III also revealed their experiences at different times.