Hetzel v. Lamas

Citation: 372 F. App'x 280Docket: No. 09-3043

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; March 24, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

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Michelle Hetzel appeals the District Court's denial of her habeas corpus petition following her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of Devon Guzman. Guzman was found dead on June 15, 2000, and local media extensively covered the case, labeling it a "lesbian love triangle" due to Guzman's relationships with Hetzel and another woman. Hetzel and her then-husband, Brandon Bloss, were charged in August 2000, leading to a series of approximately seventy-two articles published before their jury selection, which began on September 11, 2001, and was interrupted by the 9/11 attacks. Hetzel's motion for a change of venue, citing potential jury bias, was denied by the trial court. Ultimately, both Hetzel and Bloss were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. After exhausting state appeals, which included the Superior Court affirming the trial court's denial of the venue change, Hetzel filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Magistrate Judge recommended denial without an evidentiary hearing, and the District Court adopted this recommendation while allowing an appeal on the venue change claim. The appellate court noted that it must affirm the denial unless the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, as stipulated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

The case of Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008) addresses the standards for evaluating whether a state court's decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court distinguishes between an unreasonable application and an incorrect application of law, emphasizing that the focus should be on whether the state court's application was objectively unreasonable. It is presumed that state court factual findings are correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 

The right to a jury trial guarantees a fair trial by impartial jurors, although jurors need not be completely unaware of the case's facts. In cases with significant pretrial publicity, a change of venue may be constitutionally necessary if the publicity creates a presumption of prejudice that undermines the ability to conduct a fair trial. This presumption is rare and occurs only in exceptionally hostile environments.

To assess the impact of pretrial publicity on a defendant's right to an impartial jury, the courts consider the content, quantity, and timing of the publicity, as well as the voir dire record. The Pennsylvania Superior Court's denial of Hetzel's change of venue claim relied on a standard that presumes pretrial publicity to be prejudicial if it is found to be sensational, inflammatory, biased towards conviction, or linked to the defendant's prior criminal history or confessions.

A change of venue is not warranted unless the defendant demonstrates that pre-trial publicity was extensive, sustained, and pervasive enough to saturate the community, coupled with insufficient time for any prejudice to dissipate. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in evaluating Hetzel's claim for a venue change, found that while media coverage was voluminous, it was factual, not sensational or inflammatory. The trial court, after a thorough review, denied the motion but stated it would reconsider if jury selection indicated a compromised ability to empanel a fair jury. During jury selection, jurors who indicated fixed opinions were dismissed, and those selected affirmed they could remain impartial and base their verdict solely on trial evidence. The Superior Court upheld the trial court's decision, noting that the media coverage did not show extensive or pervasive prejudice, and that the articles primarily reported facts about the case without suggesting Hetzel's guilt or calling for her conviction. Hetzel's claims about opinion pieces did not sufficiently counter the presumption that the media coverage was objective. Overall, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the change of venue.

Hetzel's case is compared to Rideau and Irvin, but the nature of the media coverage is significantly different. Unlike Rideau, which featured a film of the defendant's confession likely influencing perceptions of guilt, Hetzel's case involved less compelling coverage. In contrast to Irvin, where extensive reports on his confession and criminal history were prevalent, Hetzel's media exposure was notably less intense. The interval between the peak media coverage in summer 2000 and the September 2001 trial suggests any potential prejudice likely diminished over time. Although 72 articles were published before the trial, only 24 appeared after January 1, 2001, resulting in an average of three articles per month leading up to the trial. During voir dire, while over two-thirds of potential jurors had encountered media coverage, only two expressed fixed opinions on Hetzel's guilt, both of whom were dismissed. This percentage (approximately 3%) is significantly lower than in Murphy and Patton, where higher percentages of jurors had preconceived opinions. Hetzel's claim that publicity regarding her lesbian relationships created bias was unsupported by evidence, as jurors did not indicate they could not remain impartial regarding her bisexuality. The court found no basis for presuming prejudice and upheld the Superior Court's determination that the media coverage was not extensive enough to necessitate a change of venue. Consequently, the District Court's denial of the habeas corpus writ was affirmed.