Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 15, 1813; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
A writ of error was filed in the case of Fairfax's Devise v. Hunter's Lessee, regarding an ejectment action that centered on interpreting treaties between Great Britain and the United States. The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled against the claims made under these treaties. The case established several key facts:
1. The late Lord Fairfax held title to the Northern Neck of Virginia, as detailed by a Virginia assembly act from 1736, which confirmed the legitimacy of his estate, based on charters from Kings Charles II and James II.
2. The initial letters patent granted land to Ralph Lord Hopton and others, which was later surrendered and re-granted to the Earl of St. Albans and others, with new privileges.
3. The grant included a specific description of the land and its resources, granting the patentees ownership in fee simple while imposing an annual rent to the crown and a share of mineral profits.
4. The patentees had the right to sell or transfer the land but were bound by a condition that required possession or improvement within 21 years to avoid forfeiture.
5. The last letters patent confirmed a sale to Thomas Lord Culpeper, who became the sole owner, and later, Thomas Lord Fairfax inherited this title.
These points encapsulate the legal complexities surrounding land ownership and rights derived from historical grants in Virginia.
In 1748, an act confirmed certain grants from the crown for lands within the Northern Neck, which were previously uncertain in boundaries, with the express consent of Lord Fairfax. The grantees were to hold these lands while paying rents and services to Lord Fairfax. A subsequent act in May 1779 declared previous royal reservations, including quit rents and conditions from land grants, null and void, establishing that lands granted would be held in absolute property without servile or feudal tenures.
From 1748 until his death in December 1781, Lord Fairfax operated an office for granting and conveying ungranted lands in the Northern Neck, issuing grants in fee and leases for lives or terms of years, all involving reserved annual rents and a clause for re-entry upon non-payment. He maintained this office throughout his life and received rents from these transactions.
Upon his death, Lord Fairfax owned approximately 300,000 acres in the Northern Neck, which he had granted to T.B. Martin under similar conditions; these lands were later reconveyed to him. Lord Fairfax, a Virginia resident, bequeathed all his lands in the Northern Neck to Denny Fairfax in his will, subject to Denny taking the name and arms of Fairfax, which he complied with. Denny Fairfax, however, was a native British subject who never became a U.S. citizen and resided in England throughout his life, including during the Revolutionary War, until his death between 1796 and 1803.
Lord Fairfax, at his death, had a nephew named Thomas Bryan Martin, a citizen of Virginia and the younger brother of the devised heir, whose mother, a sister of Lord Fairfax, remained a British subject. The land in question, part of the Northern Neck territory, is identified as "waste and ungranted," never having been escheated to the Commonwealth of Virginia or subjected to inquest. It was included in a patent dated April 30, 1789, granted to David Hunter (the plaintiff's lessor) under a land office treasury warrant issued on January 23, 1788. Hunter has always been a citizen of Virginia and possessed the land prior to the ejectment action. The case references the definitive treaty of peace (1783) between the United States and Great Britain, as well as various Virginia acts, including provisions against future confiscations and regulations regarding British property during the conflict, emphasizing the need for reciprocal treatment based on the actions of the British sovereign.
An act passed in May 1779 addresses escheats and forfeitures concerning British subjects, stating that property previously sequestered was at risk of waste. It allows for the immediate sale of such property, benefiting former owners or the public, and repeals prior provisions that suspended escheat and forfeiture laws. All property owned by British subjects at the time of the act is vested in the commonwealth, with real estate treated as escheat and personal estate as forfeiture. The act outlines procedures for inquests of office, assigns duties to local sheriffs in the Northern Neck, and defines British subjects as those who were subjects of the British crown and resided outside the U.S. as of April 19, 1775, without joining the U.S. or its government.
Subsequent amendments in October 1779 refine procedures for legal proceedings involving British subjects. Additional acts in May 1779 and October 1785 establish the appointment and duties of escheators in counties, specify proceedings on inquests, and impose a twelve-month waiting period after inquisition for the sale of lands seized by the commonwealth. An act in 1785 extends these provisions to the Northern Neck counties.
Moreover, an act from October 1782 addresses the collection of quit rents in the Northern Neck, stipulating that these rents be held until the right of descent is established and future rents paid into the public treasury, relieving local inhabitants from claims by the proprietor. Lastly, an act from October 1782 ensures that land entries made with local surveyors in the Northern Neck are legally valid until the assembly adopts new regulations regarding this territory.
An act from October 1785 mandates the preservation of land records for the Northern Neck, previously kept by the late proprietor, in the register's office to ensure all land title records are centralized. It allows for the issuance of grants for surveys based on entries made during the proprietor's lifetime and subjects unappropriated lands in the Northern Neck to the same regulations as other unappropriated lands in Virginia. Additionally, it exempts landholders in that district from composition and quit rents.
The document also references a 1779 act regarding citizenship, which was later repealed, and mentions prior acts concerning land and slaves, including provisions for escheated properties.
The Plaintiff's legal representatives argue that Lord Fairfax owned an absolute estate in the ungranted lands at his death, with Denny Fairfax, as devisee, retaining this estate without confiscation. They assert that the peace treaty safeguarded Fairfax's estate from confiscation and confirmed his title, which was further recognized in a 1794 treaty. The defense claims the patent for the disputed land is invalid as it violates both the peace treaty and Virginia statutes intended to uphold its terms, thus conveying no legitimate title to the Defendant. The Plaintiff's arguments are supported by specific case law references.
The estate vested in Denny Fairfax, who held it until the treaty of peace, despite being an alien enemy. The law permits an alien to take property by purchase but not by descent, and there is no distinction in this regard between alien enemies and friends. Fairfax held a fee simple estate, subject to the sovereign's right to seize it. The Plaintiffs' title hinges on the estate having vested in Fairfax; otherwise, it could not escheat to the commonwealth. Common law principles dictate that the crown can only seize property through formal means, and while an alien may take property, they cannot hold it against a sovereign's legal claim. An alien can initiate a common recovery, but they cannot be considered a tenant of the freehold unless the estate vested in them.
If an alien becomes a denizen after purchasing property, that property can descend, indicating that the estate must have remained with the alien from purchase to denization. When an alien and a subject purchase jointly, the estate survives the alien's death unless a formal office is found, implying that the estate remained with the alien until death. The case law confirms that until an office is found, nothing vests in the king, and no such office or equivalent act took place before the 1783 treaty of peace. The 1782 legislative act showed no intent to confiscate and indicated a reluctance to disturb Fairfax's title. Therefore, the treaty maintained the freehold in Fairfax and released the forfeiture, with subsequent legislative actions unable to affect the title.
The treaty's fifth article called for Congress to recommend the restoration of confiscated estates, while the sixth prohibited further confiscations. "Confiscation" encompasses any property taken due to forfeiture, including escheat. The fifth article's recommendation for restoration suggests that confiscated estates could not be reclaimed purely on the grounds of alienage. The absence of protective provisions for restored estates in the treaty implies that the prohibition against future confiscations should uniformly apply to alienage arising from involvement in the war.
Denny Fairfax became an alien by supporting Great Britain during the war, resulting in his land being subject to confiscation under Virginia law. The timing of confiscation—whether immediate or future—was irrelevant. Any confiscation act by Virginia afterward would be void under the treaty's stipulations. The 1794 treaty is declaratory, not creating new provisions. Lord Fairfax’s title to unappropriated lands stemmed from a royal grant, allowing him to dispose of lands but not occupy them; this right transferred to Virginia upon the revolution. When Lord Fairfax sought to use land, he would grant it to others and reclaim the title in a manner resembling crown deeds.
The defendants argue there is a distinction between alien friends and enemies regarding landholding rights, asserting that in the latter case, rights reside with the commonwealth without the need for an office. The main issue concerns the treaty's impact on Denny Fairfax's devise. The treaty's prohibition on future confiscations is claimed to remove the alienage disability. However, Virginia's title was already complete prior to the treaty, and Denny Fairfax’s potential title would have vested in the commonwealth upon his death, without any beneficial interest passing to him.
An office serves only as a means to establish title, not to confer it, and an alien cannot sell property, holding only a bare possession. The treaty does not safeguard the title against confiscation, which implies a new right taken from individuals for public use. The term "confiscation" refers specifically to punitive actions by state governments against individuals based on their wartime roles, not to properties escheated due to alienage.
Upon Denny Fairfax's death, if the title was unprotected by the treaty, it passed entirely to the Commonwealth, rendering the Fairfax title extinct. The Commonwealth, bound by its deed, could not contest Hunter's title. Under the 1794 treaty, Denny Fairfax retained only what he possessed at that time, which was likely a life estate with a reversion to the Commonwealth, leading to the Commonwealth obtaining a fee simple upon his death. The treaty aimed to protect individuals who became aliens due to the separation of countries, not those who were already aliens when their estates were established; thus, it did not extend protections to estates acquired by descent for aliens. The court deliberated whether Lord Fairfax held ownership of the waste and unappropriated lands in the Northern Neck through royal grants or merely held seignorial rights. The royal charter explicitly granted full ownership and use of the land to the grantees and their heirs, indicating a complete dominion over the property. Objections suggesting that the charter's language limited this ownership to mere selling rights were dismissed, as the requirement for royal consent for alienation did not restrict the initial grant's terms. The clause was intended to allow alienations without incurring a fine, which was earlier required for such transactions.
Lord Fairfax possessed absolute property rights over the contested land at his death, supported by his charter and intermediate grants, which conferred complete seizin and possession, regardless of any acts of ownership. The absence of adverse possession and the land's status as waste and unappropriated further implied that legal seizin passed with the title. This view aligns with prior Virginia court opinions in related cases.
The title inherited by Denny Fairfax through Lord Fairfax's will is examined, noting that he was an alien enemy at the time of inheritance. Under common law, an alien may acquire land through purchase (not descent) and can hold dominion until the land is seized by the state, despite an alien's inability to maintain a real action for land recovery. No distinction exists in this regard between alien friends and enemies during wartime, where the property of alien enemies is subject to confiscation.
Denny Fairfax's capacity to inherit as a devisee is confirmed, despite arguments suggesting he held the title merely as a trustee for the commonwealth. It has been established that an alien can take lands by devise, with the title not automatically vesting in the commonwealth upon Lord Fairfax's death. The idea that Denny Fairfax's title was momentary and merely a trust for the commonwealth has been debated but remains unproven.
The capacity of an alien enemy is argued to be equivalent to that of an alien friend regarding property rights. It is established that an alien's title through purchase remains intact until an office found occurs, as the alien retains the freehold, necessitating a significant act to demonstrate the freehold has transferred. An office is required to provide the necessary notoriety for the sovereign to claim title. Upon an alien's death, the sovereign automatically seizes the property since an alien cannot have inheritable blood, preventing the freehold from being in abeyance. However, if the alien's land is occupied, the king must take action to assert possession.
Applying these principles, Denny Fairfax had a defeasible title through a devise, and the law conferred seizin to his title since the possession was either vacant or not adverse. The commonwealth could not grant valid title until it had established its claim through an inquest of office, which did not occur during the war or thereafter. Thus, the grant made in 1789 was deemed erroneous and ineffective. The argument presented claims that the common law requirements for inquests and seizure were overridden by statutes, making the 1789 grant valid. Additionally, it is contended that the death of the devisee during the suit automatically vested the freehold in the commonwealth without an inquest, retroactively confirming the original Plaintiff's title. The legislature potentially had the authority to enact such a provision, provided there were no treaty constraints.
An inquest of office is deemed essential for addressing issues related to alienage, serving as a safeguard against frivolous lawsuits by litigious grantees. Virginia courts have particularly emphasized its importance to prevent harassment of landowners and to allow them to contest alienage claims. This mechanism also ensures public awareness regarding land ownership and deters potential corruption from speculative interests influencing legislation. Common law should not be considered repealed without clear statutory language indicating such intent.
The analysis of relevant acts reveals that during the war, the disputed lands were not vested in the commonwealth by any public law. The acts of 1777 and 1779 are dismissed as they pertain only to estates held by British subjects at the time of enactment and do not affect subsequently acquired estates. The 1782 Act, Chapter 8, acknowledges possible descent of land ownership to alien enemies and mandates that quit rents be held until rights of descent are clarified, suggesting a sequestration for wartime rather than a seizure due to alienage. The subsequent 1782 Act, Chapter 33, allows for the validity of land entries made with surveyors under the former proprietor, Lord Fairfax, explicitly reserving decisions on land disposal for the future and maintaining the conditions set by Fairfax’s regulations. No additional legislation on this topic was enacted during the war.
The act of 1785, ch. 47, raises complexities regarding its interaction with the treaty of peace. Section 4 acknowledges that, following the death of the late proprietor, there has been no mechanism for individuals who made land entries under act 1782, ch. 33, to acquire titles. It mandates that the Commonwealth issue grants for such entries akin to procedures for other unappropriated lands. Section 5 extends these regulations to unappropriated lands in Northern Neck, asserting that caveats should be handled similarly to other Commonwealth lands. Section 6 abolishes all future quit rents.
The original Plaintiff's patent stemmed from section 5, with arguments suggesting that the act of 1785 effectively appropriates the disputed lands and nullifies Denny Fairfax’s title due to alienage, transferring ownership to the Commonwealth. However, this argument is rejected, as it would imply a legislative overreach contrary to common law principles. It is noted that if the legislature mistakenly believed the lands were already owned by the Commonwealth, this does not rectify the situation. The court emphasizes that in cases involving penal consequences, it is inappropriate to infer broader legislative intentions than those explicitly stated.
The court expresses skepticism regarding the notion that grants from section 4 would convey more than the Commonwealth’s existing inchoate rights, which require formal legal action to finalize. Ultimately, it concludes that the patent issued under section 5 was flawed and conveyed no valid title, as it implies the Commonwealth could grant rights to lands it did not possess, which would contravene principles against maintenance outlined by common law.
Grants for lands in the Northern Neck were to be issued similarly to those in other areas of Virginia, contingent upon the commonwealth having full title and seizin at the time of the grant. The legislature's intent is reinforced by the 1779 act concerning escheators, which outlines procedures for lands seized by the commonwealth, explicitly prohibiting grants until twelve months after an inquisition's verdict is returned. This act indicates that lands acquired through escheat should not be treated the same as those for which the commonwealth has a clear title. The 1785 act extended these regulations to Northern Neck counties, suggesting the legislature believed the commonwealth had possession of Lord Fairfax's vacant lands, potentially due to the alien enemy status or prior acts that may have vested property in the commonwealth. However, this belief was mistaken and should not adversely affect third parties.
If the previous interpretation is incorrect, the title acquired by Hunter in 1789 is limited to an inchoate title that requires further legal action to be perfected. The discussion also indicates that the treaty of peace's provisions regarding confiscations do not need to be deliberated, as the 1794 treaty adequately protects Denny Fairfax's title, affirming that British subjects holding lands in the U.S. can maintain their rights as if they were natives, allowing for the transfer of ownership without alien designation.
Denny Fairfax, through a devise, held a fee simple title to the land and was in complete possession at the suit's commencement in 1791. His possession continued uninterrupted until and after the 1794 treaty, which confirmed his title and protected it from forfeiture due to alienage. The Commonwealth of Virginia had the power to transfer the estate to itself or a grantee but failed to do so, resulting in its inchoate title becoming void due to the treaty's operation. The issue of Fairfax's death during the suit is rendered moot by the treaty, which enabled his heirs to inherit without the commonwealth claiming the estate. The Court determined that the judgment of the Virginia Court of Appeals should be reversed, affirming the District Court of Winchester’s judgment with costs.
Justice Johnson dissented, raising critical questions about the ability of an alien to inherit land and the necessity of an inquest of office to divest the alien's interest for the state's benefit. He argued that the treaty of peace did not impact the case as it focused on preventing confiscations related to actions during the war, not addressing the general common law principle barring aliens from holding real estate. Johnson noted that the treaty of 1794 should be interpreted broadly to encompass cases of rightful possession or legal title affected by alien disability existing at the treaty's date, questioning the rights of the devisee in this context.
The capacity of an alien to take land as a devisee is fraught with complexities and lacks definitive case law. Generally, an alien may acquire land through purchase but cannot hold it, and if wrongfully dispossessed, lacks the legal remedy to contest eviction. This paradox highlights the fragility of their rights. However, it is acknowledged that the king's bailiff cannot interfere with an alien purchaser until an office is found. In contrast, if an alien acquires property by operation of law—such as through descent or dower—the king can act immediately without such a finding.
The legal interpretation of whether an alien devisee qualifies as a purchaser or an involuntary recipient of land by law is debated. Chief Baron Gilbert posits that a devise to an alien is void, whereas Mr. Powell argues that the alien acquires the property as a purchaser. Gilbert’s view suggests that a devise operates under statute, thus casting the interest on the alien by law. However, Powell's perspective is favored based on the principle that an alien’s ability to receive property should not limit the owner's choice in alienation.
This reasoning supports the notion that an alien can be a competent party to a contract, allowing conveyances to divest the grantor's interest, thereby potentially leading to escheat. The argument extends to the classification of devisees as purchasers, and there is contention regarding a grant made to Lord Fairfax, which is tied to the state’s assertion of sovereignty post-independence. The resolution of this matter hinges on the interpretation of the deed of cession and will be determined by the Court’s decision.
The document outlines a legal analysis regarding the nature of sovereignty and property rights following a treaty. It asserts that the entity in question lacks full sovereign powers, as it has no legislative, judicial, or executive authority. While some royal prerogatives transferred to the state upon independence, the underlying interest in the land remained with the grantee. However, this interest was deemed insufficient at the time of the 1794 treaty, as it was a minimal legal claim that was extinguished by a state grant to the plaintiff.
The validity of this grant is challenged only by the absence of an inquest of office prior to it, raising the question of whether the state could assert rights over property without such an inquest. The author believes the state could do so, supported by precedents where legislative power has dispensed with the requirement of an inquest, particularly in cases of confiscation without prior conviction.
Further, it is noted that if the facts presented in pleadings do not legally support the judgment, the error becomes evident for review under the specific section of the judiciary act. Importantly, when cases are brought to this Court, it is essential to investigate the title of the parties involved before applying any law or treaty, ensuring that the Court's decision reflects the rights of the parties at the time of judgment. A ratified treaty, even if post-dating a lower court's decision, must be considered in the Court's ruling.
